Germany ドイツ Vol.3(corporations, etc. 民間企業など)

(All the below links and tweets other than the below tweets in Japanese are in English.)

少し時間が経ちましたが、標記につき以下貼っておきます。

Germany Vol.16 (Pharmaceutical, Agricultural, Personal Care, Medical – Bayer, Merck, Nivea, Schwarzkopf, Fresenius)
Germany Vol.15 (Gas, Engineering – Linde, etc.)
Germany Vol.14 (Engineering – ThyssenKrupp)
Germany Vol.13 (Chemical – BASF)
Germany Vol.12 (Conglomerate / Manufacturing – Bosch)
Germany Vol.11 (Conglomerate / Manufacturing – Siemens)
Germany Vol.10 (Software – SAP)
Germany Vol.9 (Finance)
Germany Vol.8 (Finance)
Germany Vol.7 (Finance)

Germany 外交関係など
https://twitter.com/WSjp_insight/status/1154245381997260800

cf.
European Union Vol.6 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.6: DE, AT, etc.)
European Union Vol.8 (Commission, Council, Parliament)


https://twitter.com/JPN_PMO/status/1093418763838341120
https://twitter.com/JPN_PMO/status/1092649287685529600


https://twitter.com/JPN_PMO/status/1053143934308741120


https://twitter.com/ijazawan56/status/1150570791169396738


https://twitter.com/en_germany/status/1146267325252997123

https://twitter.com/Lufthansa_JP/status/1151325912559968257
https://twitter.com/Lufthansa_JP/status/1148426812273414147
https://twitter.com/GermanyinJapan/status/1153208313108037632


https://twitter.com/GermanyinJapan/status/1146239318639333376


https://twitter.com/GermanyinJapan/status/1144761649221386242


https://twitter.com/GermanyinJapan/status/1144396747889872896


https://twitter.com/GermanyinJapan/status/1142220716722544640


https://twitter.com/arukikata_book/status/1151699158484447233


https://twitter.com/realdoitsu/status/1138931915485065217
https://twitter.com/harubobo_nikki/status/1135011148586033152
https://twitter.com/tabimarusho/status/1134596021399375873

2019 G20 Osaka summit G20大阪サミット Vol.4

The below tweets regarding the summit and its sidelines are in English.

6月30日23時50分頃までの標記関連ツイートを取り急ぎ貼っておきます。
Here are the tweets through around 23:50, June 30 (JST).

U.S.-China


https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144825859196370944
https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144804299009957894
https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144802616846630912
https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144800880320901121


https://twitter.com/AFPphoto/status/1144583727827128321

Japan-Russia


https://twitter.com/AssjaEvg/status/1143544681315393536

Miscellaneous
https://twitter.com/g20org/status/1144895864424452096
https://twitter.com/g20org/status/1144934808126029824


https://twitter.com/zerowasteeurope/status/1144182046740365313


https://twitter.com/anticorruption/status/1145266218711965696

2019 G20 Osaka summit G20大阪サミット Vol.3

Most of the below tweets regarding the summit and its sidelines are in English.

Updated at around 23:30, June 30, 14:30, July 1, and 10:00, July 4.
下記14ヶ国及びEUに係る6月30日早朝までの標記関連ツイートを、取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。 To be continued.
Here are tweets including those concerning the below thirteen countries and the European Union through early morning, June 30 (JST).

South Africa
https://twitter.com/CyrilRamaphosa/status/1144846758108749825


https://twitter.com/PresidencyZA/status/1144454717113683968

Argentina

Brazil


https://twitter.com/BrazilWTO/status/1143466917610577921

Mexico


https://twitter.com/el_reportero/status/1144556874110513153

Indonesia


https://twitter.com/Trinhnomics/status/1144196256429817856

South Korea

European Union


https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144863067894796288
https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144878167846526976
https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144848218980831233
https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144538429620985856
https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144513214027358209
https://twitter.com/EUCouncil/status/1144264316495028224
https://twitter.com/Your_Gate_to_EU/status/1144246627735080961


https://twitter.com/PabloPerezA/status/1144931114592718849

Egypt

Senegal


https://twitter.com/PR_Senegal/status/1143435072776941574


https://twitter.com/DiopNanouche/status/1144538654980943872
https://twitter.com/DiopNanouche/status/1144538492854317056


https://twitter.com/fatousy41097754/status/1144254700537155584

Thailand


https://twitter.com/BangkokPostNews/status/1144483552991387656

Vietnam


https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144124897523687424
https://twitter.com/schnucknetwork/status/1144139201836912640


https://twitter.com/CurtisSChin/status/1144550160329916416
https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1142756007992369153
https://twitter.com/MofaJapan_en/status/1143441461528023040

Singapore


https://twitter.com/leehsienloong/status/1143851589418901505

Netherlands


https://twitter.com/JPN_PMO/status/1083193795506651137

Spain

Chile
PM Modi’s G20 Summit concludes with six bilaterals on last day
Prime Minister Phúc in the thick of things at G20 Summit
Chile’s Pinera arrives for G20 (YouTube)

2019 G20 Osaka summit G20大阪サミット Vol.1

Most of the below tweets regarding the summit and its sidelines are in English.

Updated at around 23:15, June 30.
国名及び首脳氏名などを入れて検索して出て来た、標記(9ヶ国及び全体)に係る6月28日24時頃までのツイートを少々、取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。
Vol.2以降で、他の国々についても集めます。
Here are tweets including those related to the below nine countries through around 24:00, June 28 (JST).
Tweets related to other countries will be pasted in the coming Vol.2.

United States


https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1144437078924484609


https://twitter.com/PaulaChertok/status/1143339101753528322

India

France


https://twitter.com/StuartNorval/status/1143777395289272320

Germany

United Kingdom


https://twitter.com/foreignoffice/status/1144192028722585601


https://twitter.com/UKinMorocco/status/1143819627589509120

Italy


https://twitter.com/Palazzo_Chigi/status/1144515874361151489


https://twitter.com/uzupetru/status/1144454325294342144
https://twitter.com/uzupetru/status/1144175446797541377

Australia


https://twitter.com/USAembassyinOZ/status/1144387866966941698


https://twitter.com/westaustralian/status/1145318908653658112

Canada


https://twitter.com/CanadaTrade/status/1137779488450928640

China
https://twitter.com/iaccenters_en/status/1144511940993146880


https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1143837559744860162

WHAT IS THE G20 SUMMIT? | @g20org


https://twitter.com/AlfidioValera/status/1144569250067243009


https://twitter.com/g20org/status/1144170539478421504


https://twitter.com/tictoc/status/1143813686227865600

#FoodexJapan2019 non-Japanese companies #フーデックスジャパン2019 外国企業(於:幕張メッセ Makuhari Messe)

先週行われた標記に幸運にもご招待頂き、4日間のうち最初の2日間行って来ました。
取り急ぎ下記(順不同)のとおり、名刺交換し(濃淡はありますがお話し)た外国企業の約半数を貼っておきます。企業名部分がハイパーリンクになっていますので、押して頂くと各企業ウェブサイトに飛びます。
私は通常、名刺交換・会話したのみでは固有名詞を挙げませんが、
日本でのビジネスを後押し申しあげたい(そして日本企業の在外ビジネスもどんどん活発化する必要がある)という想い(及び客観情勢)
により今回はこのようにします。
なお、ここに挙げた企業全て宛てに、こういう宣伝を行う旨、事前にメールを送ってあります。
I was lucky enough to be invited to Foodex Japan 2019, and visited many booths at Makuhari Messe on its first and second days.
As below (no particular order), I pasted names and hyperlinks of about half of the companies with which I exchanged my name cards (and talked with more rich content or less). If you push the names, you can go to the companies’ websites.
Although I usually don’t publicize specific names when I just exchanged my name cards and had conversations, this time I am doing it because I would like to boost foreign companies’ business in Japan (and Japanese companies also need to expand business in foreign countries more).
Please note that I let all the below companies know in advance.
March 13, 2019
Taku NAKAMINATO 中港 拓

Finland フィンランド / Cheese チーズ各種  Finnish Cheese Company Ltd
The Netherlands オランダ / Gouda cheese ゴーダチーズ類  Vergeer Holland
Bulgaria ブルガリア / Cheese, Butter チーズ各種及びバター  Germa Food Stuff Trading LLC
Greece ギリシャ / Feta cheese, Yoghurt, etc. フェタチーズ、ヨーグルト等  ROUSSAS
Greece ギリシャ / Yogurt, Feta cheese, etc. ヨーグルト、フェタチーズ等  Mevgal S.A.
Denmark デンマーク / Eggs 鶏卵  Danaeg Products A/S
Australia オーストラリア / Kangaroo and wild game meat カンガルー及び獣肉  Macro Group Australia Pty Ltd.
Finland フィンランド / Pork 豚肉類  Snellmanin Lihanjalostus Oy (フィンランド語)
Canada カナダ / Processed pork 豚肉加工品  Siwin Foods Ltd.
Australia オーストラリア / Dumplings, etc. 東欧風餃子等  From Granny
USA アメリカ / Pecan ペカン  Hudson Pecan Company, Inc.
Mexico メキシコ / Canned peppers, salsas, etc. 缶詰トウガラシ・大豆ソース等  La Morena
Indonesia インドネシア / Seasoning 調味料  PT RODAMAS INTI INTERNASIONAL
Belgium ベルギー / Salt 塩  Zoutman
Italy イタリア / Canned tuna, etc. ツナ缶詰等  Macaluso
Italy イタリア / Preserved tomatoes 保存トマト  Finagricola Soc.Coop.
Germany ドイツ / Health and functional confectionary ヘルスケア菓子(サプリメント等)  sanotact GmbH
Italy イタリア / Truffle トリュフ  Selektia Italia s.r.l
Italy イタリア / Pasta パスタ  Pasta Zara S.p.A.
Ukraine ウクライナ / Garlic ニンニク  Agro Patriot
Greece ギリシャ / Green pitted olives, etc. オリーブ加工品等  EL MAR OLIVES LTD
Australia オーストラリア / Olive oil オリーブオイル  Pendleton Olive Estate
Australia オーストラリア / Olive oil オリーブオイル  OLEAPAK PTY.LTD
Greece ギリシャ / Olive oil オリーブオイル  ELEON – Soya Hellas S.A.
UK イギリス / Nuts ナッツ類  Snack Factory Limited
India インド / Cashews カシューナッツ  Prasanthi Cashew Company
Thailand タイ / Snack スナック菓子  Kanom Thaipattana Co., Ltd.
Italy イタリア / Snack スナック菓子  Nutkao
Belgium ベルギー / Biscuits ビスケット  Noble Food Group
Canada カナダ / Banana chips, etc. バナナチップス等スナック菓子  Oh! Naturals
Belgium ベルギー / Ice creams アイスクリーム  COLAC
Spain スペイン / Honey 蜂蜜  Alemany
Ukraine ウクライナ / Berry paste ベリーペースト  LiQberry
Turkey トルコ / Direct juice squeezing, etc. 各種フルーツジュース等色々  Goknur
Costa Rica コスタリカ / Pineapple chunks, etc. 冷凍パイナップル片等  Costa De Oro Internacional S.A.
Costa Rica コスタリカ / Pineapple chunks, etc. ドライバナナ等  Purejoy
UAE アラブ首長国連邦 / Date paste, Premium dates, etc. ナツメヤシペースト、高級ナツメヤシ等  Royal Palm
Tunisia チュニジア / Dried tomatoes, Dried pitted dates, etc. ドライトマト、ドライナツメヤシ等色々   Mila Business Group
Canada カナダ / Blueberries ブルーベリー  Westberry Farms
Austria オーストリア / Pomegranate juice, etc. ザクロジュース等  Rubin Garden Vertriebs GmbH
Poland ポーランド / Berry juice, etc. ベリージュース等  BIO JUICE
Ecuador エクアドル / Coffee コーヒー  El Cafe C.A.
Australia オーストラリア / Coffee コーヒー  Coffee MIO
Czech チェコ / Wine ワイン  Wine Of Czech
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  Cantina Frentana
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  CASCINA PIAN D’OR Az. Agricola di Barbero Valter
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  Cantine Sgarzi Luigi srl
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  WINES FROM GALICIA
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  Monte La Reina
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  VIRGEN DE LAS VINAS
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  Bodegas Jimenez-Vila Hnos

EUJEPA Vol.4 / TPP Vol.7 (チーズ、牛肉、シーフード、ワイン Cheese, Beef, Seafood, Wine)

取り急ぎ標記につき以下貼っておきます。

English
Cheese
Beef
Seafood
Wine

日本語


https://twitter.com/txbiz_ondemand/status/1095975961810526208


https://twitter.com/EUinJapan/status/1062186435736936448


https://twitter.com/franceiine/status/1091127440242442240

cf. Cheese, etc., Top 10 Importers
EUJEPA-TPP cheese top-10-importers

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
pp23-24
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
pp24-25
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp207-211
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (http://goo.gl/SKKbqe).
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: COPYRIGHT LAW, THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, AND INTERNET FREEDOM (PDF; 10/2016) | DR MATTHEW RIMMER (@ QUT) @ THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

cf.
New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1

TPP Vol.5

All the below links and excerpts (incl pictures) are in English.

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES FOR CANADIANS (PDF; 04/2017) | Standing Committee on International Trade, Canada
pp8-11 GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS
Consultations Prior to the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
Consultations Since the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
pp11-16 EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CANADA
Expected Overall Benefits for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Many witnesses representing Canadian businesses said that, among the TPP countries, the most significant market access opportunities for their sectors would be in Japan. In addition, the Cross-Border Institute mentioned that, “[w]hile Japan is now a slow-growing economy, it’s very large, and its potential for trade expansion with Canada is great.” According to it, the reductions in Japan’s import tariffs that would result from implementation of the TPP could reduce Canada’s trade deficit with that country.
… Similarly, the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership claimed that a failure by Canada to ratify the TPP could result in a lost opportunity to obtain preferential market access to countries that might accede to the TPP in the future, such as China, India and Indonesia.
… The Greater Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce said: “Should Canada choose to extricate itself from this agreement, we find ourselves in a position where it will be, over a period of time, more difficult for us to even access … traditional markets, let alone expand the opportunities and the productive capacity of this amazing region.” The Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal told the Committee that, “[i]f the U.S. has a competitive advantage … and we have no such advantage, we are affected, as in the case of South Korea when the U.S. signed an agreement with that country. …
Expected Overall Costs for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives considered that, because tariffs on Canada’s imports from TPP countries with which it does not yet have an FTA are higher than those on its exports, the TPP would likely increase Canada’s trade deficit with those countries.
… the United Steelworkers stated that the TPP would reduce the wages of Canadian workers “by putting them into competition with poorly paid foreign workers … [working in Canada] and abroad.” Global Affairs Canada provided the Committee with a different perspective, claiming that foreign professionals who would come to Canada as a result of TPP commitments “would have to be paid the prevailing wage in Canada, in that region, for a professional at that level of expertise and experience.”
… a brief submitted to the Committee by the Niagara Regional Labour Council mentioned that “provisions contained within the TPP will lead to thousands of lost jobs, higher levels of unemployment, and stagnating wages, meaning that inequality will continue unabated.”…
In addition, many witnesses believed that the TPP would increase corporate influence on Canadian public policy. … However, Global Affairs Canada provided a different perspective in remarking that provisions in the TPP would reinforce the right of member countries to “regulate in the public interest.”
Modelling the Economic Impacts for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… Global Affairs Canada … If Canada were not to participate in the agreement, and the 11 other countries were to implement it, the study projects GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.”
… the Business Council of Canada referred to a study released by the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics that suggested that the TPP would increase Canada’s national income by $37 billion by 2030. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce commented that economic impact assessments have estimated the economic benefits for Canada of joining the TPP to be between $5 billion and $10 billion annually.
… C.D. Howe Institute, Dan Ciuriak… estimated that the TPP would lead to a “modest”GDP gain for Canada of about 0.07% by 2035, which would generate household income gains of approximately $3 billion.
Tufts University’s Jeronim Capaldo, who is one of Mr. Izurieta’s co-authors … claimed that Global Affairs Canada’s economic impact assessment made an assumption about the level of employment that would occur following the TPP’s entry into force, instead of directly modelling the TPP’s effects on Canadian employment. According to him, Global Affairs Canada’s assumption about full employment is unrealistic …
pp17-19 RATIFICATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The Alberta Beef Producers said that the Government should ratify the TPP quickly in order to “continue momentum towards implementation of the agreement more broadly.”In addition, the National Cattle Feeders’ Association indicated that “the argument can be made that Canada should ratify the TPP before the U.S. in order to make it easier to resist American efforts to extract more concessions from Canada.”
… The Canadian Chamber of Commerce contended that it would be catastrophic for Canada not to ratify the TPP if its NAFTA partners do so.
… the National Cattle Feeders’ Association claimed that, if the United States does not ratify the TPP, Canada should conclude a bilateral agreement with Japan that would “salvage” what it hopedwould be accomplished in the TPP, and that “would put Canadian producers back on an even playing field in the Japanese market with producers from countries which already have FTAs with Japan.”…
pp19-20 FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR CANADIAN BUSINESSES
… The Mining Association of Canada suggested that the Government include a northern-specific fund within Canada’s proposed infrastructure bank. In its view, this fund should be based on the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority model, which it characterized as highly successful.
… the Canadian Federation of Independent Business indicated that “many smaller companies don’t really know much about [the] TPP.” Similarly, Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters stated that “[t]he vast majority of smaller companies in Canada would have no clue about what the [TPP] is.”
pp21-22 TRADE IN GOODS
… some witnesses from the automobile manufacturing sector, as well as those representing Canada’s supply-managed agricultural sectors, said that these sectors would experience new import competition or would lose domestic market share as a result of the TPP’s tariff and quota provisions. Unifor commented that, “[w]ith elimination of the tariffs and lowering of the [rules of origin] thresholds, our supply jobs and assembly jobs are not only going to be threatened by the TPP players, but they’re also going to be penalized by non-TPP imports from China, from Malaysia, and from other countries around the world that aren’t even a part of the TPP agreement.” Similarly, Dairy Farmers of Canada …
pp22-32 Agriculture and Agri-Food
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association estimated that the TPP would allow beef producers to double or nearly triple the value of Canada’s beef exports to Japan. According to the Saskatchewan Cattlemen’s Association, such an increase in beef exports could create between 5,200 and 5,400 jobs in Canada.
The Canadian Pork Council noted that, according to a study that it commissioned, the TPP’s new market access opportunities would increase the value of Canadian pork producers’ exports by an estimated $300 million, and would create 4,000 new jobs …
Regarding Canada’s beef sector, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association indicated that, “[w]ithout the TPP or a bilateral agreement with Japan, Canada will likely lose around 80% of the value of our [beef] exports to Japan.” The Canadian Pork Council commented that the Japanese market for Canadian pork would be lost, and that damage to Canada’s pork sector would be “extreme,” if the TPP enters into force without the participation of Canada. Cereals Canada said that “being left out of a ratified TPP agreement could result in a 50% reduction in Canadian wheat exports to the [Asia-Pacific] region,” while the B.C. Seafood Alliance stated that it would be “disastrous” for its members …
According to Chicken Farmers of Canada, the TPP would open the Canadian market to an additional 26.7 million kilograms of annual chicken imports, leading to an estimated loss of 2,200 jobs and a reduction of about $150 million in Canada’s GDP. Similarly, Les Eleveurs de volailles du Quebec said that the TPP would increase import access to the Canadian chicken market from 7.5% of domestic production to 9.6%. …
Dairy Farmers of Canada noted that the TPP would increase import access to Canada’s dairy market by between 3.37% and 3.97% of the country’s annual dairy production …
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association explained that, because of the 2015 Japan?Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef is currently higher than its tariffs on Australian beef. It stated that, if the Government does not ratify the TPP, the discrepancy between Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef and its tariffs on Australian beef would widen due to future successive reductions in the latter tariffs under the 2015 agreement.
pp32-38 Manufacturing
… According to a brief submitted by Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, “the TPP does not deliver any incremental or meaningful new opportunities to increase Canadian produced vehicle exports by reducing tariffs in the markets that represent the overwhelming majority of new vehicle sales because the duty rate for these markets is already 0%.” Similarly, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association …
… Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada provided a different point of view, and denied the existence of barriers that limit Japan’s imports of foreign automobiles. According to it, North American automobile manufacturers do not produce many models of small cars, which are popular in Japan. It claimed that approximately 90% of Japanese passenger car sales are “very small cars,” with engines under 2,000 cubic centimeters; in 2014, Detroit-based companies had only 10 models in that market segment.
… for vehicles, the percentage would be 45%. In contrast, the assessment notes that NAFTA requires at least 62.5% of an automobile’s content to originate from the NAFTA region …
… the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada observed that eight out of every ten vehicles sold in Canada by its members are manufactured in North America, while the remaining two are imported from Japan. It remarked that “the elimination of tariffs into the Canadian marketplace will have little or no impact on the manufacturing base here in Canada.”
pp38-42 TRADE IN SERVICES
… The value of total services trade between Canada and the other TPP countries was $134.0 billion in 2014 … $58.8 billion in Canadian exports to, and $75.2 billion in imports from, those countries … 89.6% of the value of Canadian services exports to the other TPP countries was destined for the United States, while 89.3% of the value of Canadian services imports from those countries originated from the United States.
… some witnesses – including the Business Council of Canada and Scotiabank – said that financial service providers would benefit the most from the TPP. …
… the Canadian Union of Postal Workers pointed out that Chapter 10 of the TPP includes a “detailed annex on ‘Express Delivery Services’ which would impose far more explicit constraints on government authority concerning postal services and the activities of Canada Post than do those in NAFTA or the [WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services].” In its view, “[t]hese new rules would not only limit the ability of Canada Post to expand current services such as those of Xpresspost and its subsidiary Purolator, but would threaten its ability to maintain its current business model of integrated express delivery and letter mail services.”
pp45-51 INVESTMENT PROTECTION
pp57-61 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pp99-105 SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION – CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA
pp107-113 DISSENTING OPINION – NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA

Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Entering a New Era of Strategic Trade Policy (PDF; 09/2013) | Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci @ Frazer Institute
ppiii-iv Executive summary
Canada’s trade rules and procedures are already strongly aligned with those of the United States and, as such, implementation of the TPP should not be costly. There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP would require us to dismantle our supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. However, with Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines may improve: Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. If its rice protections remain, this will open the door for other members to shield their sensitive industries.
Canada gains from the TPP not only by expanding its economic partnerships but also by playing a significant role in shaping the rules that will govern trade relationships in the twenty-first century. …
pp6-7
Figure 6: Canada’s exports to top five trading partners, 2012 (billions of $CA)
Figure 7: Canada’s exports to top TPP countries, 2012 (billions of $CA)
p10 Figure 8: Overlapping rules of origin: the “noodle bowl” of trade agreements
p11 … Figure 9 shows that countries such as Vietnam, China, Mexico, and Peru still have significant barriers to foreign trade, though Mexico, which has had a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and Canada since 1994, has shown consistent improvements in its trade and investment rankings. …
p14 There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP will require the dismantling of Canada’s supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. As Canada was negotiating entry into the talks in 2010, messaging from the United States and New Zealand indicated that Canada’s dairy exceptions were keeping it out of the negotiations (see, for example, Inside US Trade, 2010). However, the entry of Japan into the TPP negotiations probably improves the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines. Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector in the name of food security are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. As a wealthy and attractive market (currently the third largest in the world), Japan may have enough leverage in the negotiations to maintain its agricultural protections in spite of the lofty liberalization goals of the TPP. Thus, if Japanese rice protections remain, others will likely be able to shield sensitive sectors such as US sugar and Canadian dairy.

The New Trans-Pacific Partnership: Smaller, but Just as Ambitious (PDF; 16/03/2018) | Desjardins You can check out the below two pictures: GRAPH 3, 4, and TABLE 2.
GRAPH 3 Share of CPTPP members in Canadian goods export and import categories
TABLE 1 Variation in Canadian exports by 2040 in relation to the base scenario according to various CPTPP scenarios
GRAPH 4 Highest tariffs in the 25 biggest categories of exports to the CPTPP
TABLE 2 Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam would be Canada’s biggest opportunity for saving on tariffs

GRAPH 5 Some products could be especially impacted by the CPTPP

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): AN OVERVIEW (PDF; 12/2015) | John M. Curtis @ School of Public Policy, University of Calgary
Economic Impact of Canada’s Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 02/16/2018) | Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada
Canadian industries split on new TPP trade deal (PDF; 01/23/2018) | Steven Chase and Greg Keenan @ The Globe and Mail
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP – WHAT’S IN IT FOR CANADA? (PDF; 2016) | Business Council of Canada
Give and Take – Risks and Opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Canada’s Building Trades Unions (PDF; 08/2016) | Dawson Strategic
Gains from Trade but to Whom? – Canola and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; Fall 2016) | Hawley Campbell and Henry An @ Western Economics Forum
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 07/2015) | CAFTA-ACCA
ACTRA SUBMISSION TO GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA ON THE CANADA-PACIFIC TRADE CONSULTATIONS (FORMERLY TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP) (PDF; 10/30/2017)
POLICY BRIEF: The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Health: Potential Risks and Benefits (PDF) | Ronald Labonte & Arne Ruckert @ Globalization and Health Equity, University of Ottawa

Desjardins CanadianGoodsExportImportDesjardins HighestTariffs, BiggestOpportunity

cf.
Canada Vol.38 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.4

TPP Vol.4

All the below links and excerpts (incl Figures 6-8 & 10-12) are in English.

The Art of the TRADE DEAL – Quantifying the Benefits of a TPP without the United States (PDF; 06/2017) | Canada West Foundation
p2 Executive Summary … Our modelling and analysis shows how Canada and other TPP signatories would fare under a TPP11; what the U.S. stands to lose; and, how the agreement would affect different sectors of the economy, including how changes in one sector will impact other sectors. …
… Is the endgame of a TPP11 solely its economic benefits, primarily in trade in goods and services? How should the eleven TPP countries deal with issues on which U.S. policy is shifting? Should potential losses for the U.S. from opting out be used to try and bring the Americans back to the TPP table to regain the additional benefits for all (and avoid aggressive bilateral talks)? If so, what changes, if any, should be made to the pact to either facilitate the Americans’ return to the table or, on the other hand, to try and extract concessions from them as a price for re-entry?
pp4-5 Major Findings from TPP11 modelling
FOR CANADA
⭢ Canada stands to benefit in TPP11 compared to TPP12 more than any other country in the group, save Mexico. Canada’s welfare gains would improve to C$3.4 billion under the TPP11, compared to C$2.8 billion in TPP12. Real GDP gain improves to 0.082%. from 0.068%.
⭢ A TPP11 would actually be better than the original agreement for Canadian agriculture and agri-food, because this sector would no longer compete with the U.S. in TPP11 markets. Beef, in particular, would benefit from access to the Japanese market without having to share with the Americans. Fruit and vegetable exports, processed food products, and pork and poultry would likewise do well. Canola would continue to see a significant change in the composition of exports from unprocessed oilseeds to crude and refined canola oil, due to the elimination of Japan’s tariff escalation policy in the oilseed sector.
⭢ The only Canadian sector with a significant negative impact relative to the pre-TPP baseline would be dairy, which would face increased imports under Canada’s concession – in both TPP12 or 11. Because the main global dairy producer, New Zealand, is geographically distant from Canada, the U.S. would have been more important competition to Canada in terms of fluid milk. Without the U.S., TPP11 may mean less pressure on fluid milk. But …
⭢ Canadian textiles and apparel – another sensitive sector – would see only a moderate reduction in total shipments, despite a strong surge of imports from TPP11 partners (again, this is unchanged from TPP12).
⭢ The impact on the automotive sector is neutral in the new modelling results, but much would depend on how a TPP11 would proceed on the rules of origin (ROOs), given the central role of U.S.-based producers in TPP automotive supply chains.
FOR OTHER TPP11 COUNTRIES
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for signatories in the Americas (Mexico, Canada, Peru and Chile), as these countries would avoid erosion of existing preferences in the U.S. market (assuming existing bilateral agreements remain unchanged). These countries would also benefit from not having to compete with U.S. suppliers, as they would have had to under TPP12.
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for Singapore, which similarly would avoid loss to U.S. competition of its existing preferential position in Asian markets.
⭢ Vietnam and Japan, while they would still benefit from TPP11, would also see the biggest reduction of gains, because they stood to gain the most in the U.S. market under TPP12.
FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS
⭢ Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the U.S., the automotive sector would make the largest intra-TPP export gains of all the goods sectors under TPP11.
⭢ Other sectors that would benefit from increased exports under TPP11 include machinery and equipment (C$2.3 billion), leather products (C$2.1 billion), beef (C$1.2 billion), processed foods (C$946 million) and fruit and vegetables (C$343 million).
⭢ The TPP11 would wash out the large export gains that Vietnam stood to make in textiles and apparel in the U.S. market under TPP12. Nonetheless, textiles and apparel (C$4.2 billion) see the largest gains in intra-TPP exports after automotive products.
⭢ Finally, service exports get little wind in the sails from TPP11. Business services exports make the most notable gain, expanding by C$345 million, but this falls far short of what TPP12 would likely generate.
pp6-7
TWO REASONS TO PROCEED
01 Economic Gains
02 Negotiating Leverage
An Important Caveat for Policy-Makers
TPP & NAFTA
p9 INTRODUCTION
01 Does TPP11 make sense for the eleven as a standalone agreement?
02 Does the existence of TPP11 give signatories leverage in potential bilateral (or in the case of nafta, trilateral) negotiations or renegotiations with the U.S.?
03 Could the losses to the U.S. due to its exclusion from the tpp bring the Americans back to the table? Essentially, could TPP11 be a path to realizing or re-achieving the larger political and economic benefits of a TPP12?
… If a company in Japan that produces goods with inputs from Malaysia and Vietnam wanted to sell to Canada, it could enter Canada under the favourable conditions of TPP11 since all the countries were members of the agreement.
A bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan would apply only to goods made only or mostly in Japan and the U.S. For the Japanese company that has supply and production chains in Vietnam and Malaysia, this would pose a major problem. …
pp12-13 BACKGROUND
Figure 1: Income and Population, estimated 2016, TPP11 and the U.S.
Figure 2: Global imports, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (us$ millions)
Figure 3: Inward and outward investment, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (current us$ millions)
p15 Framework for QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The GTAP-FDI model … On the production side, the model evaluates efficiency gains from the reallocation of factors of production across sectors. …
On the demand side, an aggregate Cobb-Douglas utility function allocates expenditures to private consumption, government spending, and savings to maximize per capita aggregate utility. …
pp24-32 Trade Impacts
Figure 6: Exports to TPP partners and to the world, 2035
Figure 7: Imports from TPP partners and from the world, 2035
Figure 8: Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impacts of the TPP
Figure 9: Decomposition of TPP11 impacts by policy, cumulated change in 2035
Figure 10: TPP regional sectoral impacts 2035
Figure 11: Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12 (c$ millions) (%)
Figure 12: Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada (c$ millions) (%)
pp34-35 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
… The biggest prize for Canada in a TPP11 is gaining access to Japan ahead of the U.S. and on terms that Canada could not achieve in a bilateral negotiation. This is the opposite of what happened to Canada in Korea where both the Americans and Australians were able to sign trade agreements ahead of Canada and take market share from our agricultural and livestock exporters. …
… The TPP12 featured a significant lowering of the overall amount of RVC required for an automotive product to qualify for TPP preferences compared to the NAFTA standard of 62.5% for automobiles and light trucks. …

COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP-11) – ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ON AUSTRALIA (PDF; 21/03/2018) | Parliament of Australia
PART 2: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
p3 Tariff barriers still faced by Australian exporters
15. With Japan, Australia has secured increased access for many products under the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), but will continue to face high tariffs and quota-limited access on Japan’s sensitive products. In dairy, products face ad valorem tariffs ranging up to 40 per cent and specific tariffs up to \1,199/kg ($12.62/kg). Beef tariffs, while significantly reduced under JAEPA, would still be as high as 23.5 per cent after 15 years. Wheat and barley face tariffs of up to \50/kg ($0.58/kg) and \39/kg ($0.45/kg) respectively, rice is subject to a \341/ kg tariff ($3.93/kg) and sugar is subject to a levy on high polarity sugar of 103.10 yen/kg ($1.19-kg). A range of tariffs also remain on other Australian interests in horticulture and seafood.
19. Access into the Canadian dairy market is currently significantly limited by existing quota and high tariff arrangements. Canada’s quota access for dairy products is incredibly small – for example, 332 tonnes for yoghurt, 394 tonnes for cream and 3,274 tonne for butter (2,000 tonnes of which are allocated to New Zealand). While out-of-quota tariffs range up to 369 per cent. Outside of dairy, Canada also imposes tariffs of up to 94 per cent for barley products, and imposes tariffs of 1.87 c/litre for wine, and up to around 20 per cent on industrial products, which it has eliminated for its other FTA partners.
20. Mexico has tariffs of up to 67 per cent on wheat, 115.2 per cent on barley, 125 per cent on dairy, 25 per cent on beef, and 20 per cent on wine. On industrial products, Mexico’s tariffs can range from 15 to 30 per cent for automotive parts or mining equipment.
PART 5: IMPACT ANALYSIS
pp15-19 Table 3: Key agricultural market access outcomes for Australia
pp19-20 Resources, Energy and Manufactured Good
pp28-34 Suspension of TPP provisions in TPP-11
pp35-38 PART 6: TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
p41 PART 9: IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW
113. A TPP-11 Commission established under the Agreement will be responsible for the operation of the TPP-11. The Commission will review the operation of the TPP-11 three years after entry into force of the Agreement and at least every five years thereafter. If the entry into force of the original TPP is imminent or if the original TPP is unlikely to enter into force, the Parties have agreed to, on the request of a Party, review the operation of the TPP-11 so as to consider any amendment to the Agreement and any related matters.
114. After the entry into force of the TPP-11, any state or separate customs territory may accede to the TPP-11 if it is prepared to comply with the provisions of the Agreement, other terms and conditions specified, and if all TPP-11 Parties agree to the accession.
115. Any Party may withdraw from the TPP-11 by providing written notice to the Depositary and other Parties. A withdrawal shall take effect six months after a Party provides written notification, unless the Parties agree on a different period.

JSCOT (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties) inquiry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) (PDF; 04/20/2018) | Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
pp4-6 2 Increased red tape and costs:
… It is important to understand that each agreement includes compliance terms which need to be satisfied in order to take advantage of the agreement. In the case of goods trade, this is the tariff regime where rules of origin must be satisfied. Zero preferential tariffs are different to the abolition of tariffs. Any tariff, even 0, requires the importers to satisfy the compliance rules and so red tape is retained. …
5 Further comments:
pp8-16 Annex 1: Previous Parliamentary Inquiry recommendations and resultant actions.
pp17-19 Annex 2: Previous Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee TPP Inquiry, October 2016
p22 6 Contribution to economic prosperity from liberalised trade
… Australia held similar positions in the 1950s but its ranking slipped over the following two and a half decades. It dropped to 15th in 1983 and again in 1991 and 1992.
Since then Australia’s international ranking has risen. This improvement has been linked to sustained economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, including: the opening up of trade and capital markets to competition; partial deregulation, commercialisation and privatisation of state owned enterprises; labour market reforms that reformed the centralized wage fixing system; and National Competition Policy reforms (PC 1999). These resulted in better utilisation of labour and capital by business and enabled the Australian economy to innovate, taking advantage of newly developed information and communication technologies.
pp38-39 9.2 Economic studies

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What are the economic consequences for in- and outsiders? (PDF; 10/08/2015) | Rahel Aichele, Gabriel Felbermayr @ ifo Institut (@ Global Economic Dynamics, Bertelsmann Foundation)
Table 1 Effects of TPP and FTAAP on real per capita income in insider countries, %
Table 2 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals on World Regions
Table 3 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals in Europe and the US (%)
Table 4 Welfare Effects from TPP with Flexible Comparative Advantage
Table 5 The EU’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 6 Germany’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 7 Estimated trade policy effects, goods trade
Table 8 Estimated trade policy effects, services

A good dealfrom TPP for NZ Horticulture (PDF; 11/2015) | Simon Hegarty (@ Horticulture New Zealand)
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – members & value of NZ hort exports to each
The following table highlights the outcome for nine key product lines

New Zealand wine sector welcomes agreement on CPTPP (PDF; 26/01/2018) | New Zealand Wine
Trans-Pacific Partnership overview (PDF) | New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade
IS THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP’S INVESTMENT CHAPTER THE NEW “GOLD STANDARD”? (PDF; 2016) | Jose E Alvarez
PROCESS, POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF PROCESS: THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IN NEW ZEALAND (PDF) | Amokura Kawharu

Chile and the TPP Negotiations: Analysis of the economic and political impact (PDF; 05/2013) | ONG Derechos Digitales

17-10 Going It Alone in the Asia-Pacific: Regional Trade Agreements Without the United States (PDF; 10/2017) | Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, Shujiro Urata, and Fan Zhai (@ PIIE)

Figure 6 Exports to TPP partnersFigure 7 Imports from TPP partnersFigure 8 Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impactsFigure 10 TPP regional sectoral impactsFigure 11 Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12Figure 12 Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada

cf.
Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.3 (Miscellaneous)
Australia Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.2

TPP(#CPTPP #TPP11 環太平洋パートナーシップに関する包括的及び先進的な協定 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership)Vol.3

All the below links and excerpts are in Japanese. Next post about this topic will be in English.
取り急ぎ標記につき以下のとおりリンク及び抜粋等を貼っておきます。次回、英文情報を貼ります。
平成31年2月13日、数件追加しました。

TPP協定の経済効果分析について(PDF;平成27年12月24日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
(別紙)農林水産物への影響試算の計算方法について(PDF;平成25年3月15日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
内閣官房TPP等政府対策本部
環太平洋パートナーシップ(TPP)協定交渉(平成30年11月19日)| 外務省
日EU‣EPAとTPP11の概要と海外支援について(PDF;平成30年3月)| 経済産業省
下表“TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率”等をご覧ください。
経済連携協定の活用(PDF;平成29年12月1日)| 経済産業省 経済連携課
TPP11協定(CPTPP)の概要(税率差等)(PDF;平成30年11月)| 財務省関税局
セーフガードに係る説明や、下の“【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%…”等をご覧ください。
TPP11(CPTPP)原産地規則について(PDF;平成30年11月・12月)| 財務省関税局・税関

TPP11における品目ごとの農林水産物への影響について(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
農林水産物の生産額への影響について(TPP11)(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
TPP11協定に基づく国家貿易による米麦等の輸入について(w PDFs)| 農林水産省
TPP11、12月30日発効 | 独立行政法人 農畜産業振興機構

TPP大筋合意 食卓への影響は? 価格帯も豊富、選択肢広がる(平成27年10月15日)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加
例えば、同店で現在、最も安く販売している米国産牛肉は100グラム当たり150円。38・5%の関税がかかってこの値段だが、関税が27・5%になると同138円、9%だと同118円となる。一方、同店で販売する国産豚肉の平均価格は100グラム当たり128円。現在は米国産牛肉の方が22円高いが、TPPで関税が27・5%になれば、価格差は10円に縮まる。さらに9%になると牛肉と豚肉の価格が逆転し、牛肉の方が豚肉より10円安くなる。
ただ、輸入の豚肉にかかる関税は、安い価格帯の豚肉が現行の1キロ当たり482円を10年目に50円に、高い豚肉の関税(価格の4・3%)を10年目に撤廃する方向で、輸入の牛肉よりもさらに安くなる可能性がある。
一方、輸入肉の価格が安くなることで、輸入や国産に関係なく、魚介類の価格も下がるとみられる。全国漁業協同組合連合会(全漁連)によると、総務省の消費者物価指数の動きから、牛肉の価格が20%下がると、魚介類の価格が15%下がるという関係が認められるという。
スーパーなどで品薄が続いているバターについては、新たに低関税の輸入枠が設けられる。ニュージーランドなどからの輸入が増え、品不足の解消が期待される。
【図解・行政】TPP新協定発効後の食品関税(平成29年11月)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加

包括的及び先進的な環太平洋パートナーシップ協定(TPP11協定)交渉の大筋合意に伴う熊本県産農林水産物への定性的な影響予測(PDF;平成29年12月11日)| 熊本県農林水産部
米、小麦、牛肉、豚肉、乳製品、オレンジ(温州みかん・中晩柑類)、野菜(施設野菜)、野菜(露地野菜)、鶏肉、鶏卵、林産物(合板・製材)、水産物について説明されています。
なお、同県以外の各都道府県等も同様の資料を公表されています。下の日本都道府県地図もご覧ください。
TPP協定の影響に関するQ&A(PDF;平成25年5月)| 北海道 平成31年2月13日追加
TPP11の発効について | 帯広市
<迫るTPP11 現場からの報告>(1)牛肉 黒毛輸出や銘柄化模索(2018年4月13日)| 北海道新聞
TPPの国民生活への影響|JAグループ宮城 平成31年2月13日追加

TPP 12月30日発効 米国離脱も見直さず(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
バター・脱脂粉乳で設けた生乳換算で最大7万トンの低関税輸入枠や牛肉のセーフガードの発動基準数量は、参加国全体からの輸入が対象。TPP11では元の12カ国の水準を維持した。例えば牛肉の発動基準数量は米国からの輸入を含むことを前提に設定しており、米国が抜けたため実際は発動されない可能性が高い。
牛肉の関税は、1年目に現行の38・5%から27・5%に削減。その後、段階的に削減し、16年目に9%になる。豚肉は差額関税制度を維持した上で、低価格帯の従量税、高価格帯の従価税を段階的に下げ、最終的に従量税1キロ当たり50円だけになる。米はオーストラリア向けに特別輸入枠を設ける。
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ(2018年11月2日)| 鶏鳴新聞
鶏肉の「丸どり=生鮮・冷蔵」と「丸どり、骨付きもも以外=冷凍」「アヒルの肉(丸どり以外)」は段階的に下げて6年目に撤廃。鶏肉の「丸どり=冷凍」「骨付きもも=生鮮・冷蔵」「丸どり・骨付きもも以外=生鮮・冷蔵」「骨付きもも=冷凍」は段階的に下げて11年目に撤廃。
けいざい早わかり(2017 年度第 5 号)署名されたTPP11の概要(PDF;2018年3月9日)| 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
図表2.TPP1 1における日本の農林水産物の関税の削減・撤廃の例

CPTPPが年末に発効(PDF;2018年11月1日)| みずほ総合研究所
カナダの乗用車関税は、現在の6.1%から発効日に5.5%、2019年1月1日には5.0%に引き下げられる。カナダの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、日本の対加輸出額の3割強を占める乗用車が即時撤廃ではないため、貿易額基準でみると68.4%にとどまるが、関税品目数基準では96.9%に達している。ニュージーランドの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、貿易額基準では98.0%、関税品目数基準でも93.9%と高い水準になっている(図表1)。
日本の牛肉輸入のうち、CPTPP参加国からの輸入は56.7%(2017年実績、金額ベース)を占め、その大半(49.8%)がオーストラリアからの輸入である(4頁図表3参照)。オーストラリア向けの牛肉関税は、日豪EPAによって生鮮・冷蔵が29.3%、冷凍が26.9%まですでに引き下げられている。そのため、オーストラリア産牛肉の輸入に関しては、CPTPP発効によって関税率が大きく引き下げられるわけではない。特に、冷凍牛肉については、日豪EPAに基づく現行関税率の方が低くなるため、CPTPP発効後も日豪EPAの関税率が適用される5。2019年4月1日(2年目)以降は、CPTPPにおける関税率(26.6%)が日豪EPAにおける関税率(26.7%)を下回る…
日本の輸入牛肉の56.7%がCPTPP参加国からの輸入であることはすでに述べたが、残る43.3%のうち43.0%を米国が占めている(図表3左図)。つまり、CPTPP発効後は、事実上米国のみがCPTPPの特恵関税率を適用されない国となる。また、豚肉については、日本の輸入豚肉市場はCPTPP参加国(35.3%)、EU(35.9%)、米国(28.7%)で3分されており(図表3右図)…
TAG交渉が長引けば、それだけ米国の輸出者が日本市場で不利な状況に置かれる期間が長くなることを意味する。したがって、CPTPPの発効は、TAG交渉の早期妥結を求める米国内の圧力を高め、交渉における米国の姿勢をより宥和的にする方向に働くことが考えられる。
米国のTPP復帰は米国が譲歩しないと実現しない(2018年4月18日)| 野村総合研究所
米国のTPP復帰に対する11か国の姿勢には、実は大きな開きがある。日本が米国の復帰を望んでいるのは、米国市場へのアクセスが強まり、輸出が拡大するとの期待があるためである。日本以外にも、マレーシアやベトナムには同様な期待がある。しかし一方で、米国が参加しないことでメリットを受けている国もある点に留意すべきだ。それが最も顕著なのは北米・南米の4ヵ国、つまりカナダ、チリ、メキシコ、ペルーである。これらの4か国は既に米国との間に北米自由貿易協定(NAFTA)などの協定を結んでいることから…
米国抜きTPPの行方(PDF;2017年11月15日)| 三井物産戦略研究所 アジア・中国・大洋州室
TPP参加国のうち、 米国がFTAを結んでいない国は、日本に加えベトナム、マレーシア、ブルネイ、ニュージーランドの4カ国である。…
TPP参加国のうち、 日本がFTAを結んでいないのは、米国とニュージーランドおよび交渉中のカナダだけ…
ベトナム、マレーシア… 米国抜き TPP に慎重。両国ともTPP交渉で、米国への輸出拡大を期待し、国内規制の緩和を受け入れた。そのため、米国抜きTPPでは、期待した利益の多くが得られない一方で、規制緩和の痛みばかり負うことになると懸念している。 また、すでに日本とはEPAを結んでいるので、特段日本への輸出拡大は期待できない…
TPPにおける日本の牛肉関税の削減幅は、日豪EPAより大きく、TPP11では一層、豪州が有利となる。同試算では、豪州のTPP11参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は8,800万ドルとなる。…
ニュージーランドがTPPに参加したのは、日本とのFTA実現の意味合いが大きかったので、米国抜きのTPPでもあまり期待外れにはならない。…ニュージーランドのTPP12参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は17億4,200万ドルだったが、TPP11では 15億5,600万ドルとなり、大きく目減りすることはない。…

日本農業を壊すのは自由貿易ではない | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
1.TPPを悪用した農業界
4.ウソと矛盾の農業保護論
TPP11の次の一手は-アメリカにTPP復帰を求める必要はない- | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
農産物の日本市場をTPP11で奪われるアメリカが日米FTAを要求してくるなら、日本は多国間自由貿易協定(メガFTA)主義に転換したのでTPP11に参加しなさいと主張すればよい。理論的にも… TPP11に地理的な制約はない。トルコ、ブラジル、ケニアが入ってもよい。… 当初EUは日EU自由貿易協定に関心を示さなかった。…転換… 中国・インドも参加するRCEPでは、TPPのような高いレベルの協定内容は期待できない。…
動きだした米抜きTPP――日本がアジアの通商交渉リードへ(2017年7月18日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
… 米国が検事兼裁判官となって気に入らない国に制裁を一方的に加える通商法301条に、80年代の日本はおびえた。しかし、WTOはその紛争処理手続きを経なければ対抗措置は打てないとして、通商法301条を否定した。
日米FTA交渉を求められても、日本は拒否すればよい。日米FTAは望ましくないと、米国を諭すのである。第1に、TPPはアジア太平洋経済協力会議(APEC)地域全体の自由貿易圏(FTAAP)実現に向けた取り組みの1つとして位置付けられてきた。APEC首脳が約束してきた道から外れて、2国間のFTAを目指すことは適当ではない。第2に、2国間のFTAが重なると、多数のルールや規則が錯綜し混乱する。これをバグワティという著名な国際経済学者は「スパゲティボール」と呼んで批判している。…

7 日本はどの国と業種からTPP11のメリットを得られるか ―EPAとTPPの利用における効果を業種別に比較(PDF;2018年6月) |(一財)国際貿易投資研究所
表1 TPPにおける輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表2 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表3 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表4 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの業種別効果(加重平均)
表5 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別効果(加重平均)
表6 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表7 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表8 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別関税削減額および関税削減率(加重平均)
表9 日本のTPPを利用した輸出の効果(2017年、関税削減額および削減率、加重平均)
99頁 したがって、日本が TPP を活用してより多くのメリットを得ようとすると、米国以外の TPP 11 か国への輸出では、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、皮革・毛皮・ハンドバッグ(主にベトナム向け)、繊維製品・履物、輸送用機械・部品、などの分野が有望である。米国向け輸出では、繊維製品・履物、化学工業品、プラスチック・ゴム製品、などの分野でメリットが大きい。
一方、日本の輸入では、TPP 利用でメリットが大きい業種は、農水産品と食料品・アルコールであり、これに繊維製品・履物とプラスチック・ゴム製品が挙げられる。つまり、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、及び繊維製品・履物は、日本の TPP を利用した輸出と輸入の両面において効果がある業種ということになる。

TPPの関税低減に先駆けタスマニアビーフ2品値下げ(平成30年12月6日)| イオンリテールnews 平成31年2月13日追加
機関誌「あきた経済」:「TPP12」から「TPP11」に ~貿易摩擦とメガFTAの行方~ | 一般財団法人 秋田経済研究所
カナダ向け輸出増期待 TPP11署名で北陸企業(2018年3月9日)| 北國新聞
TPP11やEVFTA、ベトナムの農林水産業発展のチャンスに(2018年11月29日)| VIETJO
自由貿易体制に備えて ~TPP11、12月30日発効へ~(2018年11月28日)| ニコニコニュース(食品産業新聞社ニュースWEB)
TPP11はTPP12より悪い(2018年5月31日)| JAcom【鈴木宣弘・東京大学教授】
TPP11 の農業分野への影響について(PDF;2018年4月11日)| 農民運動全国連合会
日米新協議いよいよ始動 TPP11 テコに自由化加速 | 一般社団法人 中央酪農会議
TPP11発効まで1カ月 輸入枠見直さず セーフガード発動しない可能性(2018年12月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPP11 合意から1年で発効 迫る大幅市場開放(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPPの現在 ~米国の離脱と署名が行われたTPP11 | 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
再起動した日本の通商戦略(PDF;2017年10・11月)| みずほ総合研究所 政策調査部
アセアン・レポート 2018年3月号(PDF)| 千葉銀行 シンガポール駐在員事務所・バンコク駐在員事務所

「TPP11大筋合意~日本の果たす役割」(時論公論)(2017年11月14日)| NHK解説委員室
また自由化の内容もやや後退しています。アメリカが求めていた知的財産権の保護など20項目が、アメリカがTPPにもどるまで実施されない「凍結」扱いとなりました。また「国有企業に対する優遇措置を禁じる新たなルール」など4項目についても新興国などが、「そもそもアメリカへの輸出が増やせることを前提に譲歩したものだ」として、凍結を主張していました。結局調整がつかずに継続協議となり、今後に課題を残しています。
大筋合意に至ったTPP11(PDF;2017年11月13日)| みずほ総合研究所
図表2:凍結項目リスト
TPP11を読む(2018年4月19日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
表1:TPP11に組み込まれないか、適用停止されるTPP12の条文
表2:TPP11における我が国のサイドレター
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ 著作権保護期間は70年に(2018年11月2日)| 財経新聞
TPP11と不動産(PDF;2018年4月3日)| 一般財団法人 土地総合研究所

TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率TPP:【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%Japan TPP,EUJEPA

オーストラリア連邦(Commonwealth of Australia) 基礎データ | 外務省
ニュージーランド(New Zealand) 基礎データ | 外務省
カナダ(Canada) 基礎データ | 外務省
メキシコ合衆国(United Mexican States) 基礎データ | 外務省
シンガポール共和国(Republic of Singapore) 基礎データ | 外務省
ベトナム社会主義共和国(Socialist Republic of Viet Nam) 基礎データ | 外務省 平成31年2月13日追加