U.K. イギリス Vol.16(Brexit Vol.13:報道等において正面から触れられていないブレグジット三点 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc.)

期日である3月29日まで1ヶ月近くとなった。3年前の英国国民投票以来、ブレグジット(英国のEU離脱)に係る報道・報告・分析や英国政府等発表を英語及び日本語で折に触れて追う中で、あまり正面から触れられていない印象のある三点を以下挙げる。

一.関税同盟離脱とハードボーダー不実施の非両立
英国においては、議会・国民・企業・有識者等に跨ってEU残留派及び離脱派それぞれが、国民投票前政治運動に始まり現在まで延々と主張をし続け、現時点から見て期限までの両派の合意そしてEU英国の合意等への道は険しい。報道等からは、こんな印象を受ける。
結局、南北アイルランド国境がこの険しさの原因であろうと昨年前半に感じ、バックストップ(1998年グッドフライデー和平合意の下で南北国境に物理的な管理施設を設けない措置を2020年末の移行期間終了までに導入できない場合にも引き続き現状どおり国境を開放しておく安全策)について報道が多く出た昨秋にその感覚が強まった。
英語報道等では、端的な説明報道はあり、非両立を前提とした報道等も少なくないが、正面から上記非両立自体を取り上げて一つ選ぶしかないとしたものは無い印象がある。他方、日本語報道等でも、上記非両立について正面から論じている報道等は皆無という印象があり、(一昨日発見した)筆者が存じ上げないある日本のシンクタンクの研究者の方が書いておられる論のみではなかろうか。
その論においては、完全離脱のためにはハードボーダー(全く別個の経済地域として日本が外国との間で設けているような厳しい国境管理)が必要である一方、現状どおりハードボーダー無しのままにしたいならEUと同じ経済地域としてEUの関税同盟・単一市場の中に留まるしかないので完全離脱は諦めるしかない、とされている。そのとおりではないか。これを公式に言うと元も子も無いから妥協案を探し続けたというのが現実であったという総合的な印象を持っている。しかし結局、無いものは無い。
不両立であるから、最終的には「誰かがどちらか一つを選ぶ」しか無い。方法は国民投票・議会議決・解散総選挙とあるが、2015年総選挙時の公約とされた国民投票が2016年に行われその結果によって現在まで本来不要と思えなくもない混乱が続いているので、国民投票結果が実際の国民の意志であるのかを確認する国民投票を実施するのが最も無理の少ない論理ではないか。
そもそも、国民投票に限らず投票行為自体が民意を問われる内容そのものよりも政治的な風に左右され易い上に、国の現状を変えるための国民投票結果があまりに僅差であった。仮に現状維持であれば政治的な風に左右され易い投票結果が僅差でも、たった一回で決めてしまって構わない。他方、50年100年に一回の現状大転換であれば、僅差を民意の確かな証明と捉えて本当に国を変えてしまっていいのかと民主主義下において問うて何が不味いのか。これが具体的に分からないまま今に至る。二回目の国民投票までやって確認した上でハードブレグジット(合意無き離脱)に突入するのであれば、英国国民の多くは納得するのではないか。

二.離党議員の選挙区事情
21日時点で、野党第一党たる労働党の下院議員8人が離党した。党首のブレグジットに関する煮え切らない姿勢や反ユダヤ主義的姿勢への不満等が、理由とされている。他方、保守党下院議員3人も、政府与党の破滅的なブレグジット対応への不満等を理由に離党した。両者は野党自由民主党に合流するのではなく独立グループを結成し、(おそらく筆者の上記考えと同じか近い)二回目の国民投票を目指すとのことである。「選良」「代議士」として純粋に国を憂い改善するための行動であるとも、選挙区の支持者あってこその議員であるため何らかの事情が関係しているとも、一般には諸々考えられる。
今回離党した元労働党の8議員(以下カッコ内は、苗字;選挙区・片仮名州名)は、コフィ(Coffey;Stockport・グレーターマンチェスター)、スミス(Smith;Penistone and Stocksbridge・サウスヨークシャー)、シューカー(Shuker;Luton South・ベッドフォードシャー)、ゲイプス(Gapes;Ilford South・グレーターロンドン)、ウムンナ(Umunna;Streatham・グレーターロンドン)、レスリー(Leslie;Nottingham East・ノッティンガムシャー)、バーガー(Berger;Liverpool Wavertree・マージーサイド)、ライアン(Ryan;Enfield North・グレーターロンドン)各氏、同じく離党した元保守党の3議員は、スーブリ(Soubry;Broxtowe・ノッティンガムシャー)、アレン(Allen;South Cambridgeshire・ケンブリッジシャー)、ウォラストン(Wollaston;Totnes・デヴォン)各氏である。
例えば、最近見た英国のある大学の研究によると、上記コフィ議員のStockport選挙区では、EU残留及び離脱の両支持数が拮抗している一方、(持家価格上位層より中位層の方が人数が通常多いであろうが)残留投票者割合が持家価格に比例して増加した分布となっていた。とすると、二回目の国民投票を推す背景に、人数のより多い持家価格中位層のうち一回目は離脱投票をした少なからぬ層が現在は残留派に転じているとは考えられないか。今後の下院議決における議員の投票行動を見る際に、持家価格に限らず選挙区事情の分析が有効である場合があろう。

三.金融街シティの非嗜好政策
2015年総選挙には大勝したとは言え、現在までそして今後も続く混乱を考えると、二大政党が根付いた英国においては、多くの保守党支持が離れても本来おかしくないはずである。また、現に労働党党首の煮え切らない上記姿勢は、ブレグジットについてはむしろ軟着陸嗜好を示していると考えられる。
しかしながら、左派色の強いコービン労働党による政権、具体的には同党の公共事業の再国有化富裕税導入などは、望まれていない、ハードブレグジット以上に恐れられている、というのが概ね報道等論調である。前者による財政赤字拡大・インフレ率急騰及び英国国債需要低下・長期国債価格低下、後者による年収 8 万ポンド以上の層に対する所得税増税及び同層の海外流出による歳入減、をシティは警戒しているとされ、概ねその警戒は的外れではないと考えられる。
字数の関係上、例えば前者のみ触れると、GDP比87.5%(2017年)という極端には酷くない債務残高、PFI(社会資本の整備・運営を民間資金・経営能力・技術力により行う)などのPPP(官民連携)を積極的に推進したのがブレア労働党政権であり労働党と言っても今さら再国有化は望まれないという空気、などは考慮せねばならない。その上で、このような保革の路線対立は、古今東西よくある話とも言える常々大きなテーマであり、上記以外でも要考慮要素を容れてその時に採るべき策を随時探って行くしかない根気の要る話である。

なお、即時の報道やその直後の可能な範囲の分析は無論重要である。また、長いプロセス、重大な国際社会的影響、複雑怪奇な政治経済事情などを節目節目で整理して取り上げる重要性も、筆者個人は通常むしろ充分に尊重する方である。しかしながら今回は、既に数えきれない報道等が流れた後の現時点で、期日までに一回だけ書くということで、このようにした次第である。

平成31年2月22日午後1時50分
文章:中港 拓

France フランス

Most of the below links (incl tweets) are in English.

取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。

France Vol.3 (Finance)
France Vol.4 (Finance)
France Vol.5 (Brands)
France Vol.6 (Food)
France Vol.7 (Pharma/Health/Biotech/Food)
France Vol.8 (Energy/Utilities, Airplane/Train)
France Vol.9 (Digital/Telecommunications/Media)
France Vol.10 (Automobile)
France Vol.11 (United States)
France Vol.12 (U.S., Canada, U.K.)
France Vol.13 (Government, diplomacy, Ireland, technology, etc.)


France Vol.2 (2017 French Presidential Elections)
France Vol.1 (France regions, history, technology, et al.)

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
pp23-24
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
pp24-25
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp207-211
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (http://goo.gl/SKKbqe).
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: COPYRIGHT LAW, THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, AND INTERNET FREEDOM (PDF; 10/2016) | DR MATTHEW RIMMER (@ QUT) @ THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

cf.
New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1

TPP Vol.5

All the below links and excerpts (incl pictures) are in English.

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES FOR CANADIANS (PDF; 04/2017) | Standing Committee on International Trade, Canada
pp8-11 GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS
Consultations Prior to the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
Consultations Since the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
pp11-16 EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CANADA
Expected Overall Benefits for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Many witnesses representing Canadian businesses said that, among the TPP countries, the most significant market access opportunities for their sectors would be in Japan. In addition, the Cross-Border Institute mentioned that, “[w]hile Japan is now a slow-growing economy, it’s very large, and its potential for trade expansion with Canada is great.” According to it, the reductions in Japan’s import tariffs that would result from implementation of the TPP could reduce Canada’s trade deficit with that country.
… Similarly, the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership claimed that a failure by Canada to ratify the TPP could result in a lost opportunity to obtain preferential market access to countries that might accede to the TPP in the future, such as China, India and Indonesia.
… The Greater Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce said: “Should Canada choose to extricate itself from this agreement, we find ourselves in a position where it will be, over a period of time, more difficult for us to even access … traditional markets, let alone expand the opportunities and the productive capacity of this amazing region.” The Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal told the Committee that, “[i]f the U.S. has a competitive advantage … and we have no such advantage, we are affected, as in the case of South Korea when the U.S. signed an agreement with that country. …
Expected Overall Costs for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives considered that, because tariffs on Canada’s imports from TPP countries with which it does not yet have an FTA are higher than those on its exports, the TPP would likely increase Canada’s trade deficit with those countries.
… the United Steelworkers stated that the TPP would reduce the wages of Canadian workers “by putting them into competition with poorly paid foreign workers … [working in Canada] and abroad.” Global Affairs Canada provided the Committee with a different perspective, claiming that foreign professionals who would come to Canada as a result of TPP commitments “would have to be paid the prevailing wage in Canada, in that region, for a professional at that level of expertise and experience.”
… a brief submitted to the Committee by the Niagara Regional Labour Council mentioned that “provisions contained within the TPP will lead to thousands of lost jobs, higher levels of unemployment, and stagnating wages, meaning that inequality will continue unabated.”…
In addition, many witnesses believed that the TPP would increase corporate influence on Canadian public policy. … However, Global Affairs Canada provided a different perspective in remarking that provisions in the TPP would reinforce the right of member countries to “regulate in the public interest.”
Modelling the Economic Impacts for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… Global Affairs Canada … If Canada were not to participate in the agreement, and the 11 other countries were to implement it, the study projects GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.”
… the Business Council of Canada referred to a study released by the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics that suggested that the TPP would increase Canada’s national income by $37 billion by 2030. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce commented that economic impact assessments have estimated the economic benefits for Canada of joining the TPP to be between $5 billion and $10 billion annually.
… C.D. Howe Institute, Dan Ciuriak… estimated that the TPP would lead to a “modest”GDP gain for Canada of about 0.07% by 2035, which would generate household income gains of approximately $3 billion.
Tufts University’s Jeronim Capaldo, who is one of Mr. Izurieta’s co-authors … claimed that Global Affairs Canada’s economic impact assessment made an assumption about the level of employment that would occur following the TPP’s entry into force, instead of directly modelling the TPP’s effects on Canadian employment. According to him, Global Affairs Canada’s assumption about full employment is unrealistic …
pp17-19 RATIFICATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The Alberta Beef Producers said that the Government should ratify the TPP quickly in order to “continue momentum towards implementation of the agreement more broadly.”In addition, the National Cattle Feeders’ Association indicated that “the argument can be made that Canada should ratify the TPP before the U.S. in order to make it easier to resist American efforts to extract more concessions from Canada.”
… The Canadian Chamber of Commerce contended that it would be catastrophic for Canada not to ratify the TPP if its NAFTA partners do so.
… the National Cattle Feeders’ Association claimed that, if the United States does not ratify the TPP, Canada should conclude a bilateral agreement with Japan that would “salvage” what it hopedwould be accomplished in the TPP, and that “would put Canadian producers back on an even playing field in the Japanese market with producers from countries which already have FTAs with Japan.”…
pp19-20 FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR CANADIAN BUSINESSES
… The Mining Association of Canada suggested that the Government include a northern-specific fund within Canada’s proposed infrastructure bank. In its view, this fund should be based on the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority model, which it characterized as highly successful.
… the Canadian Federation of Independent Business indicated that “many smaller companies don’t really know much about [the] TPP.” Similarly, Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters stated that “[t]he vast majority of smaller companies in Canada would have no clue about what the [TPP] is.”
pp21-22 TRADE IN GOODS
… some witnesses from the automobile manufacturing sector, as well as those representing Canada’s supply-managed agricultural sectors, said that these sectors would experience new import competition or would lose domestic market share as a result of the TPP’s tariff and quota provisions. Unifor commented that, “[w]ith elimination of the tariffs and lowering of the [rules of origin] thresholds, our supply jobs and assembly jobs are not only going to be threatened by the TPP players, but they’re also going to be penalized by non-TPP imports from China, from Malaysia, and from other countries around the world that aren’t even a part of the TPP agreement.” Similarly, Dairy Farmers of Canada …
pp22-32 Agriculture and Agri-Food
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association estimated that the TPP would allow beef producers to double or nearly triple the value of Canada’s beef exports to Japan. According to the Saskatchewan Cattlemen’s Association, such an increase in beef exports could create between 5,200 and 5,400 jobs in Canada.
The Canadian Pork Council noted that, according to a study that it commissioned, the TPP’s new market access opportunities would increase the value of Canadian pork producers’ exports by an estimated $300 million, and would create 4,000 new jobs …
Regarding Canada’s beef sector, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association indicated that, “[w]ithout the TPP or a bilateral agreement with Japan, Canada will likely lose around 80% of the value of our [beef] exports to Japan.” The Canadian Pork Council commented that the Japanese market for Canadian pork would be lost, and that damage to Canada’s pork sector would be “extreme,” if the TPP enters into force without the participation of Canada. Cereals Canada said that “being left out of a ratified TPP agreement could result in a 50% reduction in Canadian wheat exports to the [Asia-Pacific] region,” while the B.C. Seafood Alliance stated that it would be “disastrous” for its members …
According to Chicken Farmers of Canada, the TPP would open the Canadian market to an additional 26.7 million kilograms of annual chicken imports, leading to an estimated loss of 2,200 jobs and a reduction of about $150 million in Canada’s GDP. Similarly, Les Eleveurs de volailles du Quebec said that the TPP would increase import access to the Canadian chicken market from 7.5% of domestic production to 9.6%. …
Dairy Farmers of Canada noted that the TPP would increase import access to Canada’s dairy market by between 3.37% and 3.97% of the country’s annual dairy production …
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association explained that, because of the 2015 Japan?Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef is currently higher than its tariffs on Australian beef. It stated that, if the Government does not ratify the TPP, the discrepancy between Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef and its tariffs on Australian beef would widen due to future successive reductions in the latter tariffs under the 2015 agreement.
pp32-38 Manufacturing
… According to a brief submitted by Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, “the TPP does not deliver any incremental or meaningful new opportunities to increase Canadian produced vehicle exports by reducing tariffs in the markets that represent the overwhelming majority of new vehicle sales because the duty rate for these markets is already 0%.” Similarly, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association …
… Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada provided a different point of view, and denied the existence of barriers that limit Japan’s imports of foreign automobiles. According to it, North American automobile manufacturers do not produce many models of small cars, which are popular in Japan. It claimed that approximately 90% of Japanese passenger car sales are “very small cars,” with engines under 2,000 cubic centimeters; in 2014, Detroit-based companies had only 10 models in that market segment.
… for vehicles, the percentage would be 45%. In contrast, the assessment notes that NAFTA requires at least 62.5% of an automobile’s content to originate from the NAFTA region …
… the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada observed that eight out of every ten vehicles sold in Canada by its members are manufactured in North America, while the remaining two are imported from Japan. It remarked that “the elimination of tariffs into the Canadian marketplace will have little or no impact on the manufacturing base here in Canada.”
pp38-42 TRADE IN SERVICES
… The value of total services trade between Canada and the other TPP countries was $134.0 billion in 2014 … $58.8 billion in Canadian exports to, and $75.2 billion in imports from, those countries … 89.6% of the value of Canadian services exports to the other TPP countries was destined for the United States, while 89.3% of the value of Canadian services imports from those countries originated from the United States.
… some witnesses – including the Business Council of Canada and Scotiabank – said that financial service providers would benefit the most from the TPP. …
… the Canadian Union of Postal Workers pointed out that Chapter 10 of the TPP includes a “detailed annex on ‘Express Delivery Services’ which would impose far more explicit constraints on government authority concerning postal services and the activities of Canada Post than do those in NAFTA or the [WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services].” In its view, “[t]hese new rules would not only limit the ability of Canada Post to expand current services such as those of Xpresspost and its subsidiary Purolator, but would threaten its ability to maintain its current business model of integrated express delivery and letter mail services.”
pp45-51 INVESTMENT PROTECTION
pp57-61 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pp99-105 SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION – CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA
pp107-113 DISSENTING OPINION – NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA

Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Entering a New Era of Strategic Trade Policy (PDF; 09/2013) | Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci @ Frazer Institute
ppiii-iv Executive summary
Canada’s trade rules and procedures are already strongly aligned with those of the United States and, as such, implementation of the TPP should not be costly. There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP would require us to dismantle our supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. However, with Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines may improve: Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. If its rice protections remain, this will open the door for other members to shield their sensitive industries.
Canada gains from the TPP not only by expanding its economic partnerships but also by playing a significant role in shaping the rules that will govern trade relationships in the twenty-first century. …
pp6-7
Figure 6: Canada’s exports to top five trading partners, 2012 (billions of $CA)
Figure 7: Canada’s exports to top TPP countries, 2012 (billions of $CA)
p10 Figure 8: Overlapping rules of origin: the “noodle bowl” of trade agreements
p11 … Figure 9 shows that countries such as Vietnam, China, Mexico, and Peru still have significant barriers to foreign trade, though Mexico, which has had a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and Canada since 1994, has shown consistent improvements in its trade and investment rankings. …
p14 There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP will require the dismantling of Canada’s supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. As Canada was negotiating entry into the talks in 2010, messaging from the United States and New Zealand indicated that Canada’s dairy exceptions were keeping it out of the negotiations (see, for example, Inside US Trade, 2010). However, the entry of Japan into the TPP negotiations probably improves the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines. Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector in the name of food security are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. As a wealthy and attractive market (currently the third largest in the world), Japan may have enough leverage in the negotiations to maintain its agricultural protections in spite of the lofty liberalization goals of the TPP. Thus, if Japanese rice protections remain, others will likely be able to shield sensitive sectors such as US sugar and Canadian dairy.

The New Trans-Pacific Partnership: Smaller, but Just as Ambitious (PDF; 16/03/2018) | Desjardins You can check out the below two pictures: GRAPH 3, 4, and TABLE 2.
GRAPH 3 Share of CPTPP members in Canadian goods export and import categories
TABLE 1 Variation in Canadian exports by 2040 in relation to the base scenario according to various CPTPP scenarios
GRAPH 4 Highest tariffs in the 25 biggest categories of exports to the CPTPP
TABLE 2 Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam would be Canada’s biggest opportunity for saving on tariffs

GRAPH 5 Some products could be especially impacted by the CPTPP

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): AN OVERVIEW (PDF; 12/2015) | John M. Curtis @ School of Public Policy, University of Calgary
Economic Impact of Canada’s Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 02/16/2018) | Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada
Canadian industries split on new TPP trade deal (PDF; 01/23/2018) | Steven Chase and Greg Keenan @ The Globe and Mail
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP – WHAT’S IN IT FOR CANADA? (PDF; 2016) | Business Council of Canada
Give and Take – Risks and Opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Canada’s Building Trades Unions (PDF; 08/2016) | Dawson Strategic
Gains from Trade but to Whom? – Canola and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; Fall 2016) | Hawley Campbell and Henry An @ Western Economics Forum
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 07/2015) | CAFTA-ACCA
ACTRA SUBMISSION TO GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA ON THE CANADA-PACIFIC TRADE CONSULTATIONS (FORMERLY TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP) (PDF; 10/30/2017)
POLICY BRIEF: The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Health: Potential Risks and Benefits (PDF) | Ronald Labonte & Arne Ruckert @ Globalization and Health Equity, University of Ottawa

Desjardins CanadianGoodsExportImportDesjardins HighestTariffs, BiggestOpportunity

cf.
Canada Vol.38 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.4

TPP Vol.4

All the below links and excerpts (incl Figures 6-8 & 10-12) are in English.

The Art of the TRADE DEAL – Quantifying the Benefits of a TPP without the United States (PDF; 06/2017) | Canada West Foundation
p2 Executive Summary … Our modelling and analysis shows how Canada and other TPP signatories would fare under a TPP11; what the U.S. stands to lose; and, how the agreement would affect different sectors of the economy, including how changes in one sector will impact other sectors. …
… Is the endgame of a TPP11 solely its economic benefits, primarily in trade in goods and services? How should the eleven TPP countries deal with issues on which U.S. policy is shifting? Should potential losses for the U.S. from opting out be used to try and bring the Americans back to the TPP table to regain the additional benefits for all (and avoid aggressive bilateral talks)? If so, what changes, if any, should be made to the pact to either facilitate the Americans’ return to the table or, on the other hand, to try and extract concessions from them as a price for re-entry?
pp4-5 Major Findings from TPP11 modelling
FOR CANADA
⭢ Canada stands to benefit in TPP11 compared to TPP12 more than any other country in the group, save Mexico. Canada’s welfare gains would improve to C$3.4 billion under the TPP11, compared to C$2.8 billion in TPP12. Real GDP gain improves to 0.082%. from 0.068%.
⭢ A TPP11 would actually be better than the original agreement for Canadian agriculture and agri-food, because this sector would no longer compete with the U.S. in TPP11 markets. Beef, in particular, would benefit from access to the Japanese market without having to share with the Americans. Fruit and vegetable exports, processed food products, and pork and poultry would likewise do well. Canola would continue to see a significant change in the composition of exports from unprocessed oilseeds to crude and refined canola oil, due to the elimination of Japan’s tariff escalation policy in the oilseed sector.
⭢ The only Canadian sector with a significant negative impact relative to the pre-TPP baseline would be dairy, which would face increased imports under Canada’s concession – in both TPP12 or 11. Because the main global dairy producer, New Zealand, is geographically distant from Canada, the U.S. would have been more important competition to Canada in terms of fluid milk. Without the U.S., TPP11 may mean less pressure on fluid milk. But …
⭢ Canadian textiles and apparel – another sensitive sector – would see only a moderate reduction in total shipments, despite a strong surge of imports from TPP11 partners (again, this is unchanged from TPP12).
⭢ The impact on the automotive sector is neutral in the new modelling results, but much would depend on how a TPP11 would proceed on the rules of origin (ROOs), given the central role of U.S.-based producers in TPP automotive supply chains.
FOR OTHER TPP11 COUNTRIES
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for signatories in the Americas (Mexico, Canada, Peru and Chile), as these countries would avoid erosion of existing preferences in the U.S. market (assuming existing bilateral agreements remain unchanged). These countries would also benefit from not having to compete with U.S. suppliers, as they would have had to under TPP12.
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for Singapore, which similarly would avoid loss to U.S. competition of its existing preferential position in Asian markets.
⭢ Vietnam and Japan, while they would still benefit from TPP11, would also see the biggest reduction of gains, because they stood to gain the most in the U.S. market under TPP12.
FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS
⭢ Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the U.S., the automotive sector would make the largest intra-TPP export gains of all the goods sectors under TPP11.
⭢ Other sectors that would benefit from increased exports under TPP11 include machinery and equipment (C$2.3 billion), leather products (C$2.1 billion), beef (C$1.2 billion), processed foods (C$946 million) and fruit and vegetables (C$343 million).
⭢ The TPP11 would wash out the large export gains that Vietnam stood to make in textiles and apparel in the U.S. market under TPP12. Nonetheless, textiles and apparel (C$4.2 billion) see the largest gains in intra-TPP exports after automotive products.
⭢ Finally, service exports get little wind in the sails from TPP11. Business services exports make the most notable gain, expanding by C$345 million, but this falls far short of what TPP12 would likely generate.
pp6-7
TWO REASONS TO PROCEED
01 Economic Gains
02 Negotiating Leverage
An Important Caveat for Policy-Makers
TPP & NAFTA
p9 INTRODUCTION
01 Does TPP11 make sense for the eleven as a standalone agreement?
02 Does the existence of TPP11 give signatories leverage in potential bilateral (or in the case of nafta, trilateral) negotiations or renegotiations with the U.S.?
03 Could the losses to the U.S. due to its exclusion from the tpp bring the Americans back to the table? Essentially, could TPP11 be a path to realizing or re-achieving the larger political and economic benefits of a TPP12?
… If a company in Japan that produces goods with inputs from Malaysia and Vietnam wanted to sell to Canada, it could enter Canada under the favourable conditions of TPP11 since all the countries were members of the agreement.
A bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan would apply only to goods made only or mostly in Japan and the U.S. For the Japanese company that has supply and production chains in Vietnam and Malaysia, this would pose a major problem. …
pp12-13 BACKGROUND
Figure 1: Income and Population, estimated 2016, TPP11 and the U.S.
Figure 2: Global imports, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (us$ millions)
Figure 3: Inward and outward investment, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (current us$ millions)
p15 Framework for QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The GTAP-FDI model … On the production side, the model evaluates efficiency gains from the reallocation of factors of production across sectors. …
On the demand side, an aggregate Cobb-Douglas utility function allocates expenditures to private consumption, government spending, and savings to maximize per capita aggregate utility. …
pp24-32 Trade Impacts
Figure 6: Exports to TPP partners and to the world, 2035
Figure 7: Imports from TPP partners and from the world, 2035
Figure 8: Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impacts of the TPP
Figure 9: Decomposition of TPP11 impacts by policy, cumulated change in 2035
Figure 10: TPP regional sectoral impacts 2035
Figure 11: Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12 (c$ millions) (%)
Figure 12: Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada (c$ millions) (%)
pp34-35 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
… The biggest prize for Canada in a TPP11 is gaining access to Japan ahead of the U.S. and on terms that Canada could not achieve in a bilateral negotiation. This is the opposite of what happened to Canada in Korea where both the Americans and Australians were able to sign trade agreements ahead of Canada and take market share from our agricultural and livestock exporters. …
… The TPP12 featured a significant lowering of the overall amount of RVC required for an automotive product to qualify for TPP preferences compared to the NAFTA standard of 62.5% for automobiles and light trucks. …

COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP-11) – ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ON AUSTRALIA (PDF; 21/03/2018) | Parliament of Australia
PART 2: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
p3 Tariff barriers still faced by Australian exporters
15. With Japan, Australia has secured increased access for many products under the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), but will continue to face high tariffs and quota-limited access on Japan’s sensitive products. In dairy, products face ad valorem tariffs ranging up to 40 per cent and specific tariffs up to \1,199/kg ($12.62/kg). Beef tariffs, while significantly reduced under JAEPA, would still be as high as 23.5 per cent after 15 years. Wheat and barley face tariffs of up to \50/kg ($0.58/kg) and \39/kg ($0.45/kg) respectively, rice is subject to a \341/ kg tariff ($3.93/kg) and sugar is subject to a levy on high polarity sugar of 103.10 yen/kg ($1.19-kg). A range of tariffs also remain on other Australian interests in horticulture and seafood.
19. Access into the Canadian dairy market is currently significantly limited by existing quota and high tariff arrangements. Canada’s quota access for dairy products is incredibly small – for example, 332 tonnes for yoghurt, 394 tonnes for cream and 3,274 tonne for butter (2,000 tonnes of which are allocated to New Zealand). While out-of-quota tariffs range up to 369 per cent. Outside of dairy, Canada also imposes tariffs of up to 94 per cent for barley products, and imposes tariffs of 1.87 c/litre for wine, and up to around 20 per cent on industrial products, which it has eliminated for its other FTA partners.
20. Mexico has tariffs of up to 67 per cent on wheat, 115.2 per cent on barley, 125 per cent on dairy, 25 per cent on beef, and 20 per cent on wine. On industrial products, Mexico’s tariffs can range from 15 to 30 per cent for automotive parts or mining equipment.
PART 5: IMPACT ANALYSIS
pp15-19 Table 3: Key agricultural market access outcomes for Australia
pp19-20 Resources, Energy and Manufactured Good
pp28-34 Suspension of TPP provisions in TPP-11
pp35-38 PART 6: TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
p41 PART 9: IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW
113. A TPP-11 Commission established under the Agreement will be responsible for the operation of the TPP-11. The Commission will review the operation of the TPP-11 three years after entry into force of the Agreement and at least every five years thereafter. If the entry into force of the original TPP is imminent or if the original TPP is unlikely to enter into force, the Parties have agreed to, on the request of a Party, review the operation of the TPP-11 so as to consider any amendment to the Agreement and any related matters.
114. After the entry into force of the TPP-11, any state or separate customs territory may accede to the TPP-11 if it is prepared to comply with the provisions of the Agreement, other terms and conditions specified, and if all TPP-11 Parties agree to the accession.
115. Any Party may withdraw from the TPP-11 by providing written notice to the Depositary and other Parties. A withdrawal shall take effect six months after a Party provides written notification, unless the Parties agree on a different period.

JSCOT (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties) inquiry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) (PDF; 04/20/2018) | Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
pp4-6 2 Increased red tape and costs:
… It is important to understand that each agreement includes compliance terms which need to be satisfied in order to take advantage of the agreement. In the case of goods trade, this is the tariff regime where rules of origin must be satisfied. Zero preferential tariffs are different to the abolition of tariffs. Any tariff, even 0, requires the importers to satisfy the compliance rules and so red tape is retained. …
5 Further comments:
pp8-16 Annex 1: Previous Parliamentary Inquiry recommendations and resultant actions.
pp17-19 Annex 2: Previous Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee TPP Inquiry, October 2016
p22 6 Contribution to economic prosperity from liberalised trade
… Australia held similar positions in the 1950s but its ranking slipped over the following two and a half decades. It dropped to 15th in 1983 and again in 1991 and 1992.
Since then Australia’s international ranking has risen. This improvement has been linked to sustained economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, including: the opening up of trade and capital markets to competition; partial deregulation, commercialisation and privatisation of state owned enterprises; labour market reforms that reformed the centralized wage fixing system; and National Competition Policy reforms (PC 1999). These resulted in better utilisation of labour and capital by business and enabled the Australian economy to innovate, taking advantage of newly developed information and communication technologies.
pp38-39 9.2 Economic studies

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What are the economic consequences for in- and outsiders? (PDF; 10/08/2015) | Rahel Aichele, Gabriel Felbermayr @ ifo Institut (@ Global Economic Dynamics, Bertelsmann Foundation)
Table 1 Effects of TPP and FTAAP on real per capita income in insider countries, %
Table 2 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals on World Regions
Table 3 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals in Europe and the US (%)
Table 4 Welfare Effects from TPP with Flexible Comparative Advantage
Table 5 The EU’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 6 Germany’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 7 Estimated trade policy effects, goods trade
Table 8 Estimated trade policy effects, services

A good dealfrom TPP for NZ Horticulture (PDF; 11/2015) | Simon Hegarty (@ Horticulture New Zealand)
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – members & value of NZ hort exports to each
The following table highlights the outcome for nine key product lines

New Zealand wine sector welcomes agreement on CPTPP (PDF; 26/01/2018) | New Zealand Wine
Trans-Pacific Partnership overview (PDF) | New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade
IS THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP’S INVESTMENT CHAPTER THE NEW “GOLD STANDARD”? (PDF; 2016) | Jose E Alvarez
PROCESS, POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF PROCESS: THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IN NEW ZEALAND (PDF) | Amokura Kawharu

Chile and the TPP Negotiations: Analysis of the economic and political impact (PDF; 05/2013) | ONG Derechos Digitales

17-10 Going It Alone in the Asia-Pacific: Regional Trade Agreements Without the United States (PDF; 10/2017) | Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, Shujiro Urata, and Fan Zhai (@ PIIE)

Figure 6 Exports to TPP partnersFigure 7 Imports from TPP partnersFigure 8 Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impactsFigure 10 TPP regional sectoral impactsFigure 11 Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12Figure 12 Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada

cf.
Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.3 (Miscellaneous)
Australia Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.2

TPP(#CPTPP #TPP11 環太平洋パートナーシップに関する包括的及び先進的な協定 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership)Vol.3

All the below links and excerpts are in Japanese. Next post about this topic will be in English.
取り急ぎ標記につき以下のとおりリンク及び抜粋等を貼っておきます。次回、英文情報を貼ります。
平成31年2月13日、数件追加しました。

TPP協定の経済効果分析について(PDF;平成27年12月24日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
(別紙)農林水産物への影響試算の計算方法について(PDF;平成25年3月15日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
内閣官房TPP等政府対策本部
環太平洋パートナーシップ(TPP)協定交渉(平成30年11月19日)| 外務省
日EU‣EPAとTPP11の概要と海外支援について(PDF;平成30年3月)| 経済産業省
下表“TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率”等をご覧ください。
経済連携協定の活用(PDF;平成29年12月1日)| 経済産業省 経済連携課
TPP11協定(CPTPP)の概要(税率差等)(PDF;平成30年11月)| 財務省関税局
セーフガードに係る説明や、下の“【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%…”等をご覧ください。
TPP11(CPTPP)原産地規則について(PDF;平成30年11月・12月)| 財務省関税局・税関

TPP11における品目ごとの農林水産物への影響について(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
農林水産物の生産額への影響について(TPP11)(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
TPP11協定に基づく国家貿易による米麦等の輸入について(w PDFs)| 農林水産省
TPP11、12月30日発効 | 独立行政法人 農畜産業振興機構

TPP大筋合意 食卓への影響は? 価格帯も豊富、選択肢広がる(平成27年10月15日)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加
例えば、同店で現在、最も安く販売している米国産牛肉は100グラム当たり150円。38・5%の関税がかかってこの値段だが、関税が27・5%になると同138円、9%だと同118円となる。一方、同店で販売する国産豚肉の平均価格は100グラム当たり128円。現在は米国産牛肉の方が22円高いが、TPPで関税が27・5%になれば、価格差は10円に縮まる。さらに9%になると牛肉と豚肉の価格が逆転し、牛肉の方が豚肉より10円安くなる。
ただ、輸入の豚肉にかかる関税は、安い価格帯の豚肉が現行の1キロ当たり482円を10年目に50円に、高い豚肉の関税(価格の4・3%)を10年目に撤廃する方向で、輸入の牛肉よりもさらに安くなる可能性がある。
一方、輸入肉の価格が安くなることで、輸入や国産に関係なく、魚介類の価格も下がるとみられる。全国漁業協同組合連合会(全漁連)によると、総務省の消費者物価指数の動きから、牛肉の価格が20%下がると、魚介類の価格が15%下がるという関係が認められるという。
スーパーなどで品薄が続いているバターについては、新たに低関税の輸入枠が設けられる。ニュージーランドなどからの輸入が増え、品不足の解消が期待される。
【図解・行政】TPP新協定発効後の食品関税(平成29年11月)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加

包括的及び先進的な環太平洋パートナーシップ協定(TPP11協定)交渉の大筋合意に伴う熊本県産農林水産物への定性的な影響予測(PDF;平成29年12月11日)| 熊本県農林水産部
米、小麦、牛肉、豚肉、乳製品、オレンジ(温州みかん・中晩柑類)、野菜(施設野菜)、野菜(露地野菜)、鶏肉、鶏卵、林産物(合板・製材)、水産物について説明されています。
なお、同県以外の各都道府県等も同様の資料を公表されています。下の日本都道府県地図もご覧ください。
TPP協定の影響に関するQ&A(PDF;平成25年5月)| 北海道 平成31年2月13日追加
TPP11の発効について | 帯広市
<迫るTPP11 現場からの報告>(1)牛肉 黒毛輸出や銘柄化模索(2018年4月13日)| 北海道新聞
TPPの国民生活への影響|JAグループ宮城 平成31年2月13日追加

TPP 12月30日発効 米国離脱も見直さず(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
バター・脱脂粉乳で設けた生乳換算で最大7万トンの低関税輸入枠や牛肉のセーフガードの発動基準数量は、参加国全体からの輸入が対象。TPP11では元の12カ国の水準を維持した。例えば牛肉の発動基準数量は米国からの輸入を含むことを前提に設定しており、米国が抜けたため実際は発動されない可能性が高い。
牛肉の関税は、1年目に現行の38・5%から27・5%に削減。その後、段階的に削減し、16年目に9%になる。豚肉は差額関税制度を維持した上で、低価格帯の従量税、高価格帯の従価税を段階的に下げ、最終的に従量税1キロ当たり50円だけになる。米はオーストラリア向けに特別輸入枠を設ける。
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ(2018年11月2日)| 鶏鳴新聞
鶏肉の「丸どり=生鮮・冷蔵」と「丸どり、骨付きもも以外=冷凍」「アヒルの肉(丸どり以外)」は段階的に下げて6年目に撤廃。鶏肉の「丸どり=冷凍」「骨付きもも=生鮮・冷蔵」「丸どり・骨付きもも以外=生鮮・冷蔵」「骨付きもも=冷凍」は段階的に下げて11年目に撤廃。
けいざい早わかり(2017 年度第 5 号)署名されたTPP11の概要(PDF;2018年3月9日)| 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
図表2.TPP1 1における日本の農林水産物の関税の削減・撤廃の例

CPTPPが年末に発効(PDF;2018年11月1日)| みずほ総合研究所
カナダの乗用車関税は、現在の6.1%から発効日に5.5%、2019年1月1日には5.0%に引き下げられる。カナダの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、日本の対加輸出額の3割強を占める乗用車が即時撤廃ではないため、貿易額基準でみると68.4%にとどまるが、関税品目数基準では96.9%に達している。ニュージーランドの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、貿易額基準では98.0%、関税品目数基準でも93.9%と高い水準になっている(図表1)。
日本の牛肉輸入のうち、CPTPP参加国からの輸入は56.7%(2017年実績、金額ベース)を占め、その大半(49.8%)がオーストラリアからの輸入である(4頁図表3参照)。オーストラリア向けの牛肉関税は、日豪EPAによって生鮮・冷蔵が29.3%、冷凍が26.9%まですでに引き下げられている。そのため、オーストラリア産牛肉の輸入に関しては、CPTPP発効によって関税率が大きく引き下げられるわけではない。特に、冷凍牛肉については、日豪EPAに基づく現行関税率の方が低くなるため、CPTPP発効後も日豪EPAの関税率が適用される5。2019年4月1日(2年目)以降は、CPTPPにおける関税率(26.6%)が日豪EPAにおける関税率(26.7%)を下回る…
日本の輸入牛肉の56.7%がCPTPP参加国からの輸入であることはすでに述べたが、残る43.3%のうち43.0%を米国が占めている(図表3左図)。つまり、CPTPP発効後は、事実上米国のみがCPTPPの特恵関税率を適用されない国となる。また、豚肉については、日本の輸入豚肉市場はCPTPP参加国(35.3%)、EU(35.9%)、米国(28.7%)で3分されており(図表3右図)…
TAG交渉が長引けば、それだけ米国の輸出者が日本市場で不利な状況に置かれる期間が長くなることを意味する。したがって、CPTPPの発効は、TAG交渉の早期妥結を求める米国内の圧力を高め、交渉における米国の姿勢をより宥和的にする方向に働くことが考えられる。
米国のTPP復帰は米国が譲歩しないと実現しない(2018年4月18日)| 野村総合研究所
米国のTPP復帰に対する11か国の姿勢には、実は大きな開きがある。日本が米国の復帰を望んでいるのは、米国市場へのアクセスが強まり、輸出が拡大するとの期待があるためである。日本以外にも、マレーシアやベトナムには同様な期待がある。しかし一方で、米国が参加しないことでメリットを受けている国もある点に留意すべきだ。それが最も顕著なのは北米・南米の4ヵ国、つまりカナダ、チリ、メキシコ、ペルーである。これらの4か国は既に米国との間に北米自由貿易協定(NAFTA)などの協定を結んでいることから…
米国抜きTPPの行方(PDF;2017年11月15日)| 三井物産戦略研究所 アジア・中国・大洋州室
TPP参加国のうち、 米国がFTAを結んでいない国は、日本に加えベトナム、マレーシア、ブルネイ、ニュージーランドの4カ国である。…
TPP参加国のうち、 日本がFTAを結んでいないのは、米国とニュージーランドおよび交渉中のカナダだけ…
ベトナム、マレーシア… 米国抜き TPP に慎重。両国ともTPP交渉で、米国への輸出拡大を期待し、国内規制の緩和を受け入れた。そのため、米国抜きTPPでは、期待した利益の多くが得られない一方で、規制緩和の痛みばかり負うことになると懸念している。 また、すでに日本とはEPAを結んでいるので、特段日本への輸出拡大は期待できない…
TPPにおける日本の牛肉関税の削減幅は、日豪EPAより大きく、TPP11では一層、豪州が有利となる。同試算では、豪州のTPP11参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は8,800万ドルとなる。…
ニュージーランドがTPPに参加したのは、日本とのFTA実現の意味合いが大きかったので、米国抜きのTPPでもあまり期待外れにはならない。…ニュージーランドのTPP12参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は17億4,200万ドルだったが、TPP11では 15億5,600万ドルとなり、大きく目減りすることはない。…

日本農業を壊すのは自由貿易ではない | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
1.TPPを悪用した農業界
4.ウソと矛盾の農業保護論
TPP11の次の一手は-アメリカにTPP復帰を求める必要はない- | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
農産物の日本市場をTPP11で奪われるアメリカが日米FTAを要求してくるなら、日本は多国間自由貿易協定(メガFTA)主義に転換したのでTPP11に参加しなさいと主張すればよい。理論的にも… TPP11に地理的な制約はない。トルコ、ブラジル、ケニアが入ってもよい。… 当初EUは日EU自由貿易協定に関心を示さなかった。…転換… 中国・インドも参加するRCEPでは、TPPのような高いレベルの協定内容は期待できない。…
動きだした米抜きTPP――日本がアジアの通商交渉リードへ(2017年7月18日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
… 米国が検事兼裁判官となって気に入らない国に制裁を一方的に加える通商法301条に、80年代の日本はおびえた。しかし、WTOはその紛争処理手続きを経なければ対抗措置は打てないとして、通商法301条を否定した。
日米FTA交渉を求められても、日本は拒否すればよい。日米FTAは望ましくないと、米国を諭すのである。第1に、TPPはアジア太平洋経済協力会議(APEC)地域全体の自由貿易圏(FTAAP)実現に向けた取り組みの1つとして位置付けられてきた。APEC首脳が約束してきた道から外れて、2国間のFTAを目指すことは適当ではない。第2に、2国間のFTAが重なると、多数のルールや規則が錯綜し混乱する。これをバグワティという著名な国際経済学者は「スパゲティボール」と呼んで批判している。…

7 日本はどの国と業種からTPP11のメリットを得られるか ―EPAとTPPの利用における効果を業種別に比較(PDF;2018年6月) |(一財)国際貿易投資研究所
表1 TPPにおける輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表2 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表3 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表4 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの業種別効果(加重平均)
表5 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別効果(加重平均)
表6 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表7 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表8 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別関税削減額および関税削減率(加重平均)
表9 日本のTPPを利用した輸出の効果(2017年、関税削減額および削減率、加重平均)
99頁 したがって、日本が TPP を活用してより多くのメリットを得ようとすると、米国以外の TPP 11 か国への輸出では、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、皮革・毛皮・ハンドバッグ(主にベトナム向け)、繊維製品・履物、輸送用機械・部品、などの分野が有望である。米国向け輸出では、繊維製品・履物、化学工業品、プラスチック・ゴム製品、などの分野でメリットが大きい。
一方、日本の輸入では、TPP 利用でメリットが大きい業種は、農水産品と食料品・アルコールであり、これに繊維製品・履物とプラスチック・ゴム製品が挙げられる。つまり、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、及び繊維製品・履物は、日本の TPP を利用した輸出と輸入の両面において効果がある業種ということになる。

TPPの関税低減に先駆けタスマニアビーフ2品値下げ(平成30年12月6日)| イオンリテールnews 平成31年2月13日追加
機関誌「あきた経済」:「TPP12」から「TPP11」に ~貿易摩擦とメガFTAの行方~ | 一般財団法人 秋田経済研究所
カナダ向け輸出増期待 TPP11署名で北陸企業(2018年3月9日)| 北國新聞
TPP11やEVFTA、ベトナムの農林水産業発展のチャンスに(2018年11月29日)| VIETJO
自由貿易体制に備えて ~TPP11、12月30日発効へ~(2018年11月28日)| ニコニコニュース(食品産業新聞社ニュースWEB)
TPP11はTPP12より悪い(2018年5月31日)| JAcom【鈴木宣弘・東京大学教授】
TPP11 の農業分野への影響について(PDF;2018年4月11日)| 農民運動全国連合会
日米新協議いよいよ始動 TPP11 テコに自由化加速 | 一般社団法人 中央酪農会議
TPP11発効まで1カ月 輸入枠見直さず セーフガード発動しない可能性(2018年12月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPP11 合意から1年で発効 迫る大幅市場開放(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPPの現在 ~米国の離脱と署名が行われたTPP11 | 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
再起動した日本の通商戦略(PDF;2017年10・11月)| みずほ総合研究所 政策調査部
アセアン・レポート 2018年3月号(PDF)| 千葉銀行 シンガポール駐在員事務所・バンコク駐在員事務所

「TPP11大筋合意~日本の果たす役割」(時論公論)(2017年11月14日)| NHK解説委員室
また自由化の内容もやや後退しています。アメリカが求めていた知的財産権の保護など20項目が、アメリカがTPPにもどるまで実施されない「凍結」扱いとなりました。また「国有企業に対する優遇措置を禁じる新たなルール」など4項目についても新興国などが、「そもそもアメリカへの輸出が増やせることを前提に譲歩したものだ」として、凍結を主張していました。結局調整がつかずに継続協議となり、今後に課題を残しています。
大筋合意に至ったTPP11(PDF;2017年11月13日)| みずほ総合研究所
図表2:凍結項目リスト
TPP11を読む(2018年4月19日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
表1:TPP11に組み込まれないか、適用停止されるTPP12の条文
表2:TPP11における我が国のサイドレター
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ 著作権保護期間は70年に(2018年11月2日)| 財経新聞
TPP11と不動産(PDF;2018年4月3日)| 一般財団法人 土地総合研究所

TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率TPP:【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%Japan TPP,EUJEPA

オーストラリア連邦(Commonwealth of Australia) 基礎データ | 外務省
ニュージーランド(New Zealand) 基礎データ | 外務省
カナダ(Canada) 基礎データ | 外務省
メキシコ合衆国(United Mexican States) 基礎データ | 外務省
シンガポール共和国(Republic of Singapore) 基礎データ | 外務省
ベトナム社会主義共和国(Socialist Republic of Viet Nam) 基礎データ | 外務省 平成31年2月13日追加

EUJEPA Vol.3


All the below links, excerpts, and pictures (charts/tables) are in English.

Japan-EU EPA 【Benefits and Backgrounds】(PDF; 07/2018) | MOFA Japan You can also check out the first one of the below pictures.
Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) (07/17/2018) | MOFA Japan
2018 Japan-EU Summit: Signing Ceremony Of EPA And SPA (YouTube)

The EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (w PDF; 09/2018) | Policy Department for External Relations @ European Parliament (@Bruegel) You can also check out all the below pictures but the first one.
PDF p11 Within the EU-28, in 2017 the top goods exporters to Japan were Germany, Italy, the UK and France, respectively accounting for 32.87 %, 10.82 %, 10.67 % and 10.53 % of the EU’s EUR 60.66 billion of commodity exports to Japan in 2017. Germany, Italy, the UK and France were also the top four importers of Japanese goods, with respective shares of 23.28 %, 16.48 %, 14.37 % and 12.76 % of the EUR 68.89 billion worth of EU commodity imports from Japan in 2017.
Japan is among the low-tariff countries for industrial goods with a trade-weighted tariff average of 1.4 % (Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s agricultural markets are relatively protected. Simple average applied most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs stand at 13.3 % for agricultural goods, with high tariffs on animal products (10.6 %), dairy items (63.4 %), beverages and tobacco (15.1 %).
Figure 4 depicts the EU’s and Japan’s tariffs by harmonised system (HS) product categories. In terms of the average applied MFN tariffs, we note that Japanese tariffs are low across numerous sectors such as electrical machinery (0.1 %), transport equipment (0) and manufactures not elsewhere specified (n.e.s) (1.2 %). Prominent exceptions are clothing (9 %), leather and footwear (7.7 %).
p12 The dominant sectors in the EU’s total service exports to Japan in 2016 were financial services (23.53 %), telecommunications (14.5 %) and transport (13.97 %).
p13 Japan accounted for only 1.1 % of the total extra-EU FDI in 2016 (Figure 7). By comparison, EU investments in the US and Canada are much higher, representing 38 % and 3.7 % of total extra-EU FDI. Japanese investment in the EU stood at USD 56.8 billion, 33.7 % of its total FDI stock abroad in 2017. However, it should be noted that a substantial share, approximately 38 %, of Japan’s FDI stock in the EU is in the UK …
p15 A low score (0.05) in OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (2017), which measures statutory limitations on FDI, is indicative of the relative openness of the Japanese economy to foreign investors, as the OECD average is 0.07. On the other hand, the US (0.09), Canada (0.162) and China (0.316) are all relatively more restrictive as destinations for FDI. Except for a few countries in Europe (Austria, Poland and Sweden), all EU Member States are more open to FDI than Japan, with Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia being the least restrictive.
p17 Tariffs Agricultural goods. … significant reductions in customs duties for the EU’s major food exports to Japan such as pork (e.g. 4.3 % to 0 over 10 years for high value cuts), wine (15 % to 0 % on entry into force), beef (38.5 % to 9 % over 15 years), pasta and chocolates (complete tariff liberalisation in 10 years). For cheeses, the EUJEPA will deliver complete liberalisation for hard cheeses and provide tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with duty free access for fresh, processed and soft cheeses.
Industrial goods. In the agri-goods industry, South Korea was traditionally protectionist with a trade-weighted tariff of 49 % in the pre-FTA period. By 2014 however, these had been reduced on a preferential basis for EU goods to 28 %. The EU also liberalised its agricultural markets for South Korea by reducing trade-weighted tariffs from 11 % to 3 %.
Non-Tariff Barriers … Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (CIAR) in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Japan is aligning itself with international standards on medical devices (Quality Management Systems), textile labelling (ISO international care labelling), motor vehicles (UNECE international vehicle regulations) and pharmaceuticals (ICH).
p18 Services The EUJEPA seeks to promote bilateral trade in a broad range of services but does not require governments to deregulate or privatise the provision of public services such as healthcare, water supply and education. … In telecommunications, the agreement covers issues such as mobile roaming, number portability and confidentiality of users’ traffic data. In financial services, the agreement calls for deeper regulatory cooperation and establishes a Joint Financial Regulatory Forum for this purpose. In e-commerce, the parties commit to keep electronic transmissions duty-free, recognise the legal validity of electronic contracts and signatures and may not require source codes to be transferred or accessed. In postal and courier services, the EUJEPA will attempt to build a level-playing field for EU suppliers and their main competitors such as Japan Post.
p21 Japan is one of the least restrictive economies in the world according to ECIPE’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index Report …
pp30-33 Bilateral trade There is substantial variation in the anticipated trade response. DG Trade (2018) found that the EUJEPA would lead to an increase of +13.2 % (EUR 13 billion) increase in EU exports to Japan. EU exports to Japan would rise by 22.6-32.7 % in the CIAR (2012) simulations. A much stronger export response for the EU is found in Ifo 2017 (61 %) and Ifo 2018 (73 %).
On the import side, DG Trade (2018) reports a 23.5 % (EUR 22 billion) increase in EU imports from Japan. This result is similar to that of CIAR (2012) which predicted increases in EU import purchases from Japan in the range of 17.1-23.5 %. In contrast, Ifo (2017) and Ifo (2018) simulations lead to increases in EU imports from Japan of 55 % and 63 %, respectively.
Sectoral value added All EUJEPA studies report a positive impact on value added in agri-food industries e.g.+0.82 % according to Ifo 2018, +0.2 % increase in output for processed foods in DG Trade (2018), 0.5-0.6 % for processed foods in the CIAR (2012) and +13 % for meats in Ecorys (2009). For automobiles, projections of value added are model-dependent.
By 2035, Japan’s car exports to EU increase by nearly 51 % in this study. Because of significant NTB reductions by Japan in motors, the EU also increases its exports to Japan following the EUJEPA (+11.5 %).
Textiles, apparel and leather products benefit from the agreement as well. The industry is expected to increase its output by 2 % (EUR 7 billion) in the EU, with exports to Japan rising by 220 % (EUR 5 billion) in DG Trade (2018).
Impact of Brexit Brexit has a greater impact on Japan, as it reduces the economic benefits from EUJEPA by 14 % (EUR 1 billion) and 20 % in Ifo 2017 and Ifo 2018, respectively. This is the result of a smaller market size for Japanese companies following Brexit.
Impact of CPTPP-11 Ratification of the CPTPP-11 agreement between Japan and 10 Pacific countries may also affect gains from EUJEPA. This scenario is evaluated in Ifo 2018. Simulation results reveal that the conclusion of the agreement leads to slightly smaller positive gains for the EU and slightly higher real-income gains for Japan (from 0.308 % to 0.314 %) compared to the simple baseline scenario. CPTPP-11 is expected to reduce Japan’s costs of sourcing inputs from the Asia-Pacific, improving its competitiveness and trade with the EU.
pp44-45 1/Investment liberalisation and promotion ISDS is the mechanism preferred by Japan, one that it has also supported under the CPTPP-11. In the investment negotiations held during July 2018, chief negotiators from the EU and Japan acknowledged the convergence of positions on investment protection standards but not on investor-state dispute settlement.
2/US investigation into auto imports … In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce initiated a National Security Investigation into the import of automobiles and auto parts into the US. This investigation is motivated by Section 232 of US’s Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and will examine whether declining American domestic production in the automobile sector poses a threat to its national security by weakening the internal economy and reducing domestic research on advanced technologies. Given the deep value chains in the auto industry, EU and Japanese car producers would be significantly harmed if the investigation leads to an increase in duties on foreign vehicles entering the US market.
On 25 July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump announced plans to hold off on any new unilateral tariffs against each other as bilateral negotiations proceed on liberalising non-auto industrial goods, increasing EU imports of US soybeans and liquified natural gas (LNG), addressing WTO issues, reassessing US steel and aluminium tariffs and EU’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods. The EU will therefore be shielded from the conclusions of the US auto investigations, unless ongoing negotiations are halted by either party.
4/Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) … In the EUJEPA, Japan provides TRQs for agri-foods such as whey products, malt, potato starch, fresh and processed cheeses. …
5/Japan’s future trade ties with the UK … during the transition period (March 2019 to end of 2020). The exact terms of EUJEPA would hence be applicable to the UK over this period. Their implementation will be crucial for Japan’s car manufacturers that collectively produce 800 000 vehicles in the UK, accounting for 50 % of the UK’s total annual production …

In Focus EU-Japan ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT | European Commission
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: texts of the agreement | European Commission
EU-Japan: A Partnership of Renewed Importance (w PDF) | Cristina de Esperanza Picardo @eucentresg
New EU-Japan economic, strategic partnership may work better than past efforts (07/19/2018) | Bastian Harth @ Asia Times
… The SPA lays out the first-ever framework between the EU and Japan for cooperation and dialogue across various bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues such as cybercrime, disaster management, energy security, climate change, and aging populations. It also calls on both sides to synergize on promoting peace, stability, and international prosperity, and to recede from a sectoral and segmented approach to a comprehensive and legally binding cooperation framework. …
Especially, cybersecurity is of enormous importance for Japan, given the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Millions of cyberattacks are predicted, and despite the country’s remarkable public safety… The topic is of such importance that Japan is even going to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. …

Brexit, a Catalyst for Closer EU-Japan Relations? (PDF) | Irina Angelescu
… Consequently, there is an implicit understanding from the Japanese side that the UK government “owes” special attention to Japanese interests, and should keep those interests in mind when negotiating Brexit. The former UK Ambassador to Japan, David Warren, indicated that some of his Japanese counterparts share a sense of “betrayal,” …
…three Japanese car manufacturers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) now make almost half of the 1.67 million cars produced in the UK. …
… GlaxoSmithKline Plc estimates that, in the next two-three years, it could incur costs as high as 70 million pounds ($98 million) of Brexit-related costs. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson estimated that it could face as many as 50,000 additional tests in the amount of 1 million pounds if there will be no post-Brexit mutual recognition of testing between the EU and the UK. AstroZeneca and MerkKGaA raised similar concerns. …
… Mitsubishi Bank UFJ picked Amsterdam as its base for EU securities operations, while Nomura Holdings, Daiwa Securities and Sumitomo Matsui Financial Group said they would move to Frankfurt. …
… Decisions such as that of Unilever – the UK’s third largest company to consolidate its HQ in the Netherlands and abandon the separate London HQ is just one recent example that has caused more unease among third parties about the outcome of Brexit. …
The Japanese position has remained consistent about its preferences for Brexit from the very beginning: no Brexit or the “softest” form of Brexit, with unhindered access to the European Single Market – preferably preceded by a very long transition period that would allow Japanese businesses to adapt to changes. …
… In particular, joint training and cooperation to address newer threats like cybersecurity or disinformation campaigns conducted by countries like Russia and China could prove to be mutually beneficial. In principle, the U.S. should also welcome the closer economic ties between the EU and Japan as a means to promote free trade worldwide. At the same time, the EU-Japan data protection agreement and certain provisions in the EU-Japan EPA such as Geographic Indicators (GIs) for agricultural products could negatively affect U.S. interests. …
EU-Japan partnership agreements herald new era of closer cooperation (29/01/2018) | Irina Angelescu @ European Council on Foreign Relations

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA): Good but Good Enough? (16/10/2018) | Axel Berkofsky @ ISPI
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order (PDF; 12/2017) | Axel Berkofsky @ University of Pavia, Italy & Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) (@ Bertelsmann Stiftung) You can check out Table 1 and Figure 2 (in this PDF).
The EU-Japan EPA/SPA and the ‘Abe Doctrine’: Reinforcing Norms Globally, Changing them Domestically (PDF; 07/2018) | Edward Danks @ European Institute for Asian Studies
JAPAN-EU COOPERATION IN THE ERA OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER TRANSFORMATION: IN SEARCH OF A STABLE WORLD SYSTEM (w PDFs; 28/11/2017) | INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (w PDFs) | Lords Select Committee, UK Parliament
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: trends and prospects (PDF; 07/03/2018) | The Royal Institute of International Affairs of Belgium & the University of Essex
EU-JAPAN – READY FOR A NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS? (PDF; Spring 2014) | Friends of Europe
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A Framework To Promote Shared Values [International Agreements In Progress] (12/10/2018) | Enrico D’Ambrogio @ European Parliamentary Research
Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (18/07/2018) | Ankit Panda @ The Diplomat

〔Charts, Tables, etc.〕
EUJEPA MOFAjapan BenefitsTopProducts EU-JapanAve MFNdutiesEU servicesTrade wJapanEU FDIJapan outwardFDITradeFacilitationIndicator JapanEU ExImReduction EUtariffsComparison simulations Tab11Comparison simulations Tab11-2Comparison results Tab13

EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 日EU経済連携協定(EUJEPA)Vol.2

This time all the below links and pictures are in Japanese.
取り急ぎ標記につき以下のとおり抜粋とリンクを貼っておきます。次回、英文情報を貼ります。
平成31年2月15日、下記「cf. EU加盟28国」及び記事等10件を追加しました。

日EU経済連携協定交渉に関する主要閣僚会議及び交渉推進タスクフォース | 首相官邸
日EU・EPA(概要)(平成30年12月11日)| 外務省
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の概要PDF から下の画像1枚目抜粋
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の日EU経済連携協定(EPA)に関するファクトシート(PDF) から他の画像4枚(同PDFの3―10頁)抜粋
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の 日EU・EPA関税交渉の主な結果(平成30年11月6日〕| 外務省
◦上記主な結果内の農林水産省所管品目経済産業省所管品目 等
日EU・EPA大枠合意内容(農林水産分野の概要)(YouTube;2017年7月27日)| 農林水産省
日EU経済連携協定(日EU・EPA)の大枠合意について(平成29年9月)| 財務省
日欧EPA大枠合意 発効のメリットと国内対策(2017年7月30日)| 公明新聞
…チーズでは、カマンベルチーズなどのソフトチーズの関税(主に29.8%)を中心に、2万トン(製品ベース)の低関税輸入枠を設けて段階的に引き下げ、15年でゼロにする。ワインの関税(15%または1リットル当たり125円のいずれか低い方)は、即時ゼロになる。…パスタ(1キロ当たり30円)やチョコレート菓子(10%)は10年でゼロに。バッグなど皮革製品(最高30%)の関税も10年または15年で撤廃、消費者はその分安く購入できる。…欧州が日本製の乗用車に課す関税(10%)は段階的に引き下げ7年で撤廃。自動車部品(最大4.5%)や一般機械や化学工業製品、電気機器の関税も即時ゼロに。交渉が難航したテレビ(最大14%)は5年間かけて関税を撤廃する。
一方、日本酒(100リットル当たり最大7.7ユーロ)や、緑茶(最大3.2%)の関税も即時撤廃。海外での日本食ブームを背景に欧州への輸出拡大が期待される。…日本の国産ブドウのみを原料として国内で製造した「日本ワイン」について、現在は輸出証明書の取得が義務付けられていたが不要になる。
欧州議会、歴史的な日・EU自由貿易協定を承認(2018年12月12日)| 駐日欧州連合代表部
欧州議会議員団、日本・EU間のEPAの評価のため訪日(2018年9月14日)| 駐日欧州連合代表部
日EU経済連携協定(PDF;平成30年2月)| 在英国日本国大使館
日本とEUのEPA 来年2月発効へ 世界最大の自由貿易圏に(2018年12月13日)| NHK

日欧EPA妥結、19年発効めざす 世界貿易4割カバー(2018年12月8日)| 日本経済新聞
…関税分野では、EU側が日本産乗用車にかける関税(10%)が、協定発効から8年目でゼロになる。日本産の自動車部品も全体の92%の品目で、協定発効と同時に関税がなくなる。
日本側は、EU産ワインにかける関税(1本当たり93円もしくは15%)を協定発効と同時にゼロにする。欧州産が強いソフトチーズは、低関税の輸入枠を作り、協定の発効から16年目に関税を無くす。…
日欧EPA承認案を閣議決定 最大級の自由貿易圏(2018年11月6日)| 日本経済新聞
サッポロ「日欧EPA発効と普段のワイン飲用に関するアンケート」、70%以上が関税撤廃に期待(2018年12月17日)| ニコニコニュース(食品産業新聞社 酒類飲料日報)
日EU EPAの大枠合意について (2017年7月10日)| 住友商事グローバルリサーチ 国際部
…ここで問題なのが、38の議会での批准である。EUはリスボン条約で民主主義の原理を強化したため、EU域内の38の中央政府、地方議会の批准が必要である。2016年秋に合意されたEUとカナダのCETAがまだ発効していないのは、この38議会の批准に時間がかかっているためで、問題はISDS条項にあると言われている。…
日本とEU、EPAで大筋合意—日本自動車工業会が歓迎(2017年7月7日)| Response
日EU・EPA大枠合意を受け、EU農業団体は歓迎の意(2017年7月11日)| 独立行政法人 農畜産業振興機構
日EU・EPA交渉の大枠合意に関するJA全中会長談話(PDF;平成29年7月7日)

日 EU・EPA の合意内容と日本農業への影響(PDF;2018年3月)| (株)農林中金総合研究所 基礎研究部
6頁  EUからの農林水産物輸入のうちアルコール飲料が1,683億円で最も多く,なかでもワイン(1,186億円)の割合が高い。豚肉は1,648億円で食品ではアルコール飲料とともに日本の輸入が多い。  日本からEU向けの農林水産物輸出では,アルコール飲料,ホタテガイ,ソース混合調味料,緑茶,牛肉などの品目が多くなっている。牛肉は2013年にEU向け輸入が解禁され,輸出額を伸ばしている。
7頁  CETAはEUとカナダの自由貿易協定。2009年に交渉を開始し,13年に原則的合意,14年に条文を完成し公表して16年に署名した。さらに,17年に双方の議会が承認し,17年9月に暫定発効した。原則合意から署名までに3年間,暫定発効までに4年間が経過した。正式発効は未定である。
9-10・13-15・21・25-26・31・33・40・43・45・53頁等の図表等は分かり易いです。

TPP11及び日EU・EPAによる北海道への影響について(PDF;平成30年2月) | 北海道
日EU・EPA及びTPP11による京都府農林水産業への影響について | 京都府
林業・木材産業の成長産業化(日欧EPA対応)(PDF)| 高知県
妥結した日EU・EPAの活用に向けて | 日本貿易振興機構
日EU・EPAの署名 2019年春までの発効を目指す(PDF;2018年7月18日) | みずほ総合研究所
『日 EU・EPA 交渉のビジネス影響』 ~ 大枠合意を受けて経営者が持つべき視点~ (PDF;2018年8月17日)| Deloitte
通商白書2018: 第1節 メガFTAの進展(CPTPP、日 EU・EPA、RCEP)等
日 EU・EPAと日本の通商戦略(PDF)| 安田信之助
日EU・EPA等の経済効果分析(PDF;2017年12月21日)| 内閣官房TPP等政府対策本部
日欧EPAの評価(PDF;2017年7月)|JC総研所長・東京大学教授 鈴木宣弘

日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)(平成30年7月17日)| 外務省
日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)(PDF)| 外務省
日・EUの連携を強める戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)| EU MAG
欧州議会外交委、日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定締結勧告案を採択(2018年11月22日)| 日本貿易振興機構

ナショナリズムと難民危機を乗り越えて -日欧EPAのもたらす衝撃(PDF;2018年10月)| 国際貿易投資研究所客員研究員・法政大学名誉教授 長部重康
2頁 5年にわたる交渉を経て 2018年7月にようやく締結に漕ぎつけた。衝撃的ともいえる画期的意義は、以下のようである。まず 3本の協定の同時誕生となる。日欧 EPA は最終的に関税事項とルール作りとに純化される。投資事項は保護条約として別建てになるが、これは決着までにはかなりの時間がかかろう。加えて政治マターである戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)が、すでに同時調印された。
第2の衝撃は、投資事項が別建てにされたために、日欧 EPA が混合条約ではなくなった事実にある。発効を早期化でき(fast track)、欧州理事会の承認と欧州議会の批准のみで済む。地域議会を含む各国国民議会による合計38にまで達する批准を、クリアできる。
この結果第3の衝撃が生まれ、Brexit の期限、2019年3月よりかなり早い時期に、発効可能となった。EU 発足以来の最大の危機たる Brexit を前に、市民に対して欧州統合の再始動を鮮明にアピールできる。
最後に第4の衝撃だが、結論で詳述されるように、これまでのアメリカ主導の FTA とは異質な、日欧主導による新たな型の連携協定を世界に示し得る。以下に第1節で EU 分解の危機を分析し、第2節から第4節で日 EU 経済連携協定の意義を考察したい。
5頁 ドイツは2016年以降3年にわたり、経常収支黒字で世界のトップを続け(中国、日本がこれに次ぐ)2018年には3,000億ドル、GDP比8%と歴史的記録を達成した。これとは対照的に、資本ストックの伸びでは米、仏に劣り、設備投資では仏、EU、伊などを大きく下回る。
8頁 2018年8月、プーチン大統領はドイツを訪問したが、総工費 110 億ドルの巨大プロジェクト、「ノルドストリーム(NS)2」の2019年完成を促すためである。シュレーダーが深く関わった「ノルドストリーム 1」がすでに 2011年から稼働しているが、これに並行してバルト海底に独露間を直接結ぶ天然ガス・パイプラインを通す計画である。従来のウクライナとポーランドを通るガス動脈はますます先細って行くことになるが、現在すでに稼働率は50%に落ち込んでいる。
10頁 2018年6月、仏、独首脳は、ユーロ圏共通予算を 2021年に発足させることで合意した。EUも年末までに中期共通予算を含むユーロ圏改革の具体案作りを目指しており、ユーロの脆弱性を財政面から支えたい。…フランスでは 2002~06年、2007~17年に SGP違反で 3%を超えた前歴があり、マクロンによってようやく長年の違反状態を脱し得た。ドイツも例外ではなく 1996~99年、2002~05年、2008~10年に、イギリスでも 2003~05年、2008~15年にと、大国も軒並み違反状態を長年繰り返し、制裁金の支払いも免れてきた。
12頁 2017年7月と12月に「大枠合意」が報じられたが、これまで使われてきた「大筋合意」より完成度は低いとされるが、英語ではともに political agreement と表記された。その後、締結に至るまでかなり時間がかかったが、自動車と乳製品、特にチーズに関する合意でてこずった…
16頁 CETAについて、2018年7月になって驚愕のニュースが飛び込んできた。左派ポピュリスト政党、「5つ星運動」の党首である伊のディ・マイオ経済発展・労働相がこの条約には批准しない、と明言したからである。条約崩壊か、との不安が再び迫った。6月発足のイタリア新政権は、「自国産農産物を守る」と公約したが、最近カナダからの輸入が増大している。地理的表示に関しても不満が鬱積する。原産地呼称や地理的表示が保護される件数は、イタリアでは290品目に上るが、このうち CETA で認められたのはパルマ・ハムを含むわずか40品目に止まった。
2017年7月の大枠合意は、直前の6月に日本で、牛乳の流通拡大を盛り込んだ改正畜産経営安定法が成立したことで可能になった。
ヨーロッパにとって、農産品の輸出拡大は至上命題である。理由は2つあり、第1は、ロシアによる EU 農産品への輸入禁止措置にある。
17頁 第2は、アメリカの農産品貿易収支における巨額な対欧赤字の存在である。
日本市場は EU からの輸出額が57億ユーロに上り、第4位の農産物輸出市場である。いずれ農産品輸出の85%に日本が関税譲許することになれば、きわめて魅力的に映ろう。牛肉は関税38.5%を15年間で9%に、豚の加工品は無関税に、豚肉は低関税になる。ワインは15%関税が即時撤廃され、チーズでは29.8%が大幅に引き下げられて16年後には撤廃される(図表5)。なお国内消費におけるEU産チーズの比重は23%であり、オーストラリアの30%に次ぎ、ニュージーランドの19%を上回る。
18頁 2013年、ユネスコは日本人の伝統的食文化として、「和食」の無形文化遺産への登録を認めた。これを追い風に、世界各地で和食ブームに沸く。日欧EPAでは、和牛、緑茶、水産品、日本酒など重点品目をはじめ、ほぼすべての農産品について EU 市場で即時関税が撤廃される。2016 年の日本の食品輸出はアジアへ4,200億ドル、アメリカへ1,000億ドルに対して、ヨーロッパへはわずか400億ドルにすぎないが、この拡大への期待が膨らむ。
食の安全性への国際認証の取得である。ドイツ発祥のグローバル GAP(Good Agricultural practice)の認証取得には、農薬・飼料の使用量、農業用水管理、衛生面の配慮等々で、数100項目の検査をクリアしなければならない。現在、認証取得農業者は、世界で約18万を数える。
2011年に EU韓 FTA 発効のおかげで、その 4年後に関税撤廃され、テレビの14%関税も5年後になくなった。韓国は2011年以降、対欧自動車輸出を55%拡大させ、ヨーロッパも対韓輸出を3倍増と歴史的な高さを実現し、貿易赤字は解消された。2009~16年に、EUにおける韓国車のシェアは4.1から 6.3%に急増したが、日本車は逆に13.1から12.7%に落ち込んでしまった。
19頁 入札対象は、これまで都道府県に限られていたが、新たに人口20万人以上の 48中核都市にまで開放され、日本の人口の15%に及ぶ。
20頁 日欧EPAは、中国の進める広域経済圏構想、一帯一路に対する選択肢ともなりえよう。中国は2016年にラトビアの首都、リガで、中東欧16カ国を集めて「16+1 グループ」を発足させたが(図表6)、巨額のインフラ関連投資を餌に、ヨーロッパへの進出を加速させるとともに、南シナ海やチベット、新彊ウイグル自治区などでの国際紛争を前に応援団を増やす戦略とみられる。ギリシャとハンガリーが応援団の先頭を切っているが、すでに中国は2016年にギリシャ最大のピレウス港を2.8億ユーロで買い取り、一帯一路の到着地として、さらに将来的には軍事基地として、着々と整備を進めてきた。今回は中東欧の貧しい移行国が狙われ、アルバニア、モンテネグロ、チェコ、ハンガリー、セルビアなどに、道路、鉄道、発電事業への大型投資計画を打ち上げている。これらの国もギリシャ同様、いずれ巨額債務で中国に首根っこを押さえられる危険が高まったが、マケドニアではすでに高額融資による高速鉄道建設が凍結される事態となった。
21頁 とりわけ極左、極右が貿易自由化反対を叫び…
22頁 だが日欧間交渉においては、非対称性の障害は相対的に小さい。EU の構成単位が国民国家で日本と共通し、移民関連の競合は存在せず、価値観では「旧大陸」同士ゆえ概ね近いからである。

日欧EPAはアベノミクス・日本外交の大成果(PDF;平成31年2月14日)| みずほ総合研究所 専務執行役員 平成31年2月15日追加
[メガFTA] 日欧EPA発効 小売り先行値下げ ワイン、チーズ 国産と競合激化(平成31年2月2日)| 日本農業新聞 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA「日本ブランド」守るカギ 6億人の巨大経済圏誕生(平成31年2月2日)| FNN PRIME 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA 恩恵の影も忘れずに(平成31年2月2日)| 東京新聞 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA発効 GDP3割の自由貿易圏(平成31年2月1日)| 中日新聞 表 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPAあす発効 農産品など値下げも…(w 動画;平成31年1月31日)| 西日本放送 平成31年2月15日追加
<日欧EPA>東北もワイン一斉値下げ 日本酒業界は輸出増に期待(平成31年2月2日)| 河北新報 平成31年2月15日追加
欧州で評価の高いホタテは段階的に削減、撤廃される。石巻魚市場(石巻市)は高度衛生管理型で国際的な食品衛生管理方式「HACCP(ハサップ)」に対応し、衛生基準が厳しいEUへの輸出も見据える。
日欧EPA発効 ワイン関税撤廃で値引きセール(平成31年2月1日)| ひょうご経済+ 平成31年2月15日追加
【社説】農林水産物輸出拡大へ技術と独自性(平成31年2月15日)| 化学工業日報 平成31年2月15日追加
〇 全て英文 日欧経済連携協定(Japan=EU EPA)の経済効果の推計 Quantifying the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement(w PDF;平成30年9月11日)| 大久保敏弘、木村福成、Gabriel Felbermayr、Marina Steininger @ 慶應義塾大学経済研究所 平成31年2月15日追加
22-頁 
5 General Equilibrium Results
… In our Ricardian trade model, lowering trade costs allows countries to specialize more strongly in sectors in which the comparative advantage
is the strongest. But such a trade liberalization does not necessarily lead to an overall welfare gain. Consumers benefit from lower prices, but they may source from more inefficient countries. At the same time, governments lose tariff income. Moreover, the preferential nature of trade liberalization gives rise to the Viner-ambiguity. The FTA may affect world market prices such that some partner countries could be hurt. Further …
5.4 Changes in trade
Outcomes of the two trading regions look quite complementary in the agri-food and goods sector. All the sectors that can generate gains in terms of value added are losing in the other region and vice versa. The only exceptions are the electronic equipment, machinery sector and the textiles and apparel sector. The services sectors behave similarly and are confronted with positive value added effects in both regions. The EU-Japan trade agreement would seemingly lead to diversion effects in the agri-food and goods sectors and to output creation in the service industry. …
Overall, Japan is able to increase its exports towards all countries and regions. Not surprisingly, Japan’s exports to the EU increase to the largest extent, by 79 bn USD, which is equivalent to a 64% increase in Japanese exports towards the EU. The export increases towards the remaining countries and regions cannot be neglected either. Chinese imports of Japanese products increases by 23% (470 mio USD), ASEAN by 0.2% (200 mio USD), USA/Canada by 0.33% (520 mio USD) and imports of the rest of the world from Japan by .2% (690 mio USD). Japanese imports from the EU increase by 74%, which is equal to an increase of 83 bn USD. Other than on the export side, Japanese imports from the remaining world decreases by 6.5 bn USD. Trade diversion away from third countries and towards the EU is evident on the import side.
The largest export increase towards the EU can be expected in the automotive sector (20.8 bn USD). Further, Japanese exports towards the EU increase in the chemical industry (14.9 bn USD). The same is true for the machinery and equipment, raw materials and metal industry that export additional products worth 25.3 bn USD more towards the EU. The increase of exports in the Japanese service industry is not negligible either. …

cf. EU加盟28国 平成31年2月15日追加
オーストリア共和国(Republic of Austria) 基礎データ | 外務省
ベルギー王国(Kingdom of Belgium) 基礎データ | 外務省
ブルガリア共和国(Republic of Bulgaria) 基礎データ | 外務省
クロアチア共和国(Republic of Croatia) 基礎データ | 外務省
キプロス共和国(Republic of Cyprus) 基礎データ | 外務省
チェコ共和国(Czech Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
デンマーク王国(Kingdom of Denmark) 基礎データ | 外務省
エストニア共和国(Republic of Estonia) 基礎データ | 外務省
フィンランド共和国(Republic of Finland) 基礎データ | 外務省
フランス共和国(French Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ドイツ連邦共和国(Federal Republic of Germany) 基礎データ | 外務省
ギリシャ共和国(Hellenic Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ハンガリー(Hungary) 基礎データ | 外務省
アイルランド(Ireland) 基礎データ | 外務省
イタリア共和国(Italian Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ラトビア共和国(Republic of Latvia) 基礎データ | 外務省
リトアニア共和国(Republic of Lithuania) 基礎データ | 外務省
ルクセンブルク大公国(Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 基礎データ | 外務省
マルタ共和国(Republic of Malta) 基礎データ | 外務省
オランダ王国(Kingdom of the Netherlands) 基礎データ | 外務省
ポーランド共和国(Republic of Poland) 基礎データ | 外務省
ポルトガル共和国(Portuguese Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ルーマニア(Romania) 基礎データ | 外務省
スロバキア共和国(Slovak Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
スロベニア共和国(Republic of Slovenia) 基礎データ | 外務省
スペイン王国(Kingdom of Spain) 基礎データ | 外務省
スウェーデン王国(Kingdom of Sweden) 基礎データ | 外務省
英国(グレートブリテン及び北アイルランド連合王国) (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 基礎データ | 外務省

〔図表〕
日EUEPA主内容
日EUEPA 日本市場へのアクセス 農日EUEPA EU市場へのアクセス日EUEPA 対EU輸出入日EUEPA 直接投資

U.K. イギリス Vol.15(Brexit Vol.12)

All the below links are in English.
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標記につき以下貼っておきます。

UK Vol.125 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.43)
UK Vol.124 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.42)
UK Vol.123 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.41)
UK Vol.122 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.40)
UK Vol.121 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.39)
UK Vol.114 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.38)
UK Vol.113 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.37)
UK Vol.112 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.36)
UK Vol.111 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.35)
UK Vol.110 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.34)
UK Vol.109 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.33)
UK Vol.108 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.32)
UK Vol.106 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.31)
UK Vol.105 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.30)
UK Vol.104 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.29)
UK Vol.103 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.28)
UK Vol.102 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.27)
UK Vol.101 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.26)
UK Vol.100 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.25)
UK Vol.95 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.24)
UK Vol.94 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.23)
UK Vol.67 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.13)
UK Vol.66 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.12 – Theresa May’s Trump visit)
UK Vol.65 (Post-EUref Vol.11 – including UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit speech)

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.46(Policies & Midterms 各種政策等 Vol.20 - 大学ツイート UC LA (Los Angeles) & Berkeley)

All the below tweets are in English.
今日は、 UCLA と UCバークレー のツイートを貼っておきます。
6日、40個ほど追加しました。
なお、この大学ツイート特集に限りませんが、専門家等によるこういう政策議論がありますというご紹介として、あまりに極端なもの等を除いて当サイトに貼っています。その結果、それらの党派色が見えることがありますが、いつも書いておりますように政治的意図等は一切ありませんし、政治的影響も無いと判断しております。


cf.
1月7・13日追加
California Vol.16 (University of California, Berkeley / San Diego)
California Vol.18 (University of California, Los Angeles)
California Vol.19 (UCLA, University of Southern California, Pepperdine University, etc.)
12月18日追加 2017年のほぼ同時期です。
US Policy Changes Vol.65 (US law professors Vol.1) テキサス以西、主にカリフォルニア。