U.K. イギリス Vol.22(England イングランド Vol.4 – West Midlands Vol.1)

All the below links are in English or Japanese.

ウェールズに地理的に近接する3州です。順に、ウスターソース、ヘレフォード牛(肉)、シュロップシャー羊や(実はシュロップシャー発祥ではないとの)シュロップシャーブルーチーズ(原料:牛乳)、で日本でも名が知られています。

UK Vol.75 (England Vol.4 – West Midlands Vol.1)

Worcestershire ウースターシャー州
Worcestershire Sauce – Japanese Encyclopedia (03/21/2017) | @MATCHA_global
How to Make Yakisoba (Japanese Fried Noodles Recipe) – YouTube
WHAT IS OKONOMI SAUCE? (16/10/2017) | @OtaJoyOtafuku
Sauce Katsudon Recipe (Deep-Fried Breaded Pork Bowl with Worcestershire-Based Sauce) (w Video) | @cookingwithdog
KORROKE WITH TONKATSU SAUCE (JAPANESE POTATO CROQUETTES WITH EAS) | @geniuskitchen
JAPANESE-STYLE SPAGHETTI (11/03/2016) | Food Education International
Curry and Rice Recipe (w Video) | @JCooking101
ReCPY: Homemade Worcestershire Sauce (01/30/2012) | Moto Yamamoto @umamimart
Vegan Worcestershire Sauce, Two Ways (01/19/2012) | Mark Bittman @nytimes
How is Japanese sauce (ソース) different from… sauce? (+Recipe) | @survivingnjapan without much Japanese
Worcestershire Sauce – this one is a bit fishy if you ask me (05/27/2009) | Oyster Food and Culture
Worcestershire Sauce | @cooking_r
HISTORY OF WORCESTERSHIRE SAUCE (1837-2012) (PDF) | William Shurtleff & Akiko Aoyagi @ Soyinfo Center
12 Soy Sauce Substitutes (12/19/2018) | Medically reviewed by Gerhard Whitworth, RN; Written by Natalie Silver @Healthline
Japanese Sauces | AsiaRecipe.com
Japanese University Visits to Advance Partnership Work with University of Worcester (07/11/2017) | @WorcesterEcho
ウスターシャー・ソースのはなし | ハナママゴンの雑記帳
SOUTHERN BARBECUE SAUCE 南部風バーベキューソース | Kolis Inn
イギリスでソースと言えば (12/07/2018) | @courrierinter
ウースター市 (PDF) | @MazakCorp
Takashimaya Online
GKNエアロスペース | @SCCommerce

Herefordshire ヘレフォードシャー州
The Sun is Rising on a New Era in UK-Japan Relations (05/09/2017) | Dan Dalton (MEP for the West Midlands)
JAPAN LEARNS TOURISM FROM HEREFORDSHIRE (01/09/2019) | @EatSleepLiveHfd
肉専用種牛ヘレフォード種とはどういう牛か (PDF) | 北海道立新得畜産試験場 @ 雪印種苗
英国の肉用牛 | 英米豪で誕生した肉牛
牛の品種 | 仙台牛
ニュージーランド産牛 | コープデリ
山地における集団肉牛の繁殖方法の改善 (PDF) | 岩手県

Shropshire シュロップシャー州
Japan is less expensive than you might think (26/11/2018) | Whitchurch Rugby Club – Shropshire @Pitchero
First major export deal to Japan (09/02/2017) | @ShropsChamber
Shropshire companies set for Japan visit (28/10/2014) | @ShropshireStar
これであなたもチーズ通!知っておきたい世界の定番チーズ52選 (01/22/2017) | @nico_nico_news

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.53(A subjective English news article affecting Japan’s national interest adversely written by a Japanese journalist 日本人記者による国益に反する主観的な英文記事)

無関係な方でこの種の内容を好まない方が居られるであろうと感じ、気が進まないのですが、見つけてしまいかつ国益の話であるためスルーできない(苦笑)ので、載せます。今回がこういうの初めてですし、できれば一回きりにしたいです。
断っておきますが、弊社としてどの政治勢力とどうのこうのは少なくとも現時点で何もありません。個人として消去法で政権その他を選ぶのは、他の有権者と同じです。
Japan courts Trump using emperor, first lady’s birthday: Without close friends in Asia, Japan’s prime minister is seen using every opportunity, even the emperor’s accession, to court President Donald Trump (04/20/2019) | MARI YAMAGUCHI @ Associated Press TOKYO

正直、こんなに無茶苦茶な記事はあまり無い、と感じておりましたら、日本人記者による東京AP発の記事をABCが使っているというものでした。アポストロフィーが全くないのは、ABCがこの記事自体を軽んじて遊んでいるのでしょうか?(笑)
この記者、国益を考えたことないでしょうね。我が国は、他の民主主義・経済大国よりも地政学面その他において “常に” 余裕がありません。地面は動きませんので。資源も無い、土地も広いとは言えない。こういう点を一生分からない人が、平気でアホ情報を垂れ流します。公的マインドがあれば、政権批判には他にやり方がいくらでもあると気付くでしょうに。しかももっと理詰めで。こういうの、日本社会としてちゃんと取り上げなきゃいけませんね。
以下、抜粋と第一感です。

Abe, experts say, is taking every opportunity to court Trump as Japan tries to stay out of the U.S. leaders crosshairs, unlike some other world leaders who have upset him on trade and other issues.
世界に発信するなら、この「experts」は最初に大きく名前を出さないと。別にそれくらい言って何も無いところから逮捕勾留有罪となるような国でもないでしょう。そういう国は世界にはいくつも存在するようですが。個人的には公に、この experts は大した experts でない、と言い切ります。
最後まで読むと、この後出てくるお2人を指しているのでしょうね。

Im not sure what other choices this administration, or any Japanese administration, has except to try to build the best relationship possible with Washington through face-to-face interaction, said Stephen Nagy, a politics and international studies professor at International Christian University in Tokyo. I think Mr. Trump being the first to meet the emperor is a good example of that.
この文章、(文脈から批判的と見られるトーンの)二文目が(一見問題無いトーンの)一文目と繋がっていない。
この教授の言う、日本の政権にとって最善の日米関係を構築する以外に方法があるのか分からない、というのは全く同感です。良い悪いはともかく、今日現在の現実です。
ちなみに、今、インバウンド観光客が急激に増えているのは、良好な日米関係、中国の各種の慣行をアメリカが責め立てている状況等、と無関係でしょうか??長年、日本はインバウンドを増やすのに努力して来ましたが、なかなか実らなかった。今、素晴らしいことになっています。
また、日米協議等での日本側への要望は事実に相違するのを何度も見たことがありますが、他方、今、アメリカが中国に対して主張していることは、情報を総合すると概ね間違いなかろうとも個人的には感じます。
大抵の場合は、政治は結果責任ですから、結果が良ければそれで良いと成るのは成ります。個人として違和感を感じる時は、勿論あります。

Relations between Japan and two of its closest neighbors, South Korea and China, remain strained over their war history and territorial disputes.
で、これは、日本の責任なんでしょうか??国際政治をよく知る知らない関わらず、中国韓国との戦後のやり取りについて日本側が悪いと判断する日本人は極めて少数派ではないでしょうか。数十年間もう散々、謝罪や金銭補償をし続けてきたでしょうに。今の中年世代は、その親の世代とは違い、別に差別意識もありません。能力や人格を見るのみです。何国人だから優れていない、とか決め付けることは少なくとも私はしません。そういう時代だという認識です。

Abe has managed to largely stay on good terms with Trump by assiduously avoiding criticism of the U.S. leader. You never hear criticisms out of Japan … that has been very characteristic of the Abe administration, Nagy said. I think he has done well because he hasnt insulted Mr. Trump to cause problems.
うーん、この文章のトーンは、この教授、さっきと違いますね。書いた記者の責任でしょうか?それともさっきの文章を書く時に、トーンを記者が間違えたか。

Hiro Aida, professor of global studies at Aoyama Gakuin University and an expert on Japan-U.S. relations, said Abe is jumping at the opportunity of the emperors succession after his ties with Trump were seen to be weakening as the U.S. leader came down hard on trade issues, demanding that Japan do more to reduce the countries trade imbalance.
こういう教授は、どうせ経済貿易の実務的実際的分析をさっぱりできないので、こういういかにも決め付けの政治的批判をするのでしょうか?だから、日本の政治学教授は、全般に舐められるんです。もっと公的マインド、もっと理詰めに行かないと。国益を考えろ、批判は客観的なデータや論理などある種の証拠が無いと頭が悪いと言わざる得ない、ということです。
あと、日米関係が良くない時期が過去にありましたが、日本経済や国民生活はどうだったでしょうか??サミットで日本の首脳がずっと延々ひとりぼっちの写真が撮られているとか。これだけでも、国益上どうでしょうか。首脳の話ですからよく思い出して、国民一人一人が厳密に考える必要があります。
ちなみに、本当かどうかは定かでないと一応断りますが、先日のワシントンでの米韓首脳会談はたった2分で終わった旨の報道があります。勿論、長けりゃ良いというものではありません。ただ、北朝鮮からも韓国国内メディアからも、この点その他につき韓国大統領は批判をされています。
首脳を比較する時は、とにかく国益、この一点だけよく考えれば、ヘンな結論には至らないはずです。

U.K. イギリス Vol.20(ウェールズ Wales)

Wales LocalAuthorityDistricts
加工元地図及び加工後のこの地図に England の Herefordshire が入ってしまっていますが、当然間違いです。公開及びツイートの後で気付きました。
While the original white map and this retouched one of Wales include Herefordshire of England, it is a matter of course that it is wrong. I found this mistake after I published this post and related tweet.

取り急ぎ、以下貼っておきます。

UK Vol.134 (Wales Vol.8 – Merthyr Tydfil, Caerphilly, Blaenau Gwent, Torfaen, Newport, Monmouthshire)

UK Vol.133 (Wales Vol.7 – Swansea, Neath Port Talbot, Bridgend, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Vale of Glamorgan, Cardiff)

UK Vol.97 (Wales Vol.5 – Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire)

UK Vol.83 (Wales Vol.4 – Powys, Ceredigion)

UK Vol.78 (Wales Vol.3 – Isle of Anglesey, Conwy, Gwynedd)

UK Vol.74 (Wales Vol.2 – Flintshire, Wrexham, Denbighshire)

UK Vol.107 (Wales Vol.6)
UK Vol.4 (Wales Vol.1)

「ウェールズ」でツイッター検索すると出て来るものの一部を、以下貼っておきます。


https://twitter.com/rugbyfoot/status/1115831019721064449


https://twitter.com/rugbyfoot/status/1082921676864667648

U.K. イギリス Vol.19(スコットランド Scotland)

UK Scotland1 LocalAuthorityDistricts1

取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。
Subdivisions in Eurostat NUTS 地方
Eastern = Angus and Dundee; Clackmannanshire and Fife; East Lothian and Midlothian; Scottish Borders; Edinburgh; Falkirk; Perth and Kinross, and Stirling; West Lothian
South Western = East Dunbartonshire, West Dunbartonshire, and Helensburgh and Lomond; Dumfries and Galloway; East and North Ayrshire mainland; Glasgow; Inverclyde, East Renfrewshire, and Renfrewshire; North Lanarkshire; South Ayrshire; South Lanarkshire
North Eastern = Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire
Highlands and Islands = Caithness and Sutherland, and Ross and Cromarty; Inverness, Nairn, Moray, and Badenoch and Strathspey; Lochaber, Skye and Lochalsh, Arran and Cumbrae, and Argyll and Bute (except Helensburgh and Lomond); Eilean Siar (Western Isles); Orkney Islands; Shetland Islands

UK Vol.98 (Scotland Vol.22 – North Eastern)

UK Vol.85 (Scotland Vol.21 – Eastern Vol.3)
UK Vol.80 (Scotland Vol.20 – Eastern Vol.2)
UK Vol.76 (Scotland Vol.19 – Eastern Vol.1)

UK Vol.72 (Scotland Vol.18 – South Western Vol.2)
UK Vol.70 (Scotland Vol.17 – South Western Vol.1)

UK Vol.10 (Scotland Vol.1 – Highlands)

Council areas 一部個別地域
UK Vol.23 (Scotland Vol.14 – Dumfries & Galloway economy)
UK Vol.22 (Scotland Vol.13 – Renfrewshire economy)
UK Vol.21 (Scotland Vol.12 – Orkney Islands economy)
UK Vol.20 (Scotland Vol.11 – Shetland Islands economy)
UK Vol.19 (Scotland Vol.10 – Glasgow economy)
UK Vol.18 (Scotland Vol.9 – East Dunbartonshire economy)
UK Vol.17 (Scotland Vol.8 – Clackmannanshire economy)
UK Vol.16 (Scotland Vol.7 – West Lothian economy)
UK Vol.15 (Scotland Vol.6 – Angus economy)
UK Vol.14 (Scotland Vol.5 – Kincardineshire economy)
UK Vol.13 (Scotland Vol.4 – Aberdeenshire economy)
UK Vol.12 (Scotland Vol.3 – Invernessshire economy)
UK Vol.11 (Scotland Vol.2 – Ross & Cromarty economy)

「スコットランド」でツイッター検索すると出て来るものの一部を、以下貼っておきます。

U.K. イギリス Vol.18(北アイルランド Northern Ireland)

UK NorthernIreland LAdistrictsUK NorthernIreland counties
All the below links are in English.

取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。

Local Authority Districts
Antrim and Newtownabbey; Belfast
UK Vol.99 (Northern Ireland Vol.4)

Newry, Mourne and Down; Ards and North Down; Lisburn and Castlereagh
UK Vol.82 (Northern Ireland Vol.3)

Mid and East Antrim (Carrickfergus, Larne, Ballymena); Mid Ulster (Magherafelt, Cookstown, Dungannon); Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon
UK Vol.77 (Northern Ireland Vol.2)

Fermanagh and Omagh; Derry and Strabane; Causeway Coast and Glens
UK Vol.73 (Northern Ireland Vol.1)

その他 Miscellaneous
Good Friday (& Agreement)

UK Vol.91 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.20: 2017 General Election – Plaid Cymru, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin)

UK Vol.59 (Religion and the patterns of conflict in Northern Ireland)

UK Vol.52 (Concern over Brexit’s impact on political landscape in Northern Ireland)

UK Vol.5 (Northern Ireland)

なお、今、ツイッターで日本語で「北アイルランド」と入れて検索したら、以下のようなものが出て来ましたので、取り急ぎ情報として貼っておきます。
個人としてはニュアンスやトーンに必ずしも共感しない等のものが含まれる可能性があります旨、常々ご留意頂ければ幸甚です。

Ireland アイルランド Vol.7(州 counties)

Ireland GreenYellow

All the below links are in English.

取り急ぎ、標記につき今までにまとめたものを以下貼っておきます。

Ireland Vol.43 (Leinster Vol.10 – City of Dublin Vol.3)

Ireland Vol.42 (Leinster Vol.9 – City of Dublin Vol.2)

Ireland Vol.41 (Leinster Vol.8 – City of Dublin Vol.1)

Ireland Vol.36 (Leinster Vol.7 – Fingal)

Ireland Vol.35 (Leinster Vol.6 – South Dublin)

Ireland Vol.34 (Leinster Vol.5 – Dún Laoghaire – Rathdown)

Ireland Vol.33 (Leinster Vol.4 – Wicklow, Kildare)

Ireland Vol.32 (Leinster Vol.3 – Meath, Louth)

Ireland Vol.31 (Leinster Vol.2 – Laois, Offaly, Westmeath, Longford)

Ireland Vol.30 (Leinster Vol.1 – Kilkenny, Carlow, Wexford)

Ireland Vol.22 (Munster Vol.3 – Tipperary, Waterford)

Ireland Vol.21 (Munster Vol.2 – Kerry, Cork)

Ireland Vol.20 (Munster Vol.1 – Clare, Limerick; #StPatricksDay)

Ireland Vol.19 (Connacht Vol.2 – Mayo, Galway)

Ireland Vol.18 (Connacht Vol.1 – Leitrim, Sligo, Roscommon)

Ireland Vol.17 (Ulster – Donegal, Cavan, Monaghan)

Pinned tweets, etc. 固定ツイート等


SNSは複雑単純あるにしてもどれでも使い続けないと正直よく分からないものであると認識していますが、当方が唯一使い続けているツイッターの良さは
1.設定が全体に自由かつ簡単であり、また、それゆえもあり拡散力に優れてもいる
2.そのため、難しい話を内容とするディスカッション、コンテンツマーケティング、キュレーションに適している。
こういう良さを備えるSNSは、今後も出て来ないように感じます。
そもそも、情報が有り過ぎて困る今の時代には、ある意味キュレーション無くして物事の正確な理解はできません。
この意味では、キュレーション等のためのツイッターも、その存在無くして今の時代を語れないとも言い得ます。
フォロワー数やリツイート数・ライク数よりも、コンテンツの質が重要とも言えます。


Honestly, we have understood that it is difficult to understand how to use social network services, if we don’t keep using some specific ones, regardless of being complicated or simple. The strengths of Twitter, which we have kept using as our single tool, would be:
1. in general, we can set it freely and easily, and so forth as well, it is good at spreading stories on the Internet;
2. therefore it is suitable to discussions, content marketing, curation, etc. on difficult topics or contents.
It seems that there will not be such strong services other than Twitter.
Today, when there is too much information, in a sense, it is impossible to accurately understand news without curation.
In this sense, it would be impossible to talk about current era without presense of Twitter, which is suitable to curation, etc.
We can say that the quality of contents is far more important than the numbers of followers, retweets, likes, etc.

ご参考:
1.(無料で使用しているので思うような表示にはなっておりませんが)一応、https://9223.teacup.com/ireland_corps/bbs という(概ね日本語 Mostly in Japanese の)デジタルサイネージ digital signage があります。アイルランド関連・電子書籍関連に可能な限り絞って貼って行こうと考えています。
2.https://www.goodreads.com/world_solutions (in English)
これは引き続き、若干趣味的に試行錯誤の最中です。フィクション作品愛好者が圧倒的に多い、更新後の内容が表れるのが半日くらい後である、などの特徴があると言えそうです。
3.2019年4月16日、書籍Facebookページを公開停止といたしました。今までご覧頂いた等の方々、誠にありがとうございました。引き続き、本ウェブサイトやツイッター等をご覧頂ければ幸甚です。
On April 16, 2019, we stopped publishing the eBook-related Facebook page. Thank you so much for having visited that page, etc. We would be very pleased if you continue visiting this website, Twitter accounts, the Teacup digital signage, etc.

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
pp23-24
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
pp24-25
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp207-211
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (http://goo.gl/SKKbqe).
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: COPYRIGHT LAW, THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, AND INTERNET FREEDOM (PDF; 10/2016) | DR MATTHEW RIMMER (@ QUT) @ THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

cf.
New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1

EUJEPA Vol.3


All the below links, excerpts, and pictures (charts/tables) are in English.

Japan-EU EPA 【Benefits and Backgrounds】(PDF; 07/2018) | MOFA Japan You can also check out the first one of the below pictures.
Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) (07/17/2018) | MOFA Japan
2018 Japan-EU Summit: Signing Ceremony Of EPA And SPA (YouTube)

The EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (w PDF; 09/2018) | Policy Department for External Relations @ European Parliament (@Bruegel) You can also check out all the below pictures but the first one.
PDF p11 Within the EU-28, in 2017 the top goods exporters to Japan were Germany, Italy, the UK and France, respectively accounting for 32.87 %, 10.82 %, 10.67 % and 10.53 % of the EU’s EUR 60.66 billion of commodity exports to Japan in 2017. Germany, Italy, the UK and France were also the top four importers of Japanese goods, with respective shares of 23.28 %, 16.48 %, 14.37 % and 12.76 % of the EUR 68.89 billion worth of EU commodity imports from Japan in 2017.
Japan is among the low-tariff countries for industrial goods with a trade-weighted tariff average of 1.4 % (Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s agricultural markets are relatively protected. Simple average applied most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs stand at 13.3 % for agricultural goods, with high tariffs on animal products (10.6 %), dairy items (63.4 %), beverages and tobacco (15.1 %).
Figure 4 depicts the EU’s and Japan’s tariffs by harmonised system (HS) product categories. In terms of the average applied MFN tariffs, we note that Japanese tariffs are low across numerous sectors such as electrical machinery (0.1 %), transport equipment (0) and manufactures not elsewhere specified (n.e.s) (1.2 %). Prominent exceptions are clothing (9 %), leather and footwear (7.7 %).
p12 The dominant sectors in the EU’s total service exports to Japan in 2016 were financial services (23.53 %), telecommunications (14.5 %) and transport (13.97 %).
p13 Japan accounted for only 1.1 % of the total extra-EU FDI in 2016 (Figure 7). By comparison, EU investments in the US and Canada are much higher, representing 38 % and 3.7 % of total extra-EU FDI. Japanese investment in the EU stood at USD 56.8 billion, 33.7 % of its total FDI stock abroad in 2017. However, it should be noted that a substantial share, approximately 38 %, of Japan’s FDI stock in the EU is in the UK …
p15 A low score (0.05) in OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (2017), which measures statutory limitations on FDI, is indicative of the relative openness of the Japanese economy to foreign investors, as the OECD average is 0.07. On the other hand, the US (0.09), Canada (0.162) and China (0.316) are all relatively more restrictive as destinations for FDI. Except for a few countries in Europe (Austria, Poland and Sweden), all EU Member States are more open to FDI than Japan, with Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia being the least restrictive.
p17 Tariffs Agricultural goods. … significant reductions in customs duties for the EU’s major food exports to Japan such as pork (e.g. 4.3 % to 0 over 10 years for high value cuts), wine (15 % to 0 % on entry into force), beef (38.5 % to 9 % over 15 years), pasta and chocolates (complete tariff liberalisation in 10 years). For cheeses, the EUJEPA will deliver complete liberalisation for hard cheeses and provide tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with duty free access for fresh, processed and soft cheeses.
Industrial goods. In the agri-goods industry, South Korea was traditionally protectionist with a trade-weighted tariff of 49 % in the pre-FTA period. By 2014 however, these had been reduced on a preferential basis for EU goods to 28 %. The EU also liberalised its agricultural markets for South Korea by reducing trade-weighted tariffs from 11 % to 3 %.
Non-Tariff Barriers … Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (CIAR) in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Japan is aligning itself with international standards on medical devices (Quality Management Systems), textile labelling (ISO international care labelling), motor vehicles (UNECE international vehicle regulations) and pharmaceuticals (ICH).
p18 Services The EUJEPA seeks to promote bilateral trade in a broad range of services but does not require governments to deregulate or privatise the provision of public services such as healthcare, water supply and education. … In telecommunications, the agreement covers issues such as mobile roaming, number portability and confidentiality of users’ traffic data. In financial services, the agreement calls for deeper regulatory cooperation and establishes a Joint Financial Regulatory Forum for this purpose. In e-commerce, the parties commit to keep electronic transmissions duty-free, recognise the legal validity of electronic contracts and signatures and may not require source codes to be transferred or accessed. In postal and courier services, the EUJEPA will attempt to build a level-playing field for EU suppliers and their main competitors such as Japan Post.
p21 Japan is one of the least restrictive economies in the world according to ECIPE’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index Report …
pp30-33 Bilateral trade There is substantial variation in the anticipated trade response. DG Trade (2018) found that the EUJEPA would lead to an increase of +13.2 % (EUR 13 billion) increase in EU exports to Japan. EU exports to Japan would rise by 22.6-32.7 % in the CIAR (2012) simulations. A much stronger export response for the EU is found in Ifo 2017 (61 %) and Ifo 2018 (73 %).
On the import side, DG Trade (2018) reports a 23.5 % (EUR 22 billion) increase in EU imports from Japan. This result is similar to that of CIAR (2012) which predicted increases in EU import purchases from Japan in the range of 17.1-23.5 %. In contrast, Ifo (2017) and Ifo (2018) simulations lead to increases in EU imports from Japan of 55 % and 63 %, respectively.
Sectoral value added All EUJEPA studies report a positive impact on value added in agri-food industries e.g.+0.82 % according to Ifo 2018, +0.2 % increase in output for processed foods in DG Trade (2018), 0.5-0.6 % for processed foods in the CIAR (2012) and +13 % for meats in Ecorys (2009). For automobiles, projections of value added are model-dependent.
By 2035, Japan’s car exports to EU increase by nearly 51 % in this study. Because of significant NTB reductions by Japan in motors, the EU also increases its exports to Japan following the EUJEPA (+11.5 %).
Textiles, apparel and leather products benefit from the agreement as well. The industry is expected to increase its output by 2 % (EUR 7 billion) in the EU, with exports to Japan rising by 220 % (EUR 5 billion) in DG Trade (2018).
Impact of Brexit Brexit has a greater impact on Japan, as it reduces the economic benefits from EUJEPA by 14 % (EUR 1 billion) and 20 % in Ifo 2017 and Ifo 2018, respectively. This is the result of a smaller market size for Japanese companies following Brexit.
Impact of CPTPP-11 Ratification of the CPTPP-11 agreement between Japan and 10 Pacific countries may also affect gains from EUJEPA. This scenario is evaluated in Ifo 2018. Simulation results reveal that the conclusion of the agreement leads to slightly smaller positive gains for the EU and slightly higher real-income gains for Japan (from 0.308 % to 0.314 %) compared to the simple baseline scenario. CPTPP-11 is expected to reduce Japan’s costs of sourcing inputs from the Asia-Pacific, improving its competitiveness and trade with the EU.
pp44-45 1/Investment liberalisation and promotion ISDS is the mechanism preferred by Japan, one that it has also supported under the CPTPP-11. In the investment negotiations held during July 2018, chief negotiators from the EU and Japan acknowledged the convergence of positions on investment protection standards but not on investor-state dispute settlement.
2/US investigation into auto imports … In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce initiated a National Security Investigation into the import of automobiles and auto parts into the US. This investigation is motivated by Section 232 of US’s Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and will examine whether declining American domestic production in the automobile sector poses a threat to its national security by weakening the internal economy and reducing domestic research on advanced technologies. Given the deep value chains in the auto industry, EU and Japanese car producers would be significantly harmed if the investigation leads to an increase in duties on foreign vehicles entering the US market.
On 25 July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump announced plans to hold off on any new unilateral tariffs against each other as bilateral negotiations proceed on liberalising non-auto industrial goods, increasing EU imports of US soybeans and liquified natural gas (LNG), addressing WTO issues, reassessing US steel and aluminium tariffs and EU’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods. The EU will therefore be shielded from the conclusions of the US auto investigations, unless ongoing negotiations are halted by either party.
4/Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) … In the EUJEPA, Japan provides TRQs for agri-foods such as whey products, malt, potato starch, fresh and processed cheeses. …
5/Japan’s future trade ties with the UK … during the transition period (March 2019 to end of 2020). The exact terms of EUJEPA would hence be applicable to the UK over this period. Their implementation will be crucial for Japan’s car manufacturers that collectively produce 800 000 vehicles in the UK, accounting for 50 % of the UK’s total annual production …

In Focus EU-Japan ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT | European Commission
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: texts of the agreement | European Commission
EU-Japan: A Partnership of Renewed Importance (w PDF) | Cristina de Esperanza Picardo @eucentresg
New EU-Japan economic, strategic partnership may work better than past efforts (07/19/2018) | Bastian Harth @ Asia Times
… The SPA lays out the first-ever framework between the EU and Japan for cooperation and dialogue across various bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues such as cybercrime, disaster management, energy security, climate change, and aging populations. It also calls on both sides to synergize on promoting peace, stability, and international prosperity, and to recede from a sectoral and segmented approach to a comprehensive and legally binding cooperation framework. …
Especially, cybersecurity is of enormous importance for Japan, given the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Millions of cyberattacks are predicted, and despite the country’s remarkable public safety… The topic is of such importance that Japan is even going to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. …

Brexit, a Catalyst for Closer EU-Japan Relations? (PDF) | Irina Angelescu
… Consequently, there is an implicit understanding from the Japanese side that the UK government “owes” special attention to Japanese interests, and should keep those interests in mind when negotiating Brexit. The former UK Ambassador to Japan, David Warren, indicated that some of his Japanese counterparts share a sense of “betrayal,” …
…three Japanese car manufacturers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) now make almost half of the 1.67 million cars produced in the UK. …
… GlaxoSmithKline Plc estimates that, in the next two-three years, it could incur costs as high as 70 million pounds ($98 million) of Brexit-related costs. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson estimated that it could face as many as 50,000 additional tests in the amount of 1 million pounds if there will be no post-Brexit mutual recognition of testing between the EU and the UK. AstroZeneca and MerkKGaA raised similar concerns. …
… Mitsubishi Bank UFJ picked Amsterdam as its base for EU securities operations, while Nomura Holdings, Daiwa Securities and Sumitomo Matsui Financial Group said they would move to Frankfurt. …
… Decisions such as that of Unilever – the UK’s third largest company to consolidate its HQ in the Netherlands and abandon the separate London HQ is just one recent example that has caused more unease among third parties about the outcome of Brexit. …
The Japanese position has remained consistent about its preferences for Brexit from the very beginning: no Brexit or the “softest” form of Brexit, with unhindered access to the European Single Market – preferably preceded by a very long transition period that would allow Japanese businesses to adapt to changes. …
… In particular, joint training and cooperation to address newer threats like cybersecurity or disinformation campaigns conducted by countries like Russia and China could prove to be mutually beneficial. In principle, the U.S. should also welcome the closer economic ties between the EU and Japan as a means to promote free trade worldwide. At the same time, the EU-Japan data protection agreement and certain provisions in the EU-Japan EPA such as Geographic Indicators (GIs) for agricultural products could negatively affect U.S. interests. …
EU-Japan partnership agreements herald new era of closer cooperation (29/01/2018) | Irina Angelescu @ European Council on Foreign Relations

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA): Good but Good Enough? (16/10/2018) | Axel Berkofsky @ ISPI
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order (PDF; 12/2017) | Axel Berkofsky @ University of Pavia, Italy & Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) (@ Bertelsmann Stiftung) You can check out Table 1 and Figure 2 (in this PDF).
The EU-Japan EPA/SPA and the ‘Abe Doctrine’: Reinforcing Norms Globally, Changing them Domestically (PDF; 07/2018) | Edward Danks @ European Institute for Asian Studies
JAPAN-EU COOPERATION IN THE ERA OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER TRANSFORMATION: IN SEARCH OF A STABLE WORLD SYSTEM (w PDFs; 28/11/2017) | INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (w PDFs) | Lords Select Committee, UK Parliament
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: trends and prospects (PDF; 07/03/2018) | The Royal Institute of International Affairs of Belgium & the University of Essex
EU-JAPAN – READY FOR A NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS? (PDF; Spring 2014) | Friends of Europe
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A Framework To Promote Shared Values [International Agreements In Progress] (12/10/2018) | Enrico D’Ambrogio @ European Parliamentary Research
Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (18/07/2018) | Ankit Panda @ The Diplomat

〔Charts, Tables, etc.〕
EUJEPA MOFAjapan BenefitsTopProducts EU-JapanAve MFNdutiesEU servicesTrade wJapanEU FDIJapan outwardFDITradeFacilitationIndicator JapanEU ExImReduction EUtariffsComparison simulations Tab11Comparison simulations Tab11-2Comparison results Tab13

U.K. イギリス Vol.15(Brexit Vol.12)

All the below links are in English.
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標記につき以下貼っておきます。

UK Vol.125 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.43)
UK Vol.124 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.42)
UK Vol.123 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.41)
UK Vol.122 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.40)
UK Vol.121 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.39)
UK Vol.114 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.38)
UK Vol.113 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.37)
UK Vol.112 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.36)
UK Vol.111 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.35)
UK Vol.110 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.34)
UK Vol.109 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.33)
UK Vol.108 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.32)
UK Vol.106 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.31)
UK Vol.105 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.30)
UK Vol.104 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.29)
UK Vol.103 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.28)
UK Vol.102 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.27)
UK Vol.101 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.26)
UK Vol.100 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.25)
UK Vol.95 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.24)
UK Vol.94 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.23)
UK Vol.67 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.13)
UK Vol.66 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.12 – Theresa May’s Trump visit)
UK Vol.65 (Post-EUref Vol.11 – including UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit speech)