Iran イラン Vol.1

All the below links and tweets are in English.

取り急ぎ、現在までに取りまとめた情報を貼っておきます。 To be continued.

イラン近隣等諸国関連
Iran Vol.1 (neighbors) イラク、パキスタン、アフガニスタン、トルクメニスタン、アゼルバイジャン、アルメニア 等
Iran Vol.2 (neighbors) トルコ、シリア、レバノン 等
Iran Vol.3 (neighbors) ヨルダン、イスラエル、エジプト 等

スンニ派とシーア派
Middle East Vol.11 (Sunni Versus Shiite (Shia) / Iran Vol.7) 

イラン核合意(JCPoA:包括的共同行動計画)関連
Middle East Vol.15 (Iran Vol.11: JCPOA)
Middle East Vol.14 (Iran Vol.10: JCPOA)
Middle East Vol.13 (Iran Vol.9: JCPOA)
Middle East Vol.12 (Iran Vol.8: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA))
Middle East Vol.10 (Iran Vol.6 – US Withdrawal from Nuclear Agreement)
Middle East Vol.5 (Iran Vol.5 – Nuclear Agreement Vol.5)
Middle East Vol.4 (Iran Vol.4 – Nuclear Agreement Vol.4)
Middle East Vol.3 (Iran Vol.3 – Nuclear Agreement Vol.3)
Middle East Vol.2 (Iran Vol.2 – Nuclear Agreement Vol.2)
Middle East Vol.1 (Iran Vol.1 – Nuclear Agreement Vol.1)

ほか
Middle East Vol.9 (Iran and miscellaneous)
US Policy Changes Vol.80 (Middle East Vol.6)
US Policy Changes Vol.40 (Foreign Policy Vol.6 – Israel-Palestine, Iran)
US Policy Changes Vol.36 (Foreign Policy Vol.5 – Israel-Palestine, Russia, Iran, Syria)
US Policy Changes Vol.57 (National Security Vol.4 – nuclear ideas)
など


https://twitter.com/TRTWorldNow/status/1138773290531659782


Why would Iran attack two tankers near the Strait of Hormuz? (06/14/2019) | Shawn Snow @MilitaryTimes
With Trump Blessing, Japan’s Abe Seeks to Mend Iran Bridges (06/13/2019) | Golnar Motevalli, Isabel Reynolds, and Ladane Nasseri @bpolitics
Japan premier warns US, Iran ‘accidental conflict’ possible (w Video; 06/13/2019) | AMIR VAHDAT, AYA BATRAWY and JON GAMBRELL @AP @yahoo

European Parliament election 2019 欧州議会議員選挙

All the below links are in English.

ブレグジットに直接間接に関連する今回の標記選挙につき、駆け足でまとめたものを以下貼っておきます。
ちなみに、この選挙は様々に英語表記がなされ、これという決定的なものは無いように見受けられます。
日程も異なる選挙が各国で行われましたが、終わった後なので、「欧州議会の一つの選挙」という表現が今は一番しっくり来るようには感じます。
(アメリカの雑誌では、”Parliamentary” という言葉を使っている例も散見されました。)
なお、以下の各国の分類も、地理的近接等と分量を念頭に分けたものであり、EU公式のものではありません。

European Union Vol.1 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.1: RO, BG, GR, CY, MT) ルーマニア、ブルガリア、ギリシャ、キプロス、マルタ

European Union Vol.2 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.2: PL, CZ, SK, HU, SI, HR) ポーランド、チェコ、スロバキア、ハンガリー、スロベニア、クロアチア

European Union Vol.3 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.3: NL, BE, LU, SE, DK, FI, EE, LV, LT) オランダ、ベルギー、ルクセンブルグ、スウェーデン、デンマーク、フィンランド、エストニア、ラトビア、リトアニア

European Union Vol.4 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.4: FR, IT, ES, PT) フランス、イタリア、スペイン、ポルトガル

European Union Vol.5 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.5: UK, IE) イギリス、アイルランド

European Union Vol.6 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.6: DE, AT, etc.) ドイツ、オーストリア、(今後の)欧州委員会委員長選挙 など

European Union Vol.7 (2019 European Parliament elections Vol.7) 全体結果 など

U.S.-Japan Summit Meetings 日米首脳会談 Vol.22(President Trump’s visit to Japan トランプ米大統領訪日)

All the below tweets are in English.

引き続き、検索して出て来る日本時間28日午前5時過ぎまでのツイートを以下貼っておきます。

U.S.-Japan Summit Meetings 日米首脳会談 Vol.20(President Trump’s visit to Japan トランプ米大統領訪日)

All the below tweets are in English.

取り急ぎ、日本時間5月26日13時頃までの標記関連ツイート(直接関係無いと言えるものを含む)を以下貼っておきます。
敢えて一日本国民として思うことを言うとすれば、
〇 (もちろん時間の長さが全てではありませんが)アメリカ大統領夫妻が日本だけに立ち寄り3泊4日も滞在することに表れている、過去に無いほどの良好な日米関係を、日本国民としては素直に喜ぶべきである。
〇 (対外問題においては慎むべき場合もあるものの)民主主義下において国内の野党やマスコミが様々な意見を発信するのは、原則としては健全である。他方、直接関係の無い者が口出しするのは、個人的には好まない。この件で言えば、練られた思考や一定の節度の下でのアメリカ及び日本の野党やマスコミによる意見はOK、日米以外の政治家やマスコミなどによる意見はそのハードルが随分上がる、と考えています。
If I dare to say as a Japanese citizen my thought about the below tweets through around 1:00 pm, May 26, I think:
〇 Japanese people had better be genuinely glad to see the good U.S.-Japan relationship as never before, which is told by the fact that a U.S. President and his first lady come just to Japan and stay for as many as four days / three nights (, while the length of the time is not all that matters); and
〇 Under democracy, it is basically healthy that opposition political parties and the mass media in each country send out their opinions (, while they should sometimes refrain in the field of foreign affairs). On the other hand, I basically do NOT like all the other foreign people doing the same things. Regarding the President’s visit, OK would be opinions by American and Japanese opposition parties and mass media based on well-crafted studies and with restraint. On the other hand, the bars of the opinions by non-American and non-Japanese people are basically raised much, of course.

Australia オーストラリア Vol.7(2019 federal election results, etc. 総選挙結果など)

All the below links but the below tweets are in English.

まだ結果未確定部分がありますが、取り急ぎ標記につき以下貼っておきます。
Australia Vol.17 (2019 federal election)

cf. Australia オーストラリア Vol.6(states, economy, politics, etc. 各州, 経済, 政治 など)
Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.3 (Miscellaneous)
Antarctic Vol.1
など etc.

—–この部分は、5月24日昼頃に追加しました。
Alliances Adrift: Is this the end of America’s Asian alliances? (14/05/2019) | Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific 以下、一部抜粋。
… In the face of structural change towards a more multipolar Asian security order, however, coupled with unprecedented uncertainties regarding US credibility and resolve in this part of the world, most of the United States’ Asian alliances are arguably looking increasingly brittle.
Leading experts from Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand contributed their views on the nature and trajectory of alliances at a one-day workshop “Alliances Adrift: Is this the end of America’s Asian alliances?”
The workshop held on 23 April 2019 in Singapore …
… ANU participants included Professor Brendan Taylor, Emeritus Professor William Tow and Dr Lauren Richardson. …
Taylor and Tow subsequently visited Manila on 26th April to attend a roundtable discussion on the “Dilemmas of the Indo-Pacific”. They interacted with Philippines officials and scholars at the Asia-Pacific Pathways-sponsored event where they examined the US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. …
Emeritus Professor William Tow provided a synoptic review of the Trump administration’s policy in the Indo-Pacific … also tackled catalysts for the FOIP, such as the possibility of an emerging China-containment doctrine by the US, domestic pressures on the Trump administration to have a different foreign policy from Obama, and the complementarity of ideology and geography to operationalise the “America First” rhetoric.
Professor Brendan Taylor discussed Australia’s stakes in the Indo-Pacific, such as its fears of exclusion from the region and economic decline … underscored the conceptual ambiguity and the divergent interests within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (between Japan, US, Australia, and India) that may derail future development.
… During the open discussion, participants raised issues such as the feasibility and appropriateness of having a China-containment goal for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, the US, Australia, and India …
Taylor and Tow will bring the discussions and papers from these workshops together by co-editing a special issue in an internationally respected journal planned to appear in early 2020. They will also visit Northeast Asia and the United States later this year to follow up the Singapore session …
——-

以下は、標記と言うよりは、日豪首脳その他を検索して出てくるツイートです。
自由貿易の原則の下での各種の国益最重視 を堅持すれば長期的に国全体としてうまく行く、
客観的で説得力のある理由付けが随時必要である、と考えております。

Australia オーストラリア Vol.6(states, economy, politics, etc. 各州, 経済, 政治 など)

All the below links are in English.

標記につき取り急ぎ貼っておきます。なお、worldsolutions.work の各ポストは、日付が若干新しくありませんが、内容は最近、大幅に拡充等したものです。

Australia Vol.8 (New South Wales) ニューサウスウェールズ州
Australia Vol.13 (Victoria) ビクトリア州
Australia Vol.12 (Queensland) クイーンズランド州
Australia Vol.10 (South Australia) サウスオーストラリア州
Australia Vol.9 (Western Australia) ウェスタンオーストラリア州
Australia Vol.11 (Tasmania) タスマニア州
Australia Vol.6 (Northern Territory) ノーザンテリトリー(北部特別地域)
Australia Vol.2 (Australian Capital Territory) オーストラリア首都特別地域

Australia Vol.5 (Economy) 経済
Australia Vol.1 (Politics) 政治
Australia Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.2 TPP
Australia Vol.16 / Meat Vol.2 
Australia Vol.7 (Climate change) 気候変動
Australia Vol.14 / Antarctic Vol.2 南極

各州名及びJapanなどを入れて検索して出てきたツイートです。政府に関連するという立場でない弊社としては、現時点で日本の命運を左右する話題ではなく経済動向と不可分である国際情勢等の空気も見えるもの を敢えて外さないことがあってもむしろ良いのではないかと考え、今回は一部その類のものを含めています。
The below tweets are found if you enter such words as states’ names and Japan, etc. As far as our LLC, which is not related to the Government of Japan, has considered, this time it would be rather better to dare not to take off the information which does not affect the fate of Japan as of May 15, and which shows the atmosphere of international affairs inseparably linked to economy.

U.K. イギリス Vol.25(England イングランド Vol.7 – East of England)

All the below links are in English or Japanese.

Norfolk、Suffolk、Hertfordshire、
Luton を含む Bedfordshire、
Thurrock 及び Southend-on-Sea を含むEssex、
Peterborough を含む Cambridgeshire、です。

Cambridgeshire including Peterborough
UK Vol.120 (England Vol.13 – East of England Vol.6) – Cambridgeshire including Peterborough –
UK Vol.119 (England Vol.12 – East of England Vol.5)
UK Vol.118 (England Vol.11 – East of England Vol.4) – University of Cambridge –
Cambridge’s Silicon Fen shaken by the winds of change (23/07/2016) | @TerryMac999 @guardian
Japan working with UK companies (21/10/2011) | Cambridgeshire Chambers of Commerce
It’s a new day for Sosei Heptares (19/10/2018) | Mike Scialom @CambridgeIndy
University of Cambridge Kendo Society | @Cambridge_Uni
£2,000 Japanese gin is ‘world’s most expensive’(19/11/2015) | Amy Hopkins @spiritsbusiness
Sushi wars are hotting up in Cambridge as another restaurant opens in the city (23/06/2018) | Raymond Brown @Cambslive
On the market: 1980s Japanese-style single-storey property in Cambridge, Cambridgeshire (11/25/2013) | @WowHauser
英国産「SAKE」で日本発信 欧州で初の酒蔵完成、富裕層中心に商機狙う (09/15/2018) | 産経新聞

Essex including Thurrock and Southend-on-Sea
UK Vol.117 (England Vol.10 – East of England Vol.3)
Japanese specialist plastics company opens first UK premises in Essex | @investessex
Olympus Keymed | @investessex
The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910 (03/06/2019) | ESSEX GARDENS TRUST
New links forged with Japan through Vice-Chancellor’s visit (02/03/2017) | @Uni_of_Essex
University of Essex | 国際教養大学
Japanese Roof Garden | @SOAS
エセックスサマースクール2017を早稲田大学で開講しました ‐スーパーグローバル大学創成支援「Waseda Ocean構想」 (11/07/2017) | 早稲田大学
エセックス大学 | 獨協大学

Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire including Luton
UK Vol.116 (England Vol.9 – East of England Vol.2)
Japanese food comes to Hertford with Oishii by Elle (03/08/2017) | @hertslife
Hertfordshire fire officer leads UK Japan rescue team (14/03/2011) | @BBC
Wasabi launches first UK airport outlet at Luton (21/09/2015) | Caterlyst
Japanese garden wins award (09/08/2011) | Bedford Today
Case Study: Nissan Technical Centre Europe, Cranfield Technology Park, Bedfordshire (PDF) | @BruelKjaerUK
Impact case study (REF3b) – Institution: University of Bedfordshire | #REF2014
cf.
Japan: The World’s First Post-Growth Economy? (01/02/2011) | Jeremy Williams @postgrowth
Was this Thatcher’s greatest legacy? (14/09/2009) | Giles Edwards @BBC

Norfolk and Suffolk
UK Vol.115 (England Vol.8 – East of England Vol.1)
Global Perspectives: East Anglian heritage is ‘big in Japan’ (09/12/2017) | Trevor Heaton @EDP24
Japanese distillers come to Norfolk for Maris Otter | @HBanhamLTD
British parts supplier to open largest Honda motorcycle museum outside Japan (01/28/2015) | Kurt Ernst @HemmingsNews

U.K. イギリス Vol.18(北アイルランド Northern Ireland)

UK NorthernIreland LAdistrictsUK NorthernIreland counties
All the below links are in English.

取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。

Local Authority Districts
Antrim and Newtownabbey; Belfast
UK Vol.99 (Northern Ireland Vol.4)

Newry, Mourne and Down; Ards and North Down; Lisburn and Castlereagh
UK Vol.82 (Northern Ireland Vol.3)

Mid and East Antrim (Carrickfergus, Larne, Ballymena); Mid Ulster (Magherafelt, Cookstown, Dungannon); Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon
UK Vol.77 (Northern Ireland Vol.2)

Fermanagh and Omagh; Derry and Strabane; Causeway Coast and Glens
UK Vol.73 (Northern Ireland Vol.1)

その他 Miscellaneous
Good Friday (& Agreement)

UK Vol.91 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.20: 2017 General Election – Plaid Cymru, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin)

UK Vol.59 (Religion and the patterns of conflict in Northern Ireland)

UK Vol.52 (Concern over Brexit’s impact on political landscape in Northern Ireland)

UK Vol.5 (Northern Ireland)

なお、今、ツイッターで日本語で「北アイルランド」と入れて検索したら、以下のようなものが出て来ましたので、取り急ぎ情報として貼っておきます。
個人としてはニュアンスやトーンに必ずしも共感しない等のものが含まれる可能性があります旨、常々ご留意頂ければ幸甚です。

Pinned tweets, etc. 固定ツイート等

https://twitter.com/WSjp_insight/status/1042627697271177216


SNSは複雑単純あるにしてもどれでも使い続けないと正直よく分からないものであると認識していますが、当方が唯一使い続けているツイッターの良さは
1.設定が全体に自由かつ簡単であり、また、それゆえもあり拡散力に優れてもいる
2.そのため、難しい話を内容とするディスカッション、コンテンツマーケティング、キュレーションに適している。
こういう良さを備えるSNSは、今後も出て来ないように感じます。
そもそも、情報が有り過ぎて困る今の時代には、ある意味キュレーション無くして物事の正確な理解はできません。
この意味では、キュレーション等のためのツイッターも、その存在無くして今の時代を語れないとも言い得ます。
フォロワー数やリツイート数・ライク数よりも、コンテンツの質が重要とも言えます。


Honestly, we have understood that it is difficult to understand how to use social network services, if we don’t keep using some specific ones, regardless of being complicated or simple. The strengths of Twitter, which we have kept using as our single tool, would be:
1. in general, we can set it freely and easily, and so forth as well, it is good at spreading stories on the Internet;
2. therefore it is suitable to discussions, content marketing, curation, etc. on difficult topics or contents.
It seems that there will not be such strong services other than Twitter.
Today, when there is too much information, in a sense, it is impossible to accurately understand news without curation.
In this sense, it would be impossible to talk about current era without presense of Twitter, which is suitable to curation, etc.
We can say that the quality of contents is far more important than the numbers of followers, retweets, likes, etc.

ご参考:
1.(無料で使用しているので思うような表示にはなっておりませんが)一応、https://9223.teacup.com/ireland_corps/bbs という(概ね日本語 Mostly in Japanese の)デジタルサイネージ digital signage があります。アイルランド関連・電子書籍関連に可能な限り絞って貼って行こうと考えています。
2.https://www.goodreads.com/world_solutions (in English)
これは引き続き、若干趣味的に試行錯誤の最中です。フィクション作品愛好者が圧倒的に多い、更新後の内容が表れるのが半日くらい後である、などの特徴があると言えそうです。
3.2019年4月16日、書籍Facebookページを公開停止といたしました。今までご覧頂いた等の方々、誠にありがとうございました。引き続き、本ウェブサイトやツイッター等をご覧頂ければ幸甚です。
On April 16, 2019, we stopped publishing the eBook-related Facebook page. Thank you so much for having visited that page, etc. We would be very pleased if you continue visiting this website, Twitter accounts, the Teacup digital signage, etc.

EUJEPA Vol.3


All the below links, excerpts, and pictures (charts/tables) are in English.

Japan-EU EPA 【Benefits and Backgrounds】(PDF; 07/2018) | MOFA Japan You can also check out the first one of the below pictures.
Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) (07/17/2018) | MOFA Japan
2018 Japan-EU Summit: Signing Ceremony Of EPA And SPA (YouTube)

The EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (w PDF; 09/2018) | Policy Department for External Relations @ European Parliament (@Bruegel) You can also check out all the below pictures but the first one.
PDF p11 Within the EU-28, in 2017 the top goods exporters to Japan were Germany, Italy, the UK and France, respectively accounting for 32.87 %, 10.82 %, 10.67 % and 10.53 % of the EU’s EUR 60.66 billion of commodity exports to Japan in 2017. Germany, Italy, the UK and France were also the top four importers of Japanese goods, with respective shares of 23.28 %, 16.48 %, 14.37 % and 12.76 % of the EUR 68.89 billion worth of EU commodity imports from Japan in 2017.
Japan is among the low-tariff countries for industrial goods with a trade-weighted tariff average of 1.4 % (Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s agricultural markets are relatively protected. Simple average applied most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs stand at 13.3 % for agricultural goods, with high tariffs on animal products (10.6 %), dairy items (63.4 %), beverages and tobacco (15.1 %).
Figure 4 depicts the EU’s and Japan’s tariffs by harmonised system (HS) product categories. In terms of the average applied MFN tariffs, we note that Japanese tariffs are low across numerous sectors such as electrical machinery (0.1 %), transport equipment (0) and manufactures not elsewhere specified (n.e.s) (1.2 %). Prominent exceptions are clothing (9 %), leather and footwear (7.7 %).
p12 The dominant sectors in the EU’s total service exports to Japan in 2016 were financial services (23.53 %), telecommunications (14.5 %) and transport (13.97 %).
p13 Japan accounted for only 1.1 % of the total extra-EU FDI in 2016 (Figure 7). By comparison, EU investments in the US and Canada are much higher, representing 38 % and 3.7 % of total extra-EU FDI. Japanese investment in the EU stood at USD 56.8 billion, 33.7 % of its total FDI stock abroad in 2017. However, it should be noted that a substantial share, approximately 38 %, of Japan’s FDI stock in the EU is in the UK …
p15 A low score (0.05) in OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (2017), which measures statutory limitations on FDI, is indicative of the relative openness of the Japanese economy to foreign investors, as the OECD average is 0.07. On the other hand, the US (0.09), Canada (0.162) and China (0.316) are all relatively more restrictive as destinations for FDI. Except for a few countries in Europe (Austria, Poland and Sweden), all EU Member States are more open to FDI than Japan, with Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia being the least restrictive.
p17 Tariffs Agricultural goods. … significant reductions in customs duties for the EU’s major food exports to Japan such as pork (e.g. 4.3 % to 0 over 10 years for high value cuts), wine (15 % to 0 % on entry into force), beef (38.5 % to 9 % over 15 years), pasta and chocolates (complete tariff liberalisation in 10 years). For cheeses, the EUJEPA will deliver complete liberalisation for hard cheeses and provide tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with duty free access for fresh, processed and soft cheeses.
Industrial goods. In the agri-goods industry, South Korea was traditionally protectionist with a trade-weighted tariff of 49 % in the pre-FTA period. By 2014 however, these had been reduced on a preferential basis for EU goods to 28 %. The EU also liberalised its agricultural markets for South Korea by reducing trade-weighted tariffs from 11 % to 3 %.
Non-Tariff Barriers … Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (CIAR) in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Japan is aligning itself with international standards on medical devices (Quality Management Systems), textile labelling (ISO international care labelling), motor vehicles (UNECE international vehicle regulations) and pharmaceuticals (ICH).
p18 Services The EUJEPA seeks to promote bilateral trade in a broad range of services but does not require governments to deregulate or privatise the provision of public services such as healthcare, water supply and education. … In telecommunications, the agreement covers issues such as mobile roaming, number portability and confidentiality of users’ traffic data. In financial services, the agreement calls for deeper regulatory cooperation and establishes a Joint Financial Regulatory Forum for this purpose. In e-commerce, the parties commit to keep electronic transmissions duty-free, recognise the legal validity of electronic contracts and signatures and may not require source codes to be transferred or accessed. In postal and courier services, the EUJEPA will attempt to build a level-playing field for EU suppliers and their main competitors such as Japan Post.
p21 Japan is one of the least restrictive economies in the world according to ECIPE’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index Report …
pp30-33 Bilateral trade There is substantial variation in the anticipated trade response. DG Trade (2018) found that the EUJEPA would lead to an increase of +13.2 % (EUR 13 billion) increase in EU exports to Japan. EU exports to Japan would rise by 22.6-32.7 % in the CIAR (2012) simulations. A much stronger export response for the EU is found in Ifo 2017 (61 %) and Ifo 2018 (73 %).
On the import side, DG Trade (2018) reports a 23.5 % (EUR 22 billion) increase in EU imports from Japan. This result is similar to that of CIAR (2012) which predicted increases in EU import purchases from Japan in the range of 17.1-23.5 %. In contrast, Ifo (2017) and Ifo (2018) simulations lead to increases in EU imports from Japan of 55 % and 63 %, respectively.
Sectoral value added All EUJEPA studies report a positive impact on value added in agri-food industries e.g.+0.82 % according to Ifo 2018, +0.2 % increase in output for processed foods in DG Trade (2018), 0.5-0.6 % for processed foods in the CIAR (2012) and +13 % for meats in Ecorys (2009). For automobiles, projections of value added are model-dependent.
By 2035, Japan’s car exports to EU increase by nearly 51 % in this study. Because of significant NTB reductions by Japan in motors, the EU also increases its exports to Japan following the EUJEPA (+11.5 %).
Textiles, apparel and leather products benefit from the agreement as well. The industry is expected to increase its output by 2 % (EUR 7 billion) in the EU, with exports to Japan rising by 220 % (EUR 5 billion) in DG Trade (2018).
Impact of Brexit Brexit has a greater impact on Japan, as it reduces the economic benefits from EUJEPA by 14 % (EUR 1 billion) and 20 % in Ifo 2017 and Ifo 2018, respectively. This is the result of a smaller market size for Japanese companies following Brexit.
Impact of CPTPP-11 Ratification of the CPTPP-11 agreement between Japan and 10 Pacific countries may also affect gains from EUJEPA. This scenario is evaluated in Ifo 2018. Simulation results reveal that the conclusion of the agreement leads to slightly smaller positive gains for the EU and slightly higher real-income gains for Japan (from 0.308 % to 0.314 %) compared to the simple baseline scenario. CPTPP-11 is expected to reduce Japan’s costs of sourcing inputs from the Asia-Pacific, improving its competitiveness and trade with the EU.
pp44-45 1/Investment liberalisation and promotion ISDS is the mechanism preferred by Japan, one that it has also supported under the CPTPP-11. In the investment negotiations held during July 2018, chief negotiators from the EU and Japan acknowledged the convergence of positions on investment protection standards but not on investor-state dispute settlement.
2/US investigation into auto imports … In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce initiated a National Security Investigation into the import of automobiles and auto parts into the US. This investigation is motivated by Section 232 of US’s Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and will examine whether declining American domestic production in the automobile sector poses a threat to its national security by weakening the internal economy and reducing domestic research on advanced technologies. Given the deep value chains in the auto industry, EU and Japanese car producers would be significantly harmed if the investigation leads to an increase in duties on foreign vehicles entering the US market.
On 25 July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump announced plans to hold off on any new unilateral tariffs against each other as bilateral negotiations proceed on liberalising non-auto industrial goods, increasing EU imports of US soybeans and liquified natural gas (LNG), addressing WTO issues, reassessing US steel and aluminium tariffs and EU’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods. The EU will therefore be shielded from the conclusions of the US auto investigations, unless ongoing negotiations are halted by either party.
4/Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) … In the EUJEPA, Japan provides TRQs for agri-foods such as whey products, malt, potato starch, fresh and processed cheeses. …
5/Japan’s future trade ties with the UK … during the transition period (March 2019 to end of 2020). The exact terms of EUJEPA would hence be applicable to the UK over this period. Their implementation will be crucial for Japan’s car manufacturers that collectively produce 800 000 vehicles in the UK, accounting for 50 % of the UK’s total annual production …

In Focus EU-Japan ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT | European Commission
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: texts of the agreement | European Commission
EU-Japan: A Partnership of Renewed Importance (w PDF) | Cristina de Esperanza Picardo @eucentresg
New EU-Japan economic, strategic partnership may work better than past efforts (07/19/2018) | Bastian Harth @ Asia Times
… The SPA lays out the first-ever framework between the EU and Japan for cooperation and dialogue across various bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues such as cybercrime, disaster management, energy security, climate change, and aging populations. It also calls on both sides to synergize on promoting peace, stability, and international prosperity, and to recede from a sectoral and segmented approach to a comprehensive and legally binding cooperation framework. …
Especially, cybersecurity is of enormous importance for Japan, given the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Millions of cyberattacks are predicted, and despite the country’s remarkable public safety… The topic is of such importance that Japan is even going to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. …

Brexit, a Catalyst for Closer EU-Japan Relations? (PDF) | Irina Angelescu
… Consequently, there is an implicit understanding from the Japanese side that the UK government “owes” special attention to Japanese interests, and should keep those interests in mind when negotiating Brexit. The former UK Ambassador to Japan, David Warren, indicated that some of his Japanese counterparts share a sense of “betrayal,” …
…three Japanese car manufacturers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) now make almost half of the 1.67 million cars produced in the UK. …
… GlaxoSmithKline Plc estimates that, in the next two-three years, it could incur costs as high as 70 million pounds ($98 million) of Brexit-related costs. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson estimated that it could face as many as 50,000 additional tests in the amount of 1 million pounds if there will be no post-Brexit mutual recognition of testing between the EU and the UK. AstroZeneca and MerkKGaA raised similar concerns. …
… Mitsubishi Bank UFJ picked Amsterdam as its base for EU securities operations, while Nomura Holdings, Daiwa Securities and Sumitomo Matsui Financial Group said they would move to Frankfurt. …
… Decisions such as that of Unilever – the UK’s third largest company to consolidate its HQ in the Netherlands and abandon the separate London HQ is just one recent example that has caused more unease among third parties about the outcome of Brexit. …
The Japanese position has remained consistent about its preferences for Brexit from the very beginning: no Brexit or the “softest” form of Brexit, with unhindered access to the European Single Market – preferably preceded by a very long transition period that would allow Japanese businesses to adapt to changes. …
… In particular, joint training and cooperation to address newer threats like cybersecurity or disinformation campaigns conducted by countries like Russia and China could prove to be mutually beneficial. In principle, the U.S. should also welcome the closer economic ties between the EU and Japan as a means to promote free trade worldwide. At the same time, the EU-Japan data protection agreement and certain provisions in the EU-Japan EPA such as Geographic Indicators (GIs) for agricultural products could negatively affect U.S. interests. …
EU-Japan partnership agreements herald new era of closer cooperation (29/01/2018) | Irina Angelescu @ European Council on Foreign Relations

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA): Good but Good Enough? (16/10/2018) | Axel Berkofsky @ ISPI
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order (PDF; 12/2017) | Axel Berkofsky @ University of Pavia, Italy & Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) (@ Bertelsmann Stiftung) You can check out Table 1 and Figure 2 (in this PDF).
The EU-Japan EPA/SPA and the ‘Abe Doctrine’: Reinforcing Norms Globally, Changing them Domestically (PDF; 07/2018) | Edward Danks @ European Institute for Asian Studies
JAPAN-EU COOPERATION IN THE ERA OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER TRANSFORMATION: IN SEARCH OF A STABLE WORLD SYSTEM (w PDFs; 28/11/2017) | INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (w PDFs) | Lords Select Committee, UK Parliament
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: trends and prospects (PDF; 07/03/2018) | The Royal Institute of International Affairs of Belgium & the University of Essex
EU-JAPAN – READY FOR A NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS? (PDF; Spring 2014) | Friends of Europe
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A Framework To Promote Shared Values [International Agreements In Progress] (12/10/2018) | Enrico D’Ambrogio @ European Parliamentary Research
Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (18/07/2018) | Ankit Panda @ The Diplomat

〔Charts, Tables, etc.〕
EUJEPA MOFAjapan BenefitsTopProducts EU-JapanAve MFNdutiesEU servicesTrade wJapanEU FDIJapan outwardFDITradeFacilitationIndicator JapanEU ExImReduction EUtariffsComparison simulations Tab11Comparison simulations Tab11-2Comparison results Tab13