U.K. イギリス Vol.22(England イングランド Vol.4 – West Midlands Vol.1)

All the below links are in English or Japanese.

ウェールズに地理的に近接する3州です。順に、ウスターソース、ヘレフォード牛(肉)、シュロップシャー羊や(実はシュロップシャー発祥ではないとの)シュロップシャーブルーチーズ(原料:牛乳)、で日本でも名が知られています。

UK Vol.75 (England Vol.4 – West Midlands Vol.1)

Worcestershire ウースターシャー州
Worcestershire Sauce – Japanese Encyclopedia (03/21/2017) | @MATCHA_global
How to Make Yakisoba (Japanese Fried Noodles Recipe) – YouTube
WHAT IS OKONOMI SAUCE? (16/10/2017) | @OtaJoyOtafuku
Sauce Katsudon Recipe (Deep-Fried Breaded Pork Bowl with Worcestershire-Based Sauce) (w Video) | @cookingwithdog
KORROKE WITH TONKATSU SAUCE (JAPANESE POTATO CROQUETTES WITH EAS) | @geniuskitchen
JAPANESE-STYLE SPAGHETTI (11/03/2016) | Food Education International
Curry and Rice Recipe (w Video) | @JCooking101
ReCPY: Homemade Worcestershire Sauce (01/30/2012) | Moto Yamamoto @umamimart
Vegan Worcestershire Sauce, Two Ways (01/19/2012) | Mark Bittman @nytimes
How is Japanese sauce (ソース) different from… sauce? (+Recipe) | @survivingnjapan without much Japanese
Worcestershire Sauce – this one is a bit fishy if you ask me (05/27/2009) | Oyster Food and Culture
Worcestershire Sauce | @cooking_r
HISTORY OF WORCESTERSHIRE SAUCE (1837-2012) (PDF) | William Shurtleff & Akiko Aoyagi @ Soyinfo Center
12 Soy Sauce Substitutes (12/19/2018) | Medically reviewed by Gerhard Whitworth, RN; Written by Natalie Silver @Healthline
Japanese Sauces | AsiaRecipe.com
Japanese University Visits to Advance Partnership Work with University of Worcester (07/11/2017) | @WorcesterEcho
ウスターシャー・ソースのはなし | ハナママゴンの雑記帳
SOUTHERN BARBECUE SAUCE 南部風バーベキューソース | Kolis Inn
イギリスでソースと言えば (12/07/2018) | @courrierinter
ウースター市 (PDF) | @MazakCorp
Takashimaya Online
GKNエアロスペース | @SCCommerce

Herefordshire ヘレフォードシャー州
The Sun is Rising on a New Era in UK-Japan Relations (05/09/2017) | Dan Dalton (MEP for the West Midlands)
JAPAN LEARNS TOURISM FROM HEREFORDSHIRE (01/09/2019) | @EatSleepLiveHfd
肉専用種牛ヘレフォード種とはどういう牛か (PDF) | 北海道立新得畜産試験場 @ 雪印種苗
英国の肉用牛 | 英米豪で誕生した肉牛
牛の品種 | 仙台牛
ニュージーランド産牛 | コープデリ
山地における集団肉牛の繁殖方法の改善 (PDF) | 岩手県

Shropshire シュロップシャー州
Japan is less expensive than you might think (26/11/2018) | Whitchurch Rugby Club – Shropshire @Pitchero
First major export deal to Japan (09/02/2017) | @ShropsChamber
Shropshire companies set for Japan visit (28/10/2014) | @ShropshireStar
これであなたもチーズ通!知っておきたい世界の定番チーズ52選 (01/22/2017) | @nico_nico_news

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.53(A subjective English news article affecting Japan’s national interest adversely written by a Japanese journalist 日本人記者による国益に反する主観的な英文記事)

無関係な方でこの種の内容を好まない方が居られるであろうと感じ、気が進まないのですが、見つけてしまいかつ国益の話であるためスルーできない(苦笑)ので、載せます。今回がこういうの初めてですし、できれば一回きりにしたいです。
断っておきますが、弊社としてどの政治勢力とどうのこうのは少なくとも現時点で何もありません。個人として消去法で政権その他を選ぶのは、他の有権者と同じです。
Japan courts Trump using emperor, first lady’s birthday: Without close friends in Asia, Japan’s prime minister is seen using every opportunity, even the emperor’s accession, to court President Donald Trump (04/20/2019) | MARI YAMAGUCHI @ Associated Press TOKYO

正直、こんなに無茶苦茶な記事はあまり無い、と感じておりましたら、日本人記者による東京AP発の記事をABCが使っているというものでした。アポストロフィーが全くないのは、ABCがこの記事自体を軽んじて遊んでいるのでしょうか?(笑)
この記者、国益を考えたことないでしょうね。我が国は、他の民主主義・経済大国よりも地政学面その他において “常に” 余裕がありません。地面は動きませんので。資源も無い、土地も広いとは言えない。こういう点を一生分からない人が、平気でアホ情報を垂れ流します。公的マインドがあれば、政権批判には他にやり方がいくらでもあると気付くでしょうに。しかももっと理詰めで。こういうの、日本社会としてちゃんと取り上げなきゃいけませんね。
以下、抜粋と第一感です。

Abe, experts say, is taking every opportunity to court Trump as Japan tries to stay out of the U.S. leaders crosshairs, unlike some other world leaders who have upset him on trade and other issues.
世界に発信するなら、この「experts」は最初に大きく名前を出さないと。別にそれくらい言って何も無いところから逮捕勾留有罪となるような国でもないでしょう。そういう国は世界にはいくつも存在するようですが。個人的には公に、この experts は大した experts でない、と言い切ります。
最後まで読むと、この後出てくるお2人を指しているのでしょうね。

Im not sure what other choices this administration, or any Japanese administration, has except to try to build the best relationship possible with Washington through face-to-face interaction, said Stephen Nagy, a politics and international studies professor at International Christian University in Tokyo. I think Mr. Trump being the first to meet the emperor is a good example of that.
この文章、(文脈から批判的と見られるトーンの)二文目が(一見問題無いトーンの)一文目と繋がっていない。
この教授の言う、日本の政権にとって最善の日米関係を構築する以外に方法があるのか分からない、というのは全く同感です。良い悪いはともかく、今日現在の現実です。
ちなみに、今、インバウンド観光客が急激に増えているのは、良好な日米関係、中国の各種の慣行をアメリカが責め立てている状況等、と無関係でしょうか??長年、日本はインバウンドを増やすのに努力して来ましたが、なかなか実らなかった。今、素晴らしいことになっています。
また、日米協議等での日本側への要望は事実に相違するのを何度も見たことがありますが、他方、今、アメリカが中国に対して主張していることは、情報を総合すると概ね間違いなかろうとも個人的には感じます。
大抵の場合は、政治は結果責任ですから、結果が良ければそれで良いと成るのは成ります。個人として違和感を感じる時は、勿論あります。

Relations between Japan and two of its closest neighbors, South Korea and China, remain strained over their war history and territorial disputes.
で、これは、日本の責任なんでしょうか??国際政治をよく知る知らない関わらず、中国韓国との戦後のやり取りについて日本側が悪いと判断する日本人は極めて少数派ではないでしょうか。数十年間もう散々、謝罪や金銭補償をし続けてきたでしょうに。今の中年世代は、その親の世代とは違い、別に差別意識もありません。能力や人格を見るのみです。何国人だから優れていない、とか決め付けることは少なくとも私はしません。そういう時代だという認識です。

Abe has managed to largely stay on good terms with Trump by assiduously avoiding criticism of the U.S. leader. You never hear criticisms out of Japan … that has been very characteristic of the Abe administration, Nagy said. I think he has done well because he hasnt insulted Mr. Trump to cause problems.
うーん、この文章のトーンは、この教授、さっきと違いますね。書いた記者の責任でしょうか?それともさっきの文章を書く時に、トーンを記者が間違えたか。

Hiro Aida, professor of global studies at Aoyama Gakuin University and an expert on Japan-U.S. relations, said Abe is jumping at the opportunity of the emperors succession after his ties with Trump were seen to be weakening as the U.S. leader came down hard on trade issues, demanding that Japan do more to reduce the countries trade imbalance.
こういう教授は、どうせ経済貿易の実務的実際的分析をさっぱりできないので、こういういかにも決め付けの政治的批判をするのでしょうか?だから、日本の政治学教授は、全般に舐められるんです。もっと公的マインド、もっと理詰めに行かないと。国益を考えろ、批判は客観的なデータや論理などある種の証拠が無いと頭が悪いと言わざる得ない、ということです。
あと、日米関係が良くない時期が過去にありましたが、日本経済や国民生活はどうだったでしょうか??サミットで日本の首脳がずっと延々ひとりぼっちの写真が撮られているとか。これだけでも、国益上どうでしょうか。首脳の話ですからよく思い出して、国民一人一人が厳密に考える必要があります。
ちなみに、本当かどうかは定かでないと一応断りますが、先日のワシントンでの米韓首脳会談はたった2分で終わった旨の報道があります。勿論、長けりゃ良いというものではありません。ただ、北朝鮮からも韓国国内メディアからも、この点その他につき韓国大統領は批判をされています。
首脳を比較する時は、とにかく国益、この一点だけよく考えれば、ヘンな結論には至らないはずです。

U.K. イギリス Vol.21(England イングランド Vol.3 ― Yorkshire and the Humber ヨークシャーアンドザハンバー地方)

All the below links other than those in Japanese are in English.

標記につき、以下貼っておきます。

UK Vol.71 (England Vol.3 – Yorkshire and the Humber)

North Yorkshire
ヨークシャー・デールズ(Yorkshire Dales)| @VisitBritain
ヨーク大学
ヨーク大学Jane Grenville副学長来訪 | 東北大学国際交流課

East Riding of Yorkshire
Van Gogh and Japan at Spotlight Theatre | @VHEY_UK
ハル大学

West Yorkshire
Chiharu Shiota: Beyond Time | @YSPsculpture
リーズ大学
国際蛋白研セミナー(英国・日本二国間交流事業) “Integrative Structural Biology for Protein Science”| 大阪大学蛋白質研究所
ブラッドフォード大学

South Yorkshire
New future for endangered Japanese Bears | @YorkshireWP
シェフィールド大学
シェフィールド大学、地球規模の課題に対処するため日本との関係を強化 | @cnet_japan

U.K. イギリス Vol.20(ウェールズ Wales)

Wales LocalAuthorityDistricts
加工元地図及び加工後のこの地図に England の Herefordshire が入ってしまっていますが、当然間違いです。公開及びツイートの後で気付きました。
While the original white map and this retouched one of Wales include Herefordshire of England, it is a matter of course that it is wrong. I found this mistake after I published this post and related tweet.

取り急ぎ、以下貼っておきます。

UK Vol.134 (Wales Vol.8 – Merthyr Tydfil, Caerphilly, Blaenau Gwent, Torfaen, Newport, Monmouthshire)

UK Vol.133 (Wales Vol.7 – Swansea, Neath Port Talbot, Bridgend, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Vale of Glamorgan, Cardiff)

UK Vol.97 (Wales Vol.5 – Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire)

UK Vol.83 (Wales Vol.4 – Powys, Ceredigion)

UK Vol.78 (Wales Vol.3 – Isle of Anglesey, Conwy, Gwynedd)

UK Vol.74 (Wales Vol.2 – Flintshire, Wrexham, Denbighshire)

UK Vol.107 (Wales Vol.6)
UK Vol.4 (Wales Vol.1)

「ウェールズ」でツイッター検索すると出て来るものの一部を、以下貼っておきます。


https://twitter.com/rugbyfoot/status/1115831019721064449


https://twitter.com/rugbyfoot/status/1082921676864667648

Ireland アイルランド Vol.7(州 counties)

Ireland GreenYellow

All the below links are in English.

取り急ぎ、標記につき今までにまとめたものを以下貼っておきます。

Ireland Vol.43 (Leinster Vol.10 – City of Dublin Vol.3)

Ireland Vol.42 (Leinster Vol.9 – City of Dublin Vol.2)

Ireland Vol.41 (Leinster Vol.8 – City of Dublin Vol.1)

Ireland Vol.36 (Leinster Vol.7 – Fingal)

Ireland Vol.35 (Leinster Vol.6 – South Dublin)

Ireland Vol.34 (Leinster Vol.5 – Dún Laoghaire – Rathdown)

Ireland Vol.33 (Leinster Vol.4 – Wicklow, Kildare)

Ireland Vol.32 (Leinster Vol.3 – Meath, Louth)

Ireland Vol.31 (Leinster Vol.2 – Laois, Offaly, Westmeath, Longford)

Ireland Vol.30 (Leinster Vol.1 – Kilkenny, Carlow, Wexford)

Ireland Vol.22 (Munster Vol.3 – Tipperary, Waterford)

Ireland Vol.21 (Munster Vol.2 – Kerry, Cork)

Ireland Vol.20 (Munster Vol.1 – Clare, Limerick; #StPatricksDay)

Ireland Vol.19 (Connacht Vol.2 – Mayo, Galway)

Ireland Vol.18 (Connacht Vol.1 – Leitrim, Sligo, Roscommon)

Ireland Vol.17 (Ulster – Donegal, Cavan, Monaghan)

Pinned tweets, etc. 固定ツイート等


SNSは複雑単純あるにしてもどれでも使い続けないと正直よく分からないものであると認識していますが、当方が唯一使い続けているツイッターの良さは
1.設定が全体に自由かつ簡単であり、また、それゆえもあり拡散力に優れてもいる
2.そのため、難しい話を内容とするディスカッション、コンテンツマーケティング、キュレーションに適している。
こういう良さを備えるSNSは、今後も出て来ないように感じます。
そもそも、情報が有り過ぎて困る今の時代には、ある意味キュレーション無くして物事の正確な理解はできません。
この意味では、キュレーション等のためのツイッターも、その存在無くして今の時代を語れないとも言い得ます。
フォロワー数やリツイート数・ライク数よりも、コンテンツの質が重要とも言えます。


Honestly, we have understood that it is difficult to understand how to use social network services, if we don’t keep using some specific ones, regardless of being complicated or simple. The strengths of Twitter, which we have kept using as our single tool, would be:
1. in general, we can set it freely and easily, and so forth as well, it is good at spreading stories on the Internet;
2. therefore it is suitable to discussions, content marketing, curation, etc. on difficult topics or contents.
It seems that there will not be such strong services other than Twitter.
Today, when there is too much information, in a sense, it is impossible to accurately understand news without curation.
In this sense, it would be impossible to talk about current era without presense of Twitter, which is suitable to curation, etc.
We can say that the quality of contents is far more important than the numbers of followers, retweets, likes, etc.

ご参考:
1.(無料で使用しているので思うような表示にはなっておりませんが)一応、https://9223.teacup.com/ireland_corps/bbs という(概ね日本語 Mostly in Japanese の)デジタルサイネージ digital signage があります。アイルランド関連・電子書籍関連に可能な限り絞って貼って行こうと考えています。
2.https://www.goodreads.com/world_solutions (in English)
これは引き続き、若干趣味的に試行錯誤の最中です。フィクション作品愛好者が圧倒的に多い、更新後の内容が表れるのが半日くらい後である、などの特徴があると言えそうです。
3.2019年4月16日、書籍Facebookページを公開停止といたしました。今までご覧頂いた等の方々、誠にありがとうございました。引き続き、本ウェブサイトやツイッター等をご覧頂ければ幸甚です。
On April 16, 2019, we stopped publishing the eBook-related Facebook page. Thank you so much for having visited that page, etc. We would be very pleased if you continue visiting this website, Twitter accounts, the Teacup digital signage, etc.

U.K. Vol.17(Brexit Vol.14: 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc. – especially outside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland)

Now we have only one month left to March 29, 2019, the day of Brexit. Whenever possible since the UK referendum in 2016, I have checked out news articles, professional reports. government’s remarks, etc. in English and Japanese. I am listing and explaining the three topics which have seemingly not been confronted in the media, etc., as below.

I. Leaving the European Union Customs Union and Avoiding the return of a Hard Border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are incompatible.
I have gotten an impression from the media, etc.: in the U.K., Leavers and Remainers have respectively been stick to their own convictions since political activities before the referendum; and agreements between the two factions and those between the EU and UK by the deadline seem a steep path.
In the first half of last year, I felt such steepness is due to the Northern-Southern border. And I have come to feel so stronger, last autumn when there arose much news about the Brexit backstop – a safety net in order that the NI and the ROI will maintain the current open border, under the 1998 Good Friday agreement which decided not to make physical facilities on the border, in case no formal deal between the EU and the UK can be reached on trade and security arrangements by the end of transition period, i.e. the end of the year 2020.
In English there is much news articles plainly explaining the border question, and not a few ones whose precondition is the above incompatibility. However, there seems no article which confronts the incompatibility itself. In Japanese, there seems no such news articles other than the one written by a senior researcher of a Japanese think tank who I do not know in person.
That article says the entire Brexit necessitates the hard border – such a tight border control that Japan has done as a distinct economic area; and you need to give up the entire Brexit if you maintain the current open border, which means you need to stay in the EU customs union as you belong to the same economic area as the EU. I agree to it. I have an overall impression that concerned people have actually continued to find some compromise plan because it would have been all for nothing if they had said this clearly in public. However, eventually, nothing comes from nothing.
The incompatibility eventually leads just to “some people choose one of the two”. There are options such as another referendum, a resolution of the House of Commons, a snap election, etc. In the first place, the referendum, one of the campaign promises in the 2015 general election, was conducted in 2016 and followed by a state of seemingly senseless chaos. So, the least unreasonable would be another referendum which confirms whether or not the result of the referendum in 2016 is UK citizens’ will in reality.
Fundamentally, not only referendum but also voting itself tends to be greatly affected by political winds, not decided by the content of the subject on which the judgement of the people was sought. And in 2016, Leave won by a very narrow margin, despite this result will turn over the status quo of the whole UK. If the result were Remain, i.e. maintaining the status quo, a very narrow margin would not matter. But the result was the turnover. What are convincing reasons to avoid another referendum under democracy, which ask people whether it is OK to really exit the EU on the basis of the narrow margin? I have not understood such reasons, while I saw “referendum should not be carried out twice because we had better preserve the credibility of the referendum”, etc. Most of UK citizens will be convinced, if another referendum confirms their judgement and a hard Brexit comes true.

II. The state of things in electoral districts of MPs who left the Labour or the Conservative parties.
As of 21 February, eight Members of Parliament have left the Labour, the largest opposition party, due to their dissatisfaction with its leader’s vague attitude toward Brexit, anti-Semitic attitude, etc. On the other hand, three MPs have left the Conservative, due to their dissatisfaction with the government’s catastrophic handling of Brexit. A total of these eleven members will not join the opposition Liberal Democrats, but form an independent group which aims to conduct another referendum (seemingly similar to my above thought). We can think in general that their actions are based on their concerns that they lament the UK as parliamentarians, or are related to circumstances of constituency to whom they owe many things.
The eight ex-Labours [district/county] are Coffey [Stockport/Greater Manchester], Smith [Penistone and Stocksbridge/South Yorkshire], Shuker [Luton South/Bedfordshire], Gapes [Ilford South/Greater London], Umunna [Streatham/Greater London], Leslie [Nottingham East/Nottinghamshire], Berger [Liverpool Wavertree/Merseyside], Ryan [Enfield North/Greater London]; the three ex-Conservatives Soubry [Broxtowe/Nottinghamshire], Allen [South Cambridgeshire/Cambridgeshire], Wollaston [Totnes/Devon].
According to a UK university’s research, for example, in Coffey’s Stockport, Leave-Remain difference were marginal, and Remainers increased in proportion to house prices. We can think that there are not a few people who have middle-price houses, voted Leave in 2016, but converted themselves to Remainers, while there are usually more middle-price house owners. Would this situational change urge the ex-Labour and ex-Conservative members to secede from the party and to try to conduct another referendum? When we see MPs’ voting behaviors at resolutions in the House of Commons, there must be cases in which it is useful to analyze not only house prices but the state of things in electoral districts.

III. The City of London does not prefer Jeremy Corbyn’s policies.
Although the ruling party achieved a great victory in the 2015 general election, it could not have been intrinsically strange if approval for the party had dropped significantly in the UK where regime changes by two largest parties have already taken roots, considering chaos which has continued so far and will continue. And the above attitude of the Labour leader seems to rather show his favor on soft Brexit.
However, in the media, etc., it has been said by and large that Corbyn’s Labour government with a strong left-wing flavor and its public policy such as re-nationalisation of public utilities and wealth tax are undesired, and are feared more than hard Brexit. The former would expand budget deficit and cause a sharp rise of inflation rate, which would lead to government bonds’ decrease in demand and long-term government bonds’ decrease in price. The latter would be an income tax hike towards people with over eighty thousand pounds, and would lead to the people’s escaping abroad and the UK’s revenue decline. The City is said to be on its guard against such policies. If I dare to say, its guard might not be off-base.
For example, concerning the re-nationalisation, we need to take the following into consideration: the UK government deficit-to-GDP ratio is not extremely bad (0.875 in 2017); and Tony Blair’s Labour government so positively expanded the PPP (public-private partnership) including the PFI (private finance initiative) that re-nationalisation, which means banks, equity investors and other private financiers being forced to take a haircut on their investments, is not wanted by the City. On the other hand, in many ages and countries, there have often been policy differences between two largest parties, which need to be tackled at any time taking considerable contents such as the above two into consideration.

It should be noted that immediate news coverage and possible analyses shortly after it are of course important. And I usually respect the importance to sort long processes, significant effects on international society, complicated and mysterious affairs of politics and economy, etc., at each turning point of major incidents. However, I picked up the above three points, on the assumption that I write about Brexit just this time – after countless news articles, researches, etc. were already published.

Taku Nakaminato, World Solutions LLC
24 February, 2019

The above is a provisional English translation of “Brexit Vol.13“.

P.S. I posted the above at around 5 pm (JST). Thank you for coming, many English readers.
Around 2 pm, 25 February Today I just added the following hyperlinks:
NOT JUST ANTISEMITISM: CORBYN’S BREXIT PROBLEM IS ALSO A DISASTER FOR JEWS
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THERESA MAY COMMENTS ON LABOUR PARTY ATTRITION
Ian Austin quits Labour blaming Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership
Ian Austin says he couldn’t look Jewish father ‘in the eye’ if he remained in Labour party
Corbyn told: change course before it’s too late for Labour

U.K. イギリス Vol.16(Brexit Vol.13:報道等において正面から触れられていないブレグジット三点 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc.)

期日である3月29日まで1ヶ月近くとなった。3年前の英国国民投票以来、ブレグジット(英国のEU離脱)に係る報道・報告・分析や英国政府等発表を英語及び日本語で折に触れて追う中で、あまり正面から触れられていない印象のある三点を以下挙げる。

一.関税同盟離脱とハードボーダー不実施の非両立
英国においては、議会・国民・企業・有識者等に跨ってEU残留派及び離脱派それぞれが、国民投票前政治運動に始まり現在まで延々と主張をし続け、現時点から見て期日までの両派の合意そしてEU英国の合意等への道は険しい。報道等からは、こんな印象を受ける。
結局、南北アイルランド国境がこの険しさの原因であろうと昨年前半に感じ、バックストップ(1998年グッドフライデー和平合意の下で南北国境に物理的な管理施設を設けない措置を2020年末の移行期間終了までに導入できない場合にも引き続き現状どおり国境を開放しておく安全策)について報道が多く出た昨秋にその感覚が強まった。
英語報道等では、端的な説明報道はあり、非両立を前提とした報道等も少なくないが、正面から上記非両立自体を取り上げて一つ選ぶしかないとしたものは無い印象がある。他方、日本語報道等でも、上記非両立について正面から論じている報道等は皆無という印象があり、(一昨日発見した)筆者が存じ上げないある日本のシンクタンクの研究者の方が書いておられる論のみではなかろうか。
その論においては、完全離脱のためにはハードボーダー(全く別個の経済地域として日本が外国との間で設けているような厳しい国境管理)が必要である一方、現状どおりハードボーダー無しのままにしたいならEUと同じ経済地域としてEUの関税同盟・単一市場の中に留まるしかないので完全離脱は諦めるしかない、とされている。そのとおりではないか。これを公式に言うと元も子も無いから妥協案を探し続けたというのが現実であったという総合的な印象を持っている。しかし結局、無いものは無い
非両立であるから、最終的には「誰かがどちらか一つを選ぶ」しか無い。方法は国民投票・議会議決・解散総選挙とあるが、2015年総選挙時の公約とされた国民投票が2016年に行われその結果によって現在まで本来不要と思えなくもない混乱が続いているので、国民投票結果が実際の国民の意志であるのかを確認する国民投票を実施するのが最も無理の少ない論理ではないか。
そもそも、国民投票に限らず投票行為自体が民意を問われる内容そのものよりも政治的な風に左右され易い上に、国の現状を変えるための国民投票結果があまりに僅差であった。仮に現状維持であれば政治的な風に左右され易い投票結果が僅差でも、そのタイミングではたった一回で決めてしまって構わない。他方、50年100年に一回の現状大転換であれば、僅差を民意の確かな証明と捉えて本当に国を変えてしまっていいのかと民主主義下において問うて何が不味いのか。これが具体的に分からないまま今に至る。二回目の国民投票までやって確認した上でハードブレグジット(合意無き離脱)に突入するのであれば、英国国民の多くは納得するのではないか。

二.離党議員の選挙区事情
21日時点で、野党第一党たる労働党の下院議員8人が離党した。党首のブレグジットに関する煮え切らない姿勢や反ユダヤ主義的姿勢への不満等が、理由とされている。他方、保守党下院議員3人も、政府与党の破滅的なブレグジット対応への不満等を理由に離党した。両者は野党自由民主党に合流するのではなく独立グループを結成し、(おそらく筆者の上記考えと同じか近い)二回目の国民投票を目指すとのことである。「選良」「代議士」として純粋に国を憂い改善するための行動であるとも、選挙区の支持者あってこその議員であるため何らかの事情が関係しているとも、一般には諸々考えられる。
今回離党した元労働党の8議員(以下カッコ内は、苗字;選挙区・片仮名州名)は、コフィ(Coffey;Stockport・グレーターマンチェスター)、スミス(Smith;Penistone and Stocksbridge・サウスヨークシャー)、シューカー(Shuker;Luton South・ベッドフォードシャー)、ゲイプス(Gapes;Ilford South・グレーターロンドン)、ウムンナ(Umunna;Streatham・グレーターロンドン)、レスリー(Leslie;Nottingham East・ノッティンガムシャー)、バーガー(Berger;Liverpool Wavertree・マージーサイド)、ライアン(Ryan;Enfield North・グレーターロンドン)各氏、同じく離党した元保守党の3議員は、スーブリ(Soubry;Broxtowe・ノッティンガムシャー)、アレン(Allen;South Cambridgeshire・ケンブリッジシャー)、ウォラストン(Wollaston;Totnes・デヴォン)各氏である。
例えば、最近見た英国のある大学の研究によると、上記コフィ議員のStockport選挙区では、EU残留及び離脱の両支持数が拮抗している一方、(持家価格上位層より中位層の方が人数が通常多いであろうが)残留投票者割合が持家価格に比例して増加した分布となっていた。とすると、二回目の国民投票を推す背景に、人数のより多い持家価格中位層のうち一回目は離脱投票をした少なからぬ層が現在は残留派に転じているとは考えられないか。今後の下院議決における議員の投票行動を見る際に、持家価格に限らず選挙区事情の分析が有効である場合があろう。

三.金融街シティの非嗜好政策
2015年総選挙には大勝したとは言え、現在までそして今後も続く混乱を考えると、二大政党が根付いた英国においては、多くの保守党支持が離れても本来おかしくないはずである。また、現に労働党党首の煮え切らない上記姿勢は、ブレグジットについてはむしろ軟着陸嗜好を示していると考えられる。
しかしながら、左派色の強いコービン労働党による政権、具体的には同党の公共事業の再国有化富裕税導入などは、望まれていない、ハードブレグジット以上に恐れられている、というのが概ね報道等論調である。前者による財政赤字拡大・インフレ率急騰及び英国国債需要低下・長期国債価格低下、後者による年収 8 万ポンド以上の層に対する所得税増税及び同層の海外流出による歳入減、をシティは警戒しているとされ、概ねその警戒は的外れではないと考えられる。
字数の関係上、例えば前者のみ触れると、GDP比87.5%(2017年)という極端には酷くない債務残高、PFI(社会資本の整備・運営を民間資金・経営能力・技術力により行う)などのPPP官民連携)を積極的に推進したのがブレア労働党政権でありシティがヘアカットを強いられる再国有化は今さら望まれていない、などは考慮せねばならない。その上で、このような保革の路線対立は、古今東西よくある話とも言える常々大きなテーマであり、上記以外でも要考慮要素を容れてその時に採るべき策を随時慎重に探って行くしかない根気の要る話である。

なお、即時の報道やその直後の可能な範囲の分析は無論重要である。また、長いプロセス、重大な国際社会的影響、複雑怪奇な政治経済事情などを節目節目で整理して取り上げる重要性も、筆者個人は通常むしろ充分に尊重する方である。しかしながら今回は、既に数えきれない報道等が流れた後の現時点で、期日までに一回だけ書くということで、このようにした次第である。

平成31年2月22日午後1時50分
文章:中港 拓

24日午後5時、てにをは等数ヵ所訂正、ハイパーリンク追加(一.1件、三.4件)、をしました。

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
pp23-24
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
pp24-25
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp207-211
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (http://goo.gl/SKKbqe).
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: COPYRIGHT LAW, THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, AND INTERNET FREEDOM (PDF; 10/2016) | DR MATTHEW RIMMER (@ QUT) @ THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

cf.
New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1

TPP Vol.5

All the below links and excerpts (incl pictures) are in English.

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES FOR CANADIANS (PDF; 04/2017) | Standing Committee on International Trade, Canada
pp8-11 GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS
Consultations Prior to the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
Consultations Since the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
pp11-16 EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CANADA
Expected Overall Benefits for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Many witnesses representing Canadian businesses said that, among the TPP countries, the most significant market access opportunities for their sectors would be in Japan. In addition, the Cross-Border Institute mentioned that, “[w]hile Japan is now a slow-growing economy, it’s very large, and its potential for trade expansion with Canada is great.” According to it, the reductions in Japan’s import tariffs that would result from implementation of the TPP could reduce Canada’s trade deficit with that country.
… Similarly, the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership claimed that a failure by Canada to ratify the TPP could result in a lost opportunity to obtain preferential market access to countries that might accede to the TPP in the future, such as China, India and Indonesia.
… The Greater Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce said: “Should Canada choose to extricate itself from this agreement, we find ourselves in a position where it will be, over a period of time, more difficult for us to even access … traditional markets, let alone expand the opportunities and the productive capacity of this amazing region.” The Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal told the Committee that, “[i]f the U.S. has a competitive advantage … and we have no such advantage, we are affected, as in the case of South Korea when the U.S. signed an agreement with that country. …
Expected Overall Costs for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives considered that, because tariffs on Canada’s imports from TPP countries with which it does not yet have an FTA are higher than those on its exports, the TPP would likely increase Canada’s trade deficit with those countries.
… the United Steelworkers stated that the TPP would reduce the wages of Canadian workers “by putting them into competition with poorly paid foreign workers … [working in Canada] and abroad.” Global Affairs Canada provided the Committee with a different perspective, claiming that foreign professionals who would come to Canada as a result of TPP commitments “would have to be paid the prevailing wage in Canada, in that region, for a professional at that level of expertise and experience.”
… a brief submitted to the Committee by the Niagara Regional Labour Council mentioned that “provisions contained within the TPP will lead to thousands of lost jobs, higher levels of unemployment, and stagnating wages, meaning that inequality will continue unabated.”…
In addition, many witnesses believed that the TPP would increase corporate influence on Canadian public policy. … However, Global Affairs Canada provided a different perspective in remarking that provisions in the TPP would reinforce the right of member countries to “regulate in the public interest.”
Modelling the Economic Impacts for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… Global Affairs Canada … If Canada were not to participate in the agreement, and the 11 other countries were to implement it, the study projects GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.”
… the Business Council of Canada referred to a study released by the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics that suggested that the TPP would increase Canada’s national income by $37 billion by 2030. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce commented that economic impact assessments have estimated the economic benefits for Canada of joining the TPP to be between $5 billion and $10 billion annually.
… C.D. Howe Institute, Dan Ciuriak… estimated that the TPP would lead to a “modest”GDP gain for Canada of about 0.07% by 2035, which would generate household income gains of approximately $3 billion.
Tufts University’s Jeronim Capaldo, who is one of Mr. Izurieta’s co-authors … claimed that Global Affairs Canada’s economic impact assessment made an assumption about the level of employment that would occur following the TPP’s entry into force, instead of directly modelling the TPP’s effects on Canadian employment. According to him, Global Affairs Canada’s assumption about full employment is unrealistic …
pp17-19 RATIFICATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The Alberta Beef Producers said that the Government should ratify the TPP quickly in order to “continue momentum towards implementation of the agreement more broadly.”In addition, the National Cattle Feeders’ Association indicated that “the argument can be made that Canada should ratify the TPP before the U.S. in order to make it easier to resist American efforts to extract more concessions from Canada.”
… The Canadian Chamber of Commerce contended that it would be catastrophic for Canada not to ratify the TPP if its NAFTA partners do so.
… the National Cattle Feeders’ Association claimed that, if the United States does not ratify the TPP, Canada should conclude a bilateral agreement with Japan that would “salvage” what it hopedwould be accomplished in the TPP, and that “would put Canadian producers back on an even playing field in the Japanese market with producers from countries which already have FTAs with Japan.”…
pp19-20 FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR CANADIAN BUSINESSES
… The Mining Association of Canada suggested that the Government include a northern-specific fund within Canada’s proposed infrastructure bank. In its view, this fund should be based on the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority model, which it characterized as highly successful.
… the Canadian Federation of Independent Business indicated that “many smaller companies don’t really know much about [the] TPP.” Similarly, Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters stated that “[t]he vast majority of smaller companies in Canada would have no clue about what the [TPP] is.”
pp21-22 TRADE IN GOODS
… some witnesses from the automobile manufacturing sector, as well as those representing Canada’s supply-managed agricultural sectors, said that these sectors would experience new import competition or would lose domestic market share as a result of the TPP’s tariff and quota provisions. Unifor commented that, “[w]ith elimination of the tariffs and lowering of the [rules of origin] thresholds, our supply jobs and assembly jobs are not only going to be threatened by the TPP players, but they’re also going to be penalized by non-TPP imports from China, from Malaysia, and from other countries around the world that aren’t even a part of the TPP agreement.” Similarly, Dairy Farmers of Canada …
pp22-32 Agriculture and Agri-Food
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association estimated that the TPP would allow beef producers to double or nearly triple the value of Canada’s beef exports to Japan. According to the Saskatchewan Cattlemen’s Association, such an increase in beef exports could create between 5,200 and 5,400 jobs in Canada.
The Canadian Pork Council noted that, according to a study that it commissioned, the TPP’s new market access opportunities would increase the value of Canadian pork producers’ exports by an estimated $300 million, and would create 4,000 new jobs …
Regarding Canada’s beef sector, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association indicated that, “[w]ithout the TPP or a bilateral agreement with Japan, Canada will likely lose around 80% of the value of our [beef] exports to Japan.” The Canadian Pork Council commented that the Japanese market for Canadian pork would be lost, and that damage to Canada’s pork sector would be “extreme,” if the TPP enters into force without the participation of Canada. Cereals Canada said that “being left out of a ratified TPP agreement could result in a 50% reduction in Canadian wheat exports to the [Asia-Pacific] region,” while the B.C. Seafood Alliance stated that it would be “disastrous” for its members …
According to Chicken Farmers of Canada, the TPP would open the Canadian market to an additional 26.7 million kilograms of annual chicken imports, leading to an estimated loss of 2,200 jobs and a reduction of about $150 million in Canada’s GDP. Similarly, Les Eleveurs de volailles du Quebec said that the TPP would increase import access to the Canadian chicken market from 7.5% of domestic production to 9.6%. …
Dairy Farmers of Canada noted that the TPP would increase import access to Canada’s dairy market by between 3.37% and 3.97% of the country’s annual dairy production …
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association explained that, because of the 2015 Japan?Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef is currently higher than its tariffs on Australian beef. It stated that, if the Government does not ratify the TPP, the discrepancy between Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef and its tariffs on Australian beef would widen due to future successive reductions in the latter tariffs under the 2015 agreement.
pp32-38 Manufacturing
… According to a brief submitted by Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, “the TPP does not deliver any incremental or meaningful new opportunities to increase Canadian produced vehicle exports by reducing tariffs in the markets that represent the overwhelming majority of new vehicle sales because the duty rate for these markets is already 0%.” Similarly, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association …
… Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada provided a different point of view, and denied the existence of barriers that limit Japan’s imports of foreign automobiles. According to it, North American automobile manufacturers do not produce many models of small cars, which are popular in Japan. It claimed that approximately 90% of Japanese passenger car sales are “very small cars,” with engines under 2,000 cubic centimeters; in 2014, Detroit-based companies had only 10 models in that market segment.
… for vehicles, the percentage would be 45%. In contrast, the assessment notes that NAFTA requires at least 62.5% of an automobile’s content to originate from the NAFTA region …
… the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada observed that eight out of every ten vehicles sold in Canada by its members are manufactured in North America, while the remaining two are imported from Japan. It remarked that “the elimination of tariffs into the Canadian marketplace will have little or no impact on the manufacturing base here in Canada.”
pp38-42 TRADE IN SERVICES
… The value of total services trade between Canada and the other TPP countries was $134.0 billion in 2014 … $58.8 billion in Canadian exports to, and $75.2 billion in imports from, those countries … 89.6% of the value of Canadian services exports to the other TPP countries was destined for the United States, while 89.3% of the value of Canadian services imports from those countries originated from the United States.
… some witnesses – including the Business Council of Canada and Scotiabank – said that financial service providers would benefit the most from the TPP. …
… the Canadian Union of Postal Workers pointed out that Chapter 10 of the TPP includes a “detailed annex on ‘Express Delivery Services’ which would impose far more explicit constraints on government authority concerning postal services and the activities of Canada Post than do those in NAFTA or the [WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services].” In its view, “[t]hese new rules would not only limit the ability of Canada Post to expand current services such as those of Xpresspost and its subsidiary Purolator, but would threaten its ability to maintain its current business model of integrated express delivery and letter mail services.”
pp45-51 INVESTMENT PROTECTION
pp57-61 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pp99-105 SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION – CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA
pp107-113 DISSENTING OPINION – NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA

Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Entering a New Era of Strategic Trade Policy (PDF; 09/2013) | Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci @ Frazer Institute
ppiii-iv Executive summary
Canada’s trade rules and procedures are already strongly aligned with those of the United States and, as such, implementation of the TPP should not be costly. There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP would require us to dismantle our supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. However, with Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines may improve: Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. If its rice protections remain, this will open the door for other members to shield their sensitive industries.
Canada gains from the TPP not only by expanding its economic partnerships but also by playing a significant role in shaping the rules that will govern trade relationships in the twenty-first century. …
pp6-7
Figure 6: Canada’s exports to top five trading partners, 2012 (billions of $CA)
Figure 7: Canada’s exports to top TPP countries, 2012 (billions of $CA)
p10 Figure 8: Overlapping rules of origin: the “noodle bowl” of trade agreements
p11 … Figure 9 shows that countries such as Vietnam, China, Mexico, and Peru still have significant barriers to foreign trade, though Mexico, which has had a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and Canada since 1994, has shown consistent improvements in its trade and investment rankings. …
p14 There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP will require the dismantling of Canada’s supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. As Canada was negotiating entry into the talks in 2010, messaging from the United States and New Zealand indicated that Canada’s dairy exceptions were keeping it out of the negotiations (see, for example, Inside US Trade, 2010). However, the entry of Japan into the TPP negotiations probably improves the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines. Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector in the name of food security are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. As a wealthy and attractive market (currently the third largest in the world), Japan may have enough leverage in the negotiations to maintain its agricultural protections in spite of the lofty liberalization goals of the TPP. Thus, if Japanese rice protections remain, others will likely be able to shield sensitive sectors such as US sugar and Canadian dairy.

The New Trans-Pacific Partnership: Smaller, but Just as Ambitious (PDF; 16/03/2018) | Desjardins You can check out the below two pictures: GRAPH 3, 4, and TABLE 2.
GRAPH 3 Share of CPTPP members in Canadian goods export and import categories
TABLE 1 Variation in Canadian exports by 2040 in relation to the base scenario according to various CPTPP scenarios
GRAPH 4 Highest tariffs in the 25 biggest categories of exports to the CPTPP
TABLE 2 Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam would be Canada’s biggest opportunity for saving on tariffs

GRAPH 5 Some products could be especially impacted by the CPTPP

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): AN OVERVIEW (PDF; 12/2015) | John M. Curtis @ School of Public Policy, University of Calgary
Economic Impact of Canada’s Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 02/16/2018) | Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada
Canadian industries split on new TPP trade deal (PDF; 01/23/2018) | Steven Chase and Greg Keenan @ The Globe and Mail
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP – WHAT’S IN IT FOR CANADA? (PDF; 2016) | Business Council of Canada
Give and Take – Risks and Opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Canada’s Building Trades Unions (PDF; 08/2016) | Dawson Strategic
Gains from Trade but to Whom? – Canola and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; Fall 2016) | Hawley Campbell and Henry An @ Western Economics Forum
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 07/2015) | CAFTA-ACCA
ACTRA SUBMISSION TO GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA ON THE CANADA-PACIFIC TRADE CONSULTATIONS (FORMERLY TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP) (PDF; 10/30/2017)
POLICY BRIEF: The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Health: Potential Risks and Benefits (PDF) | Ronald Labonte & Arne Ruckert @ Globalization and Health Equity, University of Ottawa

Desjardins CanadianGoodsExportImportDesjardins HighestTariffs, BiggestOpportunity

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Canada Vol.38 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.4