Pinned tweets, etc. 固定ツイート等

アイルランドの政治・行政・企業・地方・大学: 英文脚注15000以上―アイルランド・米国・英国・欧州・日本企業情報を含む Kindle版 中港拓 (著)

#FoodexJapan2019 non-Japanese companies #フーデックスジャパン2019 外国企業(於:幕張メッセ Makuhari Messe)
U.K. イギリス Vol.18(北アイルランド Northern Ireland)
U.K. イギリス Vol.19(スコットランド Scotland)
U.K. イギリス Vol.20(ウェールズ Wales)

U.K. イギリス Vol.16(Brexit Vol.13:報道等において正面から触れられていないブレグジット三点 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc.)
U.K. Vol.17(Brexit Vol.14: 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc. – especially outside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland)

EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 日EU経済連携協定(EUJEPA)Vol.2

TPP Vol.4
TPP Vol.5
TPP Vol.6


Honestly, we have understood that it is difficult to understand how to use social network services, if we don’t keep using some specific ones, regardless of being complicated or simple. The strengths of Twitter, which we have kept using as our single tool, would be:
1. in general, we can set it freely and easily, and so forth as well, it is good at spreading stories on the Internet;
2. therefore it is suitable to discussions, content marketing, curation, etc. on difficult topics or contents.
It seems that there will not be such strong services other than Twitter.
Today, when there is too much information, in a sense, it is impossible to accurately understand news without curation.
In this sense, it would be impossible to talk about current era without presense of Twitter, which is suitable to curation, etc.
We can say that the quality of contents is far more important than the numbers of followers, retweets, likes, etc.

1.(無料で使用しているので思うような表示にはなっておりませんが)一応、 という(概ね日本語 Mostly in Japanese の)デジタルサイネージ digital signage があります。アイルランド関連・電子書籍関連に可能な限り絞って貼って行こうと考えています。
2. (in English)
On April 16, 2019, we stopped publishing the eBook-related Facebook page. Thank you so much for having visited that page, etc. We would be very pleased if you continue visiting this website, Twitter accounts, the Teacup digital signage, etc.

EUJEPA Vol.4 / TPP Vol.7 (チーズ、牛肉、シーフード、ワイン Cheese, Beef, Seafood, Wine)




cf. Cheese, etc., Top 10 Importers
EUJEPA-TPP cheese top-10-importers

U.K. Vol.17(Brexit Vol.14: 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc. – especially outside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland)

Now we have only one month left to March 29, 2019, the day of Brexit. Whenever possible since the UK referendum in 2016, I have checked out news articles, professional reports. government’s remarks, etc. in English and Japanese. I am listing and explaining the three topics which have seemingly not been confronted in the media, etc., as below.

I. Leaving the European Union Customs Union and Avoiding the return of a Hard Border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are incompatible.
I have gotten an impression from the media, etc.: in the U.K., Leavers and Remainers have respectively been stick to their own convictions since political activities before the referendum; and agreements between the two factions and those between the EU and UK by the deadline seem a steep path.
In the first half of last year, I felt such steepness is due to the Northern-Southern border. And I have come to feel so stronger, last autumn when there arose much news about the Brexit backstop – a safety net in order that the NI and the ROI will maintain the current open border, under the 1998 Good Friday agreement which decided not to make physical facilities on the border, in case no formal deal between the EU and the UK can be reached on trade and security arrangements by the end of transition period, i.e. the end of the year 2020.
In English there is much news articles plainly explaining the border question, and not a few ones whose precondition is the above incompatibility. However, there seems no article which confronts the incompatibility itself. In Japanese, there seems no such news articles other than the one written by a senior researcher of a Japanese think tank who I do not know in person.
That article says the entire Brexit necessitates the hard border – such a tight border control that Japan has done as a distinct economic area; and you need to give up the entire Brexit if you maintain the current open border, which means you need to stay in the EU customs union as you belong to the same economic area as the EU. I agree to it. I have an overall impression that concerned people have actually continued to find some compromise plan because it would have been all for nothing if they had said this clearly in public. However, eventually, nothing comes from nothing.
The incompatibility eventually leads just to “some people choose one of the two”. There are options such as another referendum, a resolution of the House of Commons, a snap election, etc. In the first place, the referendum, one of the campaign promises in the 2015 general election, was conducted in 2016 and followed by a state of seemingly senseless chaos. So, the least unreasonable would be another referendum which confirms whether or not the result of the referendum in 2016 is UK citizens’ will in reality.
Fundamentally, not only referendum but also voting itself tends to be greatly affected by political winds, not decided by the content of the subject on which the judgement of the people was sought. And in 2016, Leave won by a very narrow margin, despite this result will turn over the status quo of the whole UK. If the result were Remain, i.e. maintaining the status quo, a very narrow margin would not matter. But the result was the turnover. What are convincing reasons to avoid another referendum under democracy, which ask people whether it is OK to really exit the EU on the basis of the narrow margin? I have not understood such reasons, while I saw “referendum should not be carried out twice because we had better preserve the credibility of the referendum”, etc. Most of UK citizens will be convinced, if another referendum confirms their judgement and a hard Brexit comes true.

II. The state of things in electoral districts of MPs who left the Labour or the Conservative parties.
As of 21 February, eight Members of Parliament have left the Labour, the largest opposition party, due to their dissatisfaction with its leader’s vague attitude toward Brexit, anti-Semitic attitude, etc. On the other hand, three MPs have left the Conservative, due to their dissatisfaction with the government’s catastrophic handling of Brexit. A total of these eleven members will not join the opposition Liberal Democrats, but form an independent group which aims to conduct another referendum (seemingly similar to my above thought). We can think in general that their actions are based on their concerns that they lament the UK as parliamentarians, or are related to circumstances of constituency to whom they owe many things.
The eight ex-Labours [district/county] are Coffey [Stockport/Greater Manchester], Smith [Penistone and Stocksbridge/South Yorkshire], Shuker [Luton South/Bedfordshire], Gapes [Ilford South/Greater London], Umunna [Streatham/Greater London], Leslie [Nottingham East/Nottinghamshire], Berger [Liverpool Wavertree/Merseyside], Ryan [Enfield North/Greater London]; the three ex-Conservatives Soubry [Broxtowe/Nottinghamshire], Allen [South Cambridgeshire/Cambridgeshire], Wollaston [Totnes/Devon].
According to a UK university’s research, for example, in Coffey’s Stockport, Leave-Remain difference were marginal, and Remainers increased in proportion to house prices. We can think that there are not a few people who have middle-price houses, voted Leave in 2016, but converted themselves to Remainers, while there are usually more middle-price house owners. Would this situational change urge the ex-Labour and ex-Conservative members to secede from the party and to try to conduct another referendum? When we see MPs’ voting behaviors at resolutions in the House of Commons, there must be cases in which it is useful to analyze not only house prices but the state of things in electoral districts.

III. The City of London does not prefer Jeremy Corbyn’s policies.
Although the ruling party achieved a great victory in the 2015 general election, it could not have been intrinsically strange if approval for the party had dropped significantly in the UK where regime changes by two largest parties have already taken roots, considering chaos which has continued so far and will continue. And the above attitude of the Labour leader seems to rather show his favor on soft Brexit.
However, in the media, etc., it has been said by and large that Corbyn’s Labour government with a strong left-wing flavor and its public policy such as re-nationalisation of public utilities and wealth tax are undesired, and are feared more than hard Brexit. The former would expand budget deficit and cause a sharp rise of inflation rate, which would lead to government bonds’ decrease in demand and long-term government bonds’ decrease in price. The latter would be an income tax hike towards people with over eighty thousand pounds, and would lead to the people’s escaping abroad and the UK’s revenue decline. The City is said to be on its guard against such policies. If I dare to say, its guard might not be off-base.
For example, concerning the re-nationalisation, we need to take the following into consideration: the UK government deficit-to-GDP ratio is not extremely bad (0.875 in 2017); and Tony Blair’s Labour government so positively expanded the PPP (public-private partnership) including the PFI (private finance initiative) that re-nationalisation, which means banks, equity investors and other private financiers being forced to take a haircut on their investments, is not wanted by the City. On the other hand, in many ages and countries, there have often been policy differences between two largest parties, which need to be tackled at any time taking considerable contents such as the above two into consideration.

It should be noted that immediate news coverage and possible analyses shortly after it are of course important. And I usually respect the importance to sort long processes, significant effects on international society, complicated and mysterious affairs of politics and economy, etc., at each turning point of major incidents. However, I picked up the above three points, on the assumption that I write about Brexit just this time – after countless news articles, researches, etc. were already published.

Taku Nakaminato, World Solutions LLC
24 February, 2019

The above is a provisional English translation of “Brexit Vol.13“.

P.S. I posted the above at around 5 pm (JST). Thank you for coming, many English readers.
Around 2 pm, 25 February Today I just added the following hyperlinks:
Ian Austin quits Labour blaming Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership
Ian Austin says he couldn’t look Jewish father ‘in the eye’ if he remained in Labour party
Corbyn told: change course before it’s too late for Labour

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1


All the below links, excerpts, and pictures (charts/tables) are in English.

Japan-EU EPA 【Benefits and Backgrounds】(PDF; 07/2018) | MOFA Japan You can also check out the first one of the below pictures.
Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) (07/17/2018) | MOFA Japan
2018 Japan-EU Summit: Signing Ceremony Of EPA And SPA (YouTube)

The EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (w PDF; 09/2018) | Policy Department for External Relations @ European Parliament (@Bruegel) You can also check out all the below pictures but the first one.
PDF p11 Within the EU-28, in 2017 the top goods exporters to Japan were Germany, Italy, the UK and France, respectively accounting for 32.87 %, 10.82 %, 10.67 % and 10.53 % of the EU’s EUR 60.66 billion of commodity exports to Japan in 2017. Germany, Italy, the UK and France were also the top four importers of Japanese goods, with respective shares of 23.28 %, 16.48 %, 14.37 % and 12.76 % of the EUR 68.89 billion worth of EU commodity imports from Japan in 2017.
Japan is among the low-tariff countries for industrial goods with a trade-weighted tariff average of 1.4 % (Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s agricultural markets are relatively protected. Simple average applied most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs stand at 13.3 % for agricultural goods, with high tariffs on animal products (10.6 %), dairy items (63.4 %), beverages and tobacco (15.1 %).
Figure 4 depicts the EU’s and Japan’s tariffs by harmonised system (HS) product categories. In terms of the average applied MFN tariffs, we note that Japanese tariffs are low across numerous sectors such as electrical machinery (0.1 %), transport equipment (0) and manufactures not elsewhere specified (n.e.s) (1.2 %). Prominent exceptions are clothing (9 %), leather and footwear (7.7 %).
p12 The dominant sectors in the EU’s total service exports to Japan in 2016 were financial services (23.53 %), telecommunications (14.5 %) and transport (13.97 %).
p13 Japan accounted for only 1.1 % of the total extra-EU FDI in 2016 (Figure 7). By comparison, EU investments in the US and Canada are much higher, representing 38 % and 3.7 % of total extra-EU FDI. Japanese investment in the EU stood at USD 56.8 billion, 33.7 % of its total FDI stock abroad in 2017. However, it should be noted that a substantial share, approximately 38 %, of Japan’s FDI stock in the EU is in the UK …
p15 A low score (0.05) in OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (2017), which measures statutory limitations on FDI, is indicative of the relative openness of the Japanese economy to foreign investors, as the OECD average is 0.07. On the other hand, the US (0.09), Canada (0.162) and China (0.316) are all relatively more restrictive as destinations for FDI. Except for a few countries in Europe (Austria, Poland and Sweden), all EU Member States are more open to FDI than Japan, with Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia being the least restrictive.
p17 Tariffs Agricultural goods. … significant reductions in customs duties for the EU’s major food exports to Japan such as pork (e.g. 4.3 % to 0 over 10 years for high value cuts), wine (15 % to 0 % on entry into force), beef (38.5 % to 9 % over 15 years), pasta and chocolates (complete tariff liberalisation in 10 years). For cheeses, the EUJEPA will deliver complete liberalisation for hard cheeses and provide tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with duty free access for fresh, processed and soft cheeses.
Industrial goods. In the agri-goods industry, South Korea was traditionally protectionist with a trade-weighted tariff of 49 % in the pre-FTA period. By 2014 however, these had been reduced on a preferential basis for EU goods to 28 %. The EU also liberalised its agricultural markets for South Korea by reducing trade-weighted tariffs from 11 % to 3 %.
Non-Tariff Barriers … Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (CIAR) in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Japan is aligning itself with international standards on medical devices (Quality Management Systems), textile labelling (ISO international care labelling), motor vehicles (UNECE international vehicle regulations) and pharmaceuticals (ICH).
p18 Services The EUJEPA seeks to promote bilateral trade in a broad range of services but does not require governments to deregulate or privatise the provision of public services such as healthcare, water supply and education. … In telecommunications, the agreement covers issues such as mobile roaming, number portability and confidentiality of users’ traffic data. In financial services, the agreement calls for deeper regulatory cooperation and establishes a Joint Financial Regulatory Forum for this purpose. In e-commerce, the parties commit to keep electronic transmissions duty-free, recognise the legal validity of electronic contracts and signatures and may not require source codes to be transferred or accessed. In postal and courier services, the EUJEPA will attempt to build a level-playing field for EU suppliers and their main competitors such as Japan Post.
p21 Japan is one of the least restrictive economies in the world according to ECIPE’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index Report …
pp30-33 Bilateral trade There is substantial variation in the anticipated trade response. DG Trade (2018) found that the EUJEPA would lead to an increase of +13.2 % (EUR 13 billion) increase in EU exports to Japan. EU exports to Japan would rise by 22.6-32.7 % in the CIAR (2012) simulations. A much stronger export response for the EU is found in Ifo 2017 (61 %) and Ifo 2018 (73 %).
On the import side, DG Trade (2018) reports a 23.5 % (EUR 22 billion) increase in EU imports from Japan. This result is similar to that of CIAR (2012) which predicted increases in EU import purchases from Japan in the range of 17.1-23.5 %. In contrast, Ifo (2017) and Ifo (2018) simulations lead to increases in EU imports from Japan of 55 % and 63 %, respectively.
Sectoral value added All EUJEPA studies report a positive impact on value added in agri-food industries e.g.+0.82 % according to Ifo 2018, +0.2 % increase in output for processed foods in DG Trade (2018), 0.5-0.6 % for processed foods in the CIAR (2012) and +13 % for meats in Ecorys (2009). For automobiles, projections of value added are model-dependent.
By 2035, Japan’s car exports to EU increase by nearly 51 % in this study. Because of significant NTB reductions by Japan in motors, the EU also increases its exports to Japan following the EUJEPA (+11.5 %).
Textiles, apparel and leather products benefit from the agreement as well. The industry is expected to increase its output by 2 % (EUR 7 billion) in the EU, with exports to Japan rising by 220 % (EUR 5 billion) in DG Trade (2018).
Impact of Brexit Brexit has a greater impact on Japan, as it reduces the economic benefits from EUJEPA by 14 % (EUR 1 billion) and 20 % in Ifo 2017 and Ifo 2018, respectively. This is the result of a smaller market size for Japanese companies following Brexit.
Impact of CPTPP-11 Ratification of the CPTPP-11 agreement between Japan and 10 Pacific countries may also affect gains from EUJEPA. This scenario is evaluated in Ifo 2018. Simulation results reveal that the conclusion of the agreement leads to slightly smaller positive gains for the EU and slightly higher real-income gains for Japan (from 0.308 % to 0.314 %) compared to the simple baseline scenario. CPTPP-11 is expected to reduce Japan’s costs of sourcing inputs from the Asia-Pacific, improving its competitiveness and trade with the EU.
pp44-45 1/Investment liberalisation and promotion ISDS is the mechanism preferred by Japan, one that it has also supported under the CPTPP-11. In the investment negotiations held during July 2018, chief negotiators from the EU and Japan acknowledged the convergence of positions on investment protection standards but not on investor-state dispute settlement.
2/US investigation into auto imports … In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce initiated a National Security Investigation into the import of automobiles and auto parts into the US. This investigation is motivated by Section 232 of US’s Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and will examine whether declining American domestic production in the automobile sector poses a threat to its national security by weakening the internal economy and reducing domestic research on advanced technologies. Given the deep value chains in the auto industry, EU and Japanese car producers would be significantly harmed if the investigation leads to an increase in duties on foreign vehicles entering the US market.
On 25 July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump announced plans to hold off on any new unilateral tariffs against each other as bilateral negotiations proceed on liberalising non-auto industrial goods, increasing EU imports of US soybeans and liquified natural gas (LNG), addressing WTO issues, reassessing US steel and aluminium tariffs and EU’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods. The EU will therefore be shielded from the conclusions of the US auto investigations, unless ongoing negotiations are halted by either party.
4/Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) … In the EUJEPA, Japan provides TRQs for agri-foods such as whey products, malt, potato starch, fresh and processed cheeses. …
5/Japan’s future trade ties with the UK … during the transition period (March 2019 to end of 2020). The exact terms of EUJEPA would hence be applicable to the UK over this period. Their implementation will be crucial for Japan’s car manufacturers that collectively produce 800 000 vehicles in the UK, accounting for 50 % of the UK’s total annual production …

In Focus EU-Japan ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT | European Commission
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: texts of the agreement | European Commission
EU-Japan: A Partnership of Renewed Importance (w PDF) | Cristina de Esperanza Picardo @eucentresg
New EU-Japan economic, strategic partnership may work better than past efforts (07/19/2018) | Bastian Harth @ Asia Times
… The SPA lays out the first-ever framework between the EU and Japan for cooperation and dialogue across various bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues such as cybercrime, disaster management, energy security, climate change, and aging populations. It also calls on both sides to synergize on promoting peace, stability, and international prosperity, and to recede from a sectoral and segmented approach to a comprehensive and legally binding cooperation framework. …
Especially, cybersecurity is of enormous importance for Japan, given the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Millions of cyberattacks are predicted, and despite the country’s remarkable public safety… The topic is of such importance that Japan is even going to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. …

Brexit, a Catalyst for Closer EU-Japan Relations? (PDF) | Irina Angelescu
… Consequently, there is an implicit understanding from the Japanese side that the UK government “owes” special attention to Japanese interests, and should keep those interests in mind when negotiating Brexit. The former UK Ambassador to Japan, David Warren, indicated that some of his Japanese counterparts share a sense of “betrayal,” …
…three Japanese car manufacturers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) now make almost half of the 1.67 million cars produced in the UK. …
… GlaxoSmithKline Plc estimates that, in the next two-three years, it could incur costs as high as 70 million pounds ($98 million) of Brexit-related costs. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson estimated that it could face as many as 50,000 additional tests in the amount of 1 million pounds if there will be no post-Brexit mutual recognition of testing between the EU and the UK. AstroZeneca and MerkKGaA raised similar concerns. …
… Mitsubishi Bank UFJ picked Amsterdam as its base for EU securities operations, while Nomura Holdings, Daiwa Securities and Sumitomo Matsui Financial Group said they would move to Frankfurt. …
… Decisions such as that of Unilever – the UK’s third largest company to consolidate its HQ in the Netherlands and abandon the separate London HQ is just one recent example that has caused more unease among third parties about the outcome of Brexit. …
The Japanese position has remained consistent about its preferences for Brexit from the very beginning: no Brexit or the “softest” form of Brexit, with unhindered access to the European Single Market – preferably preceded by a very long transition period that would allow Japanese businesses to adapt to changes. …
… In particular, joint training and cooperation to address newer threats like cybersecurity or disinformation campaigns conducted by countries like Russia and China could prove to be mutually beneficial. In principle, the U.S. should also welcome the closer economic ties between the EU and Japan as a means to promote free trade worldwide. At the same time, the EU-Japan data protection agreement and certain provisions in the EU-Japan EPA such as Geographic Indicators (GIs) for agricultural products could negatively affect U.S. interests. …
EU-Japan partnership agreements herald new era of closer cooperation (29/01/2018) | Irina Angelescu @ European Council on Foreign Relations

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA): Good but Good Enough? (16/10/2018) | Axel Berkofsky @ ISPI
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order (PDF; 12/2017) | Axel Berkofsky @ University of Pavia, Italy & Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) (@ Bertelsmann Stiftung) You can check out Table 1 and Figure 2 (in this PDF).
The EU-Japan EPA/SPA and the ‘Abe Doctrine’: Reinforcing Norms Globally, Changing them Domestically (PDF; 07/2018) | Edward Danks @ European Institute for Asian Studies
EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (w PDFs) | Lords Select Committee, UK Parliament
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: trends and prospects (PDF; 07/03/2018) | The Royal Institute of International Affairs of Belgium & the University of Essex
EU-JAPAN – READY FOR A NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS? (PDF; Spring 2014) | Friends of Europe
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A Framework To Promote Shared Values [International Agreements In Progress] (12/10/2018) | Enrico D’Ambrogio @ European Parliamentary Research
Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (18/07/2018) | Ankit Panda @ The Diplomat

〔Charts, Tables, etc.〕
EUJEPA MOFAjapan BenefitsTopProducts EU-JapanAve MFNdutiesEU servicesTrade wJapanEU FDIJapan outwardFDITradeFacilitationIndicator JapanEU ExImReduction EUtariffsComparison simulations Tab11Comparison simulations Tab11-2Comparison results Tab13

EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 日EU経済連携協定(EUJEPA)Vol.2

This time all the below links and pictures are in Japanese.
平成31年2月15日、下記「cf. EU加盟28国」及び記事等10件を追加しました。

日EU経済連携協定交渉に関する主要閣僚会議及び交渉推進タスクフォース | 首相官邸
日EU・EPA(概要)(平成30年12月11日)| 外務省
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の概要PDF から下の画像1枚目抜粋
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の日EU経済連携協定(EPA)に関するファクトシート(PDF) から他の画像4枚(同PDFの3―10頁)抜粋
◦上記概要(12月11日) 内の 日EU・EPA関税交渉の主な結果(平成30年11月6日〕| 外務省
◦上記主な結果内の農林水産省所管品目経済産業省所管品目 等
日EU・EPA大枠合意内容(農林水産分野の概要)(YouTube;2017年7月27日)| 農林水産省
日EU経済連携協定(日EU・EPA)の大枠合意について(平成29年9月)| 財務省
日欧EPA大枠合意 発効のメリットと国内対策(2017年7月30日)| 公明新聞
欧州議会、歴史的な日・EU自由貿易協定を承認(2018年12月12日)| 駐日欧州連合代表部
欧州議会議員団、日本・EU間のEPAの評価のため訪日(2018年9月14日)| 駐日欧州連合代表部
日EU経済連携協定(PDF;平成30年2月)| 在英国日本国大使館
日本とEUのEPA 来年2月発効へ 世界最大の自由貿易圏に(2018年12月13日)| NHK

日欧EPA妥結、19年発効めざす 世界貿易4割カバー(2018年12月8日)| 日本経済新聞
日欧EPA承認案を閣議決定 最大級の自由貿易圏(2018年11月6日)| 日本経済新聞
サッポロ「日欧EPA発効と普段のワイン飲用に関するアンケート」、70%以上が関税撤廃に期待(2018年12月17日)| ニコニコニュース(食品産業新聞社 酒類飲料日報)
日EU EPAの大枠合意について (2017年7月10日)| 住友商事グローバルリサーチ 国際部
日本とEU、EPAで大筋合意—日本自動車工業会が歓迎(2017年7月7日)| Response
日EU・EPA大枠合意を受け、EU農業団体は歓迎の意(2017年7月11日)| 独立行政法人 農畜産業振興機構

日 EU・EPA の合意内容と日本農業への影響(PDF;2018年3月)| (株)農林中金総合研究所 基礎研究部
6頁  EUからの農林水産物輸入のうちアルコール飲料が1,683億円で最も多く,なかでもワイン(1,186億円)の割合が高い。豚肉は1,648億円で食品ではアルコール飲料とともに日本の輸入が多い。  日本からEU向けの農林水産物輸出では,アルコール飲料,ホタテガイ,ソース混合調味料,緑茶,牛肉などの品目が多くなっている。牛肉は2013年にEU向け輸入が解禁され,輸出額を伸ばしている。
7頁  CETAはEUとカナダの自由貿易協定。2009年に交渉を開始し,13年に原則的合意,14年に条文を完成し公表して16年に署名した。さらに,17年に双方の議会が承認し,17年9月に暫定発効した。原則合意から署名までに3年間,暫定発効までに4年間が経過した。正式発効は未定である。

TPP11及び日EU・EPAによる北海道への影響について(PDF;平成30年2月) | 北海道
日EU・EPA及びTPP11による京都府農林水産業への影響について | 京都府
林業・木材産業の成長産業化(日欧EPA対応)(PDF)| 高知県
妥結した日EU・EPAの活用に向けて | 日本貿易振興機構
日EU・EPAの署名 2019年春までの発効を目指す(PDF;2018年7月18日) | みずほ総合研究所
『日 EU・EPA 交渉のビジネス影響』 ~ 大枠合意を受けて経営者が持つべき視点~ (PDF;2018年8月17日)| Deloitte
通商白書2018: 第1節 メガFTAの進展(CPTPP、日 EU・EPA、RCEP)等
日 EU・EPAと日本の通商戦略(PDF)| 安田信之助
日EU・EPA等の経済効果分析(PDF;2017年12月21日)| 内閣官房TPP等政府対策本部
日欧EPAの評価(PDF;2017年7月)|JC総研所長・東京大学教授 鈴木宣弘

日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)(平成30年7月17日)| 外務省
日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)(PDF)| 外務省
日・EUの連携を強める戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)| EU MAG
欧州議会外交委、日EU戦略的パートナーシップ協定締結勧告案を採択(2018年11月22日)| 日本貿易振興機構

ナショナリズムと難民危機を乗り越えて -日欧EPAのもたらす衝撃(PDF;2018年10月)| 国際貿易投資研究所客員研究員・法政大学名誉教授 長部重康
2頁 5年にわたる交渉を経て 2018年7月にようやく締結に漕ぎつけた。衝撃的ともいえる画期的意義は、以下のようである。まず 3本の協定の同時誕生となる。日欧 EPA は最終的に関税事項とルール作りとに純化される。投資事項は保護条約として別建てになるが、これは決着までにはかなりの時間がかかろう。加えて政治マターである戦略的パートナーシップ協定(SPA)が、すでに同時調印された。
第2の衝撃は、投資事項が別建てにされたために、日欧 EPA が混合条約ではなくなった事実にある。発効を早期化でき(fast track)、欧州理事会の承認と欧州議会の批准のみで済む。地域議会を含む各国国民議会による合計38にまで達する批准を、クリアできる。
この結果第3の衝撃が生まれ、Brexit の期限、2019年3月よりかなり早い時期に、発効可能となった。EU 発足以来の最大の危機たる Brexit を前に、市民に対して欧州統合の再始動を鮮明にアピールできる。
最後に第4の衝撃だが、結論で詳述されるように、これまでのアメリカ主導の FTA とは異質な、日欧主導による新たな型の連携協定を世界に示し得る。以下に第1節で EU 分解の危機を分析し、第2節から第4節で日 EU 経済連携協定の意義を考察したい。
5頁 ドイツは2016年以降3年にわたり、経常収支黒字で世界のトップを続け(中国、日本がこれに次ぐ)2018年には3,000億ドル、GDP比8%と歴史的記録を達成した。これとは対照的に、資本ストックの伸びでは米、仏に劣り、設備投資では仏、EU、伊などを大きく下回る。
8頁 2018年8月、プーチン大統領はドイツを訪問したが、総工費 110 億ドルの巨大プロジェクト、「ノルドストリーム(NS)2」の2019年完成を促すためである。シュレーダーが深く関わった「ノルドストリーム 1」がすでに 2011年から稼働しているが、これに並行してバルト海底に独露間を直接結ぶ天然ガス・パイプラインを通す計画である。従来のウクライナとポーランドを通るガス動脈はますます先細って行くことになるが、現在すでに稼働率は50%に落ち込んでいる。
10頁 2018年6月、仏、独首脳は、ユーロ圏共通予算を 2021年に発足させることで合意した。EUも年末までに中期共通予算を含むユーロ圏改革の具体案作りを目指しており、ユーロの脆弱性を財政面から支えたい。…フランスでは 2002~06年、2007~17年に SGP違反で 3%を超えた前歴があり、マクロンによってようやく長年の違反状態を脱し得た。ドイツも例外ではなく 1996~99年、2002~05年、2008~10年に、イギリスでも 2003~05年、2008~15年にと、大国も軒並み違反状態を長年繰り返し、制裁金の支払いも免れてきた。
12頁 2017年7月と12月に「大枠合意」が報じられたが、これまで使われてきた「大筋合意」より完成度は低いとされるが、英語ではともに political agreement と表記された。その後、締結に至るまでかなり時間がかかったが、自動車と乳製品、特にチーズに関する合意でてこずった…
16頁 CETAについて、2018年7月になって驚愕のニュースが飛び込んできた。左派ポピュリスト政党、「5つ星運動」の党首である伊のディ・マイオ経済発展・労働相がこの条約には批准しない、と明言したからである。条約崩壊か、との不安が再び迫った。6月発足のイタリア新政権は、「自国産農産物を守る」と公約したが、最近カナダからの輸入が増大している。地理的表示に関しても不満が鬱積する。原産地呼称や地理的表示が保護される件数は、イタリアでは290品目に上るが、このうち CETA で認められたのはパルマ・ハムを含むわずか40品目に止まった。
ヨーロッパにとって、農産品の輸出拡大は至上命題である。理由は2つあり、第1は、ロシアによる EU 農産品への輸入禁止措置にある。
17頁 第2は、アメリカの農産品貿易収支における巨額な対欧赤字の存在である。
日本市場は EU からの輸出額が57億ユーロに上り、第4位の農産物輸出市場である。いずれ農産品輸出の85%に日本が関税譲許することになれば、きわめて魅力的に映ろう。牛肉は関税38.5%を15年間で9%に、豚の加工品は無関税に、豚肉は低関税になる。ワインは15%関税が即時撤廃され、チーズでは29.8%が大幅に引き下げられて16年後には撤廃される(図表5)。なお国内消費におけるEU産チーズの比重は23%であり、オーストラリアの30%に次ぎ、ニュージーランドの19%を上回る。
18頁 2013年、ユネスコは日本人の伝統的食文化として、「和食」の無形文化遺産への登録を認めた。これを追い風に、世界各地で和食ブームに沸く。日欧EPAでは、和牛、緑茶、水産品、日本酒など重点品目をはじめ、ほぼすべての農産品について EU 市場で即時関税が撤廃される。2016 年の日本の食品輸出はアジアへ4,200億ドル、アメリカへ1,000億ドルに対して、ヨーロッパへはわずか400億ドルにすぎないが、この拡大への期待が膨らむ。
食の安全性への国際認証の取得である。ドイツ発祥のグローバル GAP(Good Agricultural practice)の認証取得には、農薬・飼料の使用量、農業用水管理、衛生面の配慮等々で、数100項目の検査をクリアしなければならない。現在、認証取得農業者は、世界で約18万を数える。
2011年に EU韓 FTA 発効のおかげで、その 4年後に関税撤廃され、テレビの14%関税も5年後になくなった。韓国は2011年以降、対欧自動車輸出を55%拡大させ、ヨーロッパも対韓輸出を3倍増と歴史的な高さを実現し、貿易赤字は解消された。2009~16年に、EUにおける韓国車のシェアは4.1から 6.3%に急増したが、日本車は逆に13.1から12.7%に落ち込んでしまった。
19頁 入札対象は、これまで都道府県に限られていたが、新たに人口20万人以上の 48中核都市にまで開放され、日本の人口の15%に及ぶ。
20頁 日欧EPAは、中国の進める広域経済圏構想、一帯一路に対する選択肢ともなりえよう。中国は2016年にラトビアの首都、リガで、中東欧16カ国を集めて「16+1 グループ」を発足させたが(図表6)、巨額のインフラ関連投資を餌に、ヨーロッパへの進出を加速させるとともに、南シナ海やチベット、新彊ウイグル自治区などでの国際紛争を前に応援団を増やす戦略とみられる。ギリシャとハンガリーが応援団の先頭を切っているが、すでに中国は2016年にギリシャ最大のピレウス港を2.8億ユーロで買い取り、一帯一路の到着地として、さらに将来的には軍事基地として、着々と整備を進めてきた。今回は中東欧の貧しい移行国が狙われ、アルバニア、モンテネグロ、チェコ、ハンガリー、セルビアなどに、道路、鉄道、発電事業への大型投資計画を打ち上げている。これらの国もギリシャ同様、いずれ巨額債務で中国に首根っこを押さえられる危険が高まったが、マケドニアではすでに高額融資による高速鉄道建設が凍結される事態となった。
21頁 とりわけ極左、極右が貿易自由化反対を叫び…
22頁 だが日欧間交渉においては、非対称性の障害は相対的に小さい。EU の構成単位が国民国家で日本と共通し、移民関連の競合は存在せず、価値観では「旧大陸」同士ゆえ概ね近いからである。

日欧EPAはアベノミクス・日本外交の大成果(PDF;平成31年2月14日)| みずほ総合研究所 専務執行役員 平成31年2月15日追加
[メガFTA] 日欧EPA発効 小売り先行値下げ ワイン、チーズ 国産と競合激化(平成31年2月2日)| 日本農業新聞 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA「日本ブランド」守るカギ 6億人の巨大経済圏誕生(平成31年2月2日)| FNN PRIME 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA 恩恵の影も忘れずに(平成31年2月2日)| 東京新聞 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA発効 GDP3割の自由貿易圏(平成31年2月1日)| 中日新聞 表 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPAあす発効 農産品など値下げも…(w 動画;平成31年1月31日)| 西日本放送 平成31年2月15日追加
<日欧EPA>東北もワイン一斉値下げ 日本酒業界は輸出増に期待(平成31年2月2日)| 河北新報 平成31年2月15日追加
日欧EPA発効 ワイン関税撤廃で値引きセール(平成31年2月1日)| ひょうご経済+ 平成31年2月15日追加
【社説】農林水産物輸出拡大へ技術と独自性(平成31年2月15日)| 化学工業日報 平成31年2月15日追加
〇 全て英文 日欧経済連携協定(Japan=EU EPA)の経済効果の推計 Quantifying the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement(w PDF;平成30年9月11日)| 大久保敏弘、木村福成、Gabriel Felbermayr、Marina Steininger @ 慶應義塾大学経済研究所 平成31年2月15日追加
5 General Equilibrium Results
… In our Ricardian trade model, lowering trade costs allows countries to specialize more strongly in sectors in which the comparative advantage
is the strongest. But such a trade liberalization does not necessarily lead to an overall welfare gain. Consumers benefit from lower prices, but they may source from more inefficient countries. At the same time, governments lose tariff income. Moreover, the preferential nature of trade liberalization gives rise to the Viner-ambiguity. The FTA may affect world market prices such that some partner countries could be hurt. Further …
5.4 Changes in trade
Outcomes of the two trading regions look quite complementary in the agri-food and goods sector. All the sectors that can generate gains in terms of value added are losing in the other region and vice versa. The only exceptions are the electronic equipment, machinery sector and the textiles and apparel sector. The services sectors behave similarly and are confronted with positive value added effects in both regions. The EU-Japan trade agreement would seemingly lead to diversion effects in the agri-food and goods sectors and to output creation in the service industry. …
Overall, Japan is able to increase its exports towards all countries and regions. Not surprisingly, Japan’s exports to the EU increase to the largest extent, by 79 bn USD, which is equivalent to a 64% increase in Japanese exports towards the EU. The export increases towards the remaining countries and regions cannot be neglected either. Chinese imports of Japanese products increases by 23% (470 mio USD), ASEAN by 0.2% (200 mio USD), USA/Canada by 0.33% (520 mio USD) and imports of the rest of the world from Japan by .2% (690 mio USD). Japanese imports from the EU increase by 74%, which is equal to an increase of 83 bn USD. Other than on the export side, Japanese imports from the remaining world decreases by 6.5 bn USD. Trade diversion away from third countries and towards the EU is evident on the import side.
The largest export increase towards the EU can be expected in the automotive sector (20.8 bn USD). Further, Japanese exports towards the EU increase in the chemical industry (14.9 bn USD). The same is true for the machinery and equipment, raw materials and metal industry that export additional products worth 25.3 bn USD more towards the EU. The increase of exports in the Japanese service industry is not negligible either. …

cf. EU加盟28国 平成31年2月15日追加
オーストリア共和国(Republic of Austria) 基礎データ | 外務省
ベルギー王国(Kingdom of Belgium) 基礎データ | 外務省
ブルガリア共和国(Republic of Bulgaria) 基礎データ | 外務省
クロアチア共和国(Republic of Croatia) 基礎データ | 外務省
キプロス共和国(Republic of Cyprus) 基礎データ | 外務省
チェコ共和国(Czech Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
デンマーク王国(Kingdom of Denmark) 基礎データ | 外務省
エストニア共和国(Republic of Estonia) 基礎データ | 外務省
フィンランド共和国(Republic of Finland) 基礎データ | 外務省
フランス共和国(French Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ドイツ連邦共和国(Federal Republic of Germany) 基礎データ | 外務省
ギリシャ共和国(Hellenic Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ハンガリー(Hungary) 基礎データ | 外務省
アイルランド(Ireland) 基礎データ | 外務省
イタリア共和国(Italian Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ラトビア共和国(Republic of Latvia) 基礎データ | 外務省
リトアニア共和国(Republic of Lithuania) 基礎データ | 外務省
ルクセンブルク大公国(Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 基礎データ | 外務省
マルタ共和国(Republic of Malta) 基礎データ | 外務省
オランダ王国(Kingdom of the Netherlands) 基礎データ | 外務省
ポーランド共和国(Republic of Poland) 基礎データ | 外務省
ポルトガル共和国(Portuguese Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
ルーマニア(Romania) 基礎データ | 外務省
スロバキア共和国(Slovak Republic) 基礎データ | 外務省
スロベニア共和国(Republic of Slovenia) 基礎データ | 外務省
スペイン王国(Kingdom of Spain) 基礎データ | 外務省
スウェーデン王国(Kingdom of Sweden) 基礎データ | 外務省
英国(グレートブリテン及び北アイルランド連合王国) (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 基礎データ | 外務省

日EUEPA 日本市場へのアクセス 農日EUEPA EU市場へのアクセス日EUEPA 対EU輸出入日EUEPA 直接投資

U.K. イギリス Vol.15(Brexit Vol.12)

All the below links are in English.

UK Vol.125 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.43)
UK Vol.124 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.42)
UK Vol.123 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.41)
UK Vol.122 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.40)
UK Vol.121 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.39)
UK Vol.114 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.38)
UK Vol.113 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.37)
UK Vol.112 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.36)
UK Vol.111 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.35)
UK Vol.110 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.34)
UK Vol.109 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.33)
UK Vol.108 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.32)
UK Vol.106 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.31)
UK Vol.105 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.30)
UK Vol.104 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.29)
UK Vol.103 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.28)
UK Vol.102 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.27)
UK Vol.101 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.26)
UK Vol.100 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.25)
UK Vol.95 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.24)
UK Vol.94 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.23)
UK Vol.67 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.13)
UK Vol.66 (Post-EUref #Brexit Vol.12 – Theresa May’s Trump visit)
UK Vol.65 (Post-EUref Vol.11 – including UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit speech)

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.50(Policies & Midterms 各種政策等 Vol.24 - 大学ツイート Washington, Nevada, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico)

All the below tweets are in English.
昨日書きましたとおり、今日はワシントン、ネバダ、ハワイ、アラスカ、プエルトリコ(11日追加)、次回と次々回は College です。アメリカには、University とは別に、素晴らしい College があります。







Puerto Rico

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.46(Policies & Midterms 各種政策等 Vol.20 - 大学ツイート UC LA (Los Angeles) & Berkeley)

All the below tweets are in English.
今日は、 UCLA と UCバークレー のツイートを貼っておきます。

California Vol.16 (University of California, Berkeley / San Diego)
California Vol.18 (University of California, Los Angeles)
California Vol.19 (UCLA, University of Southern California, Pepperdine University, etc.)
12月18日追加 2017年のほぼ同時期です。
US Policy Changes Vol.65 (US law professors Vol.1) テキサス以西、主にカリフォルニア。

U.S.A. アメリカ Vol.45(Policies & Midterms 各種政策等 Vol.19 - 大学ツイート UC San Diego)

All the below tweets are in English.
今日は、University of California, San Diego です。

cf. 1月7・9日追加
California Vol.17 (UCSD)
California Vol.16 (University of California, Berkeley / San Diego)