“The Creation and Destruction of Value” 価値の創造と破壊 Vol.10

(All the below links are in English.)

Vol.10 金融革命の度合と限界(第4章-3)

 銀行規制は国内市場では比較的機能するが、国境を跨ぐ複雑な取引に対しては相当難しくなる。“too big to fail”となる大規模かつ複雑な構造の銀行が誕生しないように規制をかける必要があった。また、過度の成長と技術革新から生じた危機への対処法は逆説的に更なる技術の発展にある、と銀行の問題についても言える。技術革新により少ない雇用で多くの市場参加者が生じ、生産性が上がりマクロ経済の脆弱性は下がる。

2005 Bankruptcy Act impacted repos and housing bubble | Mary Fricker, RepoWatch
Banks’ Off-Balance-Sheet Risks Come Under Basel Scrutiny | Jim Brunsden @business
Bank Size and Systemic Risk (PDF) | Luc Laeven, Lev Ratnovski, and Hui Tong @IMFNews
We will put people first, not bankers | Gordon Brown @guardian
Why the French said “non”: Creditor-debtor politics and the German financial crises of 1930 and 1931 (PDF) | Simon Banholzer & Tobias Straumann
Preventing Transboundary Crises: The Management and Regulation of Setbacks (PDF) | Emery Roe @CalStateEastBay
Changes may hurt as much as crisis | Harold James @FinancialNews

Australia オーストラリア Vol.4

(All the below links are in English.)

オーストラリア中央銀行 Reserve Bank of Australia の 2016年第2四半期 Bulletin June Quarter 2016 | @RBAInfo をご紹介します。

1. Household Wealth in Australia: Evidence from the 2014 HILDA Survey | Paul Ryan and Tahlee Stone(オーストラリア国民の家計の財産状態)

This article uses data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey* to assess how the distribution of wealth changed for Australian households between 2010 and 2014. Average household wealth increased modestly over that period, driven mainly by growth in the value of financial assets, most notably superannuation. The growth of housing wealth was slow in comparison, particularly in Queensland and Western Australia. While most of the changes in wealth were broadly based across households, wealth increased more rapidly for those residing in New South Wales and for retired households with large holdings of superannuation and equity assets.
** Australian System of National Accounts (ASNA)
*** Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Survey of Income and Housing (SIH)

… As the general distribution of household wealth (i.e. total assets minus total debts) across, these categories is broadly the same in 2014 as it was in 2010, this article focuses on how the distribution of housing assets (including investment properties), non-housing assets (predominately superannuation) and household debt have changed between 2010 and 2014.
The HILDA Survey* data suggest that the average Australian household had total wealth of around $740 000 in 2014. Measures of real (inflation adjusted) wealth per household from the HILDA Survey grew a little less over the decade to 2014 than measures based on household-level data from the SIH*** and distributional wealth indicators from the ABS that are consistent with aggregate data from the ASNA** (Graph 1).
Looking at the cross-sectional distribution of household wealth, older and higher-income households tend to have higher levels of wealth (Graph 2). …

Household Wealth
Overall, almost 60 per cent of households in the HILDA Survey had more real wealth in 2014 than was the case in 2010. Households with the lowest levels of wealth in 2010 saw the most growth of wealth over the four years to 2014 (Graph 3). This partly reflects the fact that low-wealth households are generally young and are just starting to build wealth. …

… most of the increase in wealth over the 2010–14 period came from growth in the value of non-housing assets, which are predominantly financial assets such as superannuation, equities and deposits (Graph 4). …

… Households in New South Wales and Victoria saw the largest increase in wealth, with growth in both housing and non-housing assets, while households in Queensland and Western Australia saw the biggest decrease in wealth, on average, mainly owing to a fall in the value of housing assets. The other states and territories generally saw relatively little growth in wealth over the period. The outcomes for households in Queensland and Western Australia are likely to have been influenced by the decline in commodity prices and the mining investment boom following the peak, which occurred between 2010 and 2014. …

Housing Assets
Housing is the largest asset class on Australian households’ balance sheets, accounting for around 60 per cent of total assets. Over any given period, growth in housing assets can be due to a change in housing prices or a change in the stock of housing held by Australian households. …Looking more closely across the states reveals large differences in the mean and median values of housing assets (Graph 5). …

… the share of households that either became home owners for the first time or upgraded their main residence decreased relative to the 2006–10 period (Graph 6). …Households in New South Wales and Victoria were slightly more likely to increase their holdings of other property than was the case from 2006 to 2010.

Household Debt
… High-income households hold the majority of debt. The top income quintile held almost 50 per cent of the stock of household debt in 2014. Almost a third of households held no debt, with the majority of these being retired households.
Over the four years to 2014, about 40 per cent of households increased their levels of nominal debt, while a similar share of households reduced their holdings of debt (Graph 7). …

Property debt accounted for a little over 80 per cent of the stock of debt held by households in 2014. Average debt increased modestly from 2010 to 2014, by a little more than 2 per cent per year (Graph 8). …

Non-housing Assets
… The mean value of real non-housing assets increased from around $320,000 in 2010 to almost $400,000 in 2014 (Graph 9). … Wealthier households held a higher-than-average share of assets in the form of direct equity holdings and business assets, while households with lower net wealth held more in cash and deposits, superannuation and durable goods (Graph 9).

The mean superannuation balance grew by around 4 per cent per annum in real terms for all households over the period to $250,000 in 2014 (Graph 10). … The noticeably stronger growth in median superannuation assets relative to the mean for households aged 45 to 64 years suggests that the ‘typical’ (or median) household in these age groups are building up superannuation assets faster in the lead-up to retirement than the households in the same age group with the largest balances of superannuation (Graph 10).

… The main driver of growth in household wealth over that period was an increase in the value of financial assets, mostly superannuation assets. Weaker growth in housing wealth, with declines in Queensland and Western Australia, contributed to the slower growth in total wealth from 2010–14. …

2. Conditions in the Manufacturing Sector | Sean Langcake(製造業界の現状)

Manufacturing output and employment have fallen steadily as a share of the Australian economy for the past three decades. This article looks at the composition of the sector and draws on the Reserve Bank’s liaison with manufacturers to provide an insight into some of their responses to the structural challenges in recent years. According to liaison, the increase in the supply of manufactured goods from low-cost sources abroad, exacerbated by the appreciation of the Australian dollar during the period of rising commodity prices, impaired the viability of many domestic manufacturers and precipitated the closure of some manufacturing production over the past decade. While the recent exchange rate depreciation has helped to improve competitiveness of Australian producers, so far there is only limited evidence of a recovery in manufacturing output and investment.

… It currently accounts for around 7 per cent of total output and employment. … over the 2000s, strong Asian demand for Australian commodities led to a sharp increase in the terms of trade and an appreciation of the Australian dollar. …

Manufacturing in Australia
Manufacturing output increased steadily throughout most of the 1990s before plateauing in the early 2000s; output today is around the same level it was just over a decade ago (Graph 1). … Over the past two decades, the Australian economy as a whole has grown considerably, resulting in a marked decline in manufacturing output as a share of total output. Employment in manufacturing has also declined over the past two decades, with growth in labour productivity in line with that of the economy as a whole. …
…investment in the manufacturing sector has also fallen steadily since its peak in 2005/06 (Graph 1). …

Australia’s manufacturing sector is quite diverse and is comprised of several sub-industries, the largest being: food, beverage & tobacco; machinery & equipment; petroleum, coal & chemicals; and metal products (Graph 2). …

The food, beverage & tobacco and metal products sub-industries both rely heavily on inputs from primary industries (agriculture and mining) where Australia has an abundant supply, and use a relatively low share of intermediate components that are imported. …
Conversely, the machinery & equipment and petroleum, coal & chemicals sub-industries use relatively few inputs from primary industries in Australia and have a relatively high share of imported intermediate components. …

The International Context
Over the past 25 years, most advanced economies have seen their manufacturing sectors recede as a share of both output and employment, although Australia has generally had a lower share than many other advanced economies (Graph 3).

The ratio of value added to total production in the Australian manufacturing sector is broadly comparable to that in other advanced economies’ manufacturing industries (Table 2). Relative to other Australian industries, manufacturing is a low value-added sector; the ratio of value-added to total production (29 per cent) is the lowest of any industry. …

… The steady increase in China’s share of Australia’s merchandise imports has coincided with a fall in the prices of imported manufactured goods relative to domestic production (Graph 4).

The Australian Dollar and Implications for Competitiveness
The appreciation of the Australian dollar from 2000 to 2013 worked against the international competitiveness of Australian manufacturing (Graph 4). Exports of Australian manufactured goods grew slowly over this period as they became relatively more expensive overseas (Graph 5). …

… Typically, contacts maintain some productive capacity in Australia, either as a testing or research and development (R&D) facility, to protect their more sensitive intellectual property, or to be able to fill orders more quickly. Nevertheless, firms that have ‘offshored’ production typically have much less productive capacity remaining in Australia than their overseas operations. …
…there are significant lags between a depreciation of the dollar and a response in manufacturing production and exports due to the nature of supply chains. For instance, even though domestic producers have become more competitive against imported products, retailers or other manufacturers may have contracts that secure supply in advance, which inhibits their ability to switch to domestically produced products. …
…they responded to the appreciation of the dollar by importing more goods, either by choice or necessity as production of some inputs had moved offshore. … while the lower value of the dollar aids demand, margins are under pressure due to rising import costs in instances where local substitutes are not readily available.

Domestic Input Costs and Implications for International Competitiveness
… Australian manufacturing labour costs appear to be relatively high compared with those in other economies – a feature that has become more pronounced over time (Graph 6). …

…firms have been looking to find labour productivity gains by automating some production processes. They have also been developing new products to diversify their offering. These shifts are borne out in the nature of firms’ investments; increasingly, manufacturers are investing in intellectual property rather than physical capital (Graph 7). …

…foreign-owned manufacturing firms operating in Australia are more willing to invest in R&D than physical capital in their Australian subsidiaries, although it is difficult to quantify what share of manufacturing activity is accounted for by these firms. …

Difficulties Integrating in Supply Chains
…other economies have responded to pressure from cheaper, imported manufactured goods by integrating themselves more effectively into increasingly fragmented global supply chains. … Australia’s geographic isolation contributes to high trade costs and presents a significant impediment to greater participation in global supply chains. …the costs of trading Australia’s manufactured goods – largely international transport costs – are in the order of 20–25 per cent higher than the global average. … only 4 per cent of manufacturing firms are part of an integrated supply chain.
…Australia’s relatively high trade costs leave domestic producers primarily exposed to the relatively small domestic market and unable to benefit from the scale advantages that other advanced economies achieve through production for larger domestic markets and export markets. …around 45 per cent of the difference between US and Australian non-farm labour productivity levels can be explained by Australia’s geographic isolation. High trade costs may also protect less productive domestic firms from import competition, although this protection is likely to have been eroded through time by lower international search and transaction costs. …

Conclusion( )内は抄訳
The depreciation of the Australian dollar over recent years has helped to improve the competitiveness of Australian manufacturing. Additionally, there is likely to be a steady level of activity in the food, beverages & tobacco sub-industry due to Australia’s comparative advantage in primary resources and growing export demand. Against this, softer demand from the mining sector and the cessation of passenger vehicle production will weigh on output, although motor vehicle and transport equipment production currently makes up only around 5 per cent of manufacturing output.
In the longer term, the structural challenges facing the Australian manufacturing sector are likely to constrain output. Declining global prices for manufactured goods and the sustained high level of the Australian dollar during the resource investment boom impaired the viability of many Australian manufacturers and precipitated considerable structural change in the sector, with numerous manufacturers either closing or shifting production to lower-cost economies. R&D operations are one area where Australia’s cost disadvantages are less of an impediment and our highly skilled workforce is a comparative advantage. Although R&D investment has been growing steadily, the subsequent demand for labour and, in particular, physical capital are likely to be less than was generated by ‘traditional’ manufacturing activities.

Crisis Management 危機管理 Vol.2

(The below link is in English.)


今日は、ニュージーランドのクライストチャーチ市経済インフラ状況レポートの最新版 Latest Christchurch Economic Infrastructure Situation Report online (see PDF) | @CDCChristchurch @ChristchurchCC @SCIRT_info (#Chch #CDEM #lgnz #ECan #CHC_Airport #ChorusNZ #ufbnz #OrionNZ…) をごく簡単にご紹介します。2011年カンタベリー地震等による被害からの復旧等が記載されており、PDFの総論 General context(p9-21)、水 Water(p23,30,32,34-39)、交通 Transport(p48-50,52-66)、通信 Communications(p72-76,78-79)、エネルギー Energy(p84,87-89,91-94)に本Christchurch市の、その他のページに広域周辺地域及び国の、現状や政策等が記されています。以下、PDF内の図表をいくつか貼っておきます。

Game Changers

Water Supply Damage
Wastewater Damage

NZ Transport Networks
Road Damage
Roads Significance
Rail Traffic
Lyttleton Port

Enable Networks
Tasman Global

Pet Storage


Ireland アイルランド Vol.4

アイルランド中央銀行の2016年第1四半期レポート Quarterly Financial Accounts Q1 2016 (18 August 2016): Irish households become the fourth most indebted in Europe | @centralbank_ie 概要・抜粋(abstract/excerpts) です。

1. Irish households fell from being the third most indebted in the European Union to the fourth most indebted during Q1 2016. This was largely due to the continued reduction in Irish household debt, as well as, further increases in Irish disposable income.
2.Household debt as a proportion of disposable income now stands at 149.4 per cent. That is its lowest level since end-2004.
3. Households net worth increased by 0.3 per cent to reach €628.7bn, or €132,141 per capita. The increase in net worth was largely driven by a rise in housing asset values (€1.7bn), as well as a further decline in household liabilities (€0.9bn).
4. NFC debt to GDP declined by 9.8 percentage point over the quarter, falling to €257.3bn. Irish NFC debt has been extremely volatile in recent quarters due to the impact of domiciled MNCs on debt and GDP.
(non-financial corporations 非金融法人の総負債は第1四半期に2573億ユーロとなり、対GDP比率は9.8%減った。アイルランド国内に本社を置く multinational corporations 多国籍企業が総負債やGDPへの影響を持つため、最近のいくつかの四半期において非金融法人の総負債は極端に揺れ動いている。)
Household Debt Cross Country Comparison

1. Net Lending/Borrowing of All Sectors (Chart 1.1 関連)
The domestic economy continued to be a net lender to the rest of the world during Q1 2016, as the net borrowing of government and financial corporations was exceeded by deleveraging by households and non-financial corporations…

Net LendingBorrowing Private Sector Debt to GDP

2. Private Sector Debt (Chart 2.1 関連)
… CSO revisions to the National Accounts and International Investment Position… redomiciling of some corporations and corporate restructuring… contributed to significant increases in GDP and NFC debt from 2014 onwards. Private sector debt as a percentage of GDP peaked in Q1 2015 at 400.7 per cent, and has since declined substantially to 315.2 per cent in Q1 2016. … primarily by growth in annualised GDP over the period, but is also reflective of falling private sector debt, which has contracted by 3.7 per cent since Q1 2015. …

3. Household Sector
Household Net Worth Debt Indicators

Chart 3.1 関連
… This was partially offset by a decline in households’ holdings of financial assets (€0.5bm). Compared to a post-crisis low of €454.1bn in Q2 2012, household net worth has risen by 38.5 per cent. However, it is still 12.4 per cent lower than its pre-crisis peak of €718bn in Q2 2007.

Chart 3.2 関連
Household debt continued to decrease during Q1 2016, falling by €1.1bn, or 0.7 per cent, to €148.5bn. This represented a household debt per capita of €31,216. Household debt is at its lowest level since Q1 2006. …

Chart 3.3 関連
Indicators of household debt sustainability continued to improve during Q1 2016. Debt as a proportion of disposable income fell over the quarter, from 152.7 per cent to 149.4 per cent, reflecting both the decline in household debt, as well as strong growth in annualised disposable income. …

Comparison Transactions in Financial Assets Deposit Transactions with MFIsGovernment

Chart 3.4 関連
… Over the year Danish household debt fell significantly more than any other country examined, declining by 23.2 percentage points. In contrast to this, Swedish households saw a 4 percentage point increase over the same period as they climbed to become the third most indebted in the European Union, with a household debt level of 153.5 per cent of disposable income.

Chart 3.5 関連
… The reduction in financial assets over the quarter largely reflected a fall in transactions of insurance technical reserves. … The majority of households’ financial investments over the quarter were in the form of currency & deposits, while shares & other equity experienced positive transactions for the first time since Q4 2013.

Chart 3.6 関連
… This marked the first time since Q4 2013 that household deposit transactions with MFIs (monetary financial institutions) had declined. In contrast, households increased lodgements with government deposit accounts for the first time since Q1 2013.

Chart 3.7 関連
… Over recent quarters net lending has become increasingly driven by higher investment in financial assets, as opposed to deleveraging.

Household Net LendingBorrowing NFC Debt

4. Non-Financial Corporation Sector
Irish NFCs are significantly impacted by the activities of large MNCs. These latest NFC results incorporate the recent annual revisions to the CSO’s International Investment Position (IIP). The revisions include large MNCs which redomiciled to Ireland or moved significant parts of their balance sheets to Ireland during 2014 and 2015. These entities also contributed towards some of the very substantial increase in Irish GDP for 2015.

Chart 4.1 関連
… The decline in debt over the past year largely reflected exchange rate movements. Debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 327.5 per cent in Q1 2015 to 257.3 per cent in Q1 2016. This reflected both falling NFC debt, as well as, substantial GDP growth during 2015.

NFC Debt Comparison Loans AssetsLiabilities

Chart 4.2 関連
… Luxembourg, which also has a lot of large MNCs relative to the size of its economy, had the highest debt at 349 per cent of GDP. … how volatile Irish NFC debt to GDP has been in recent years compared to other euro area countries.

Chart 4.3 関連
… The substantial increase in debt held by non-residents reflects this corporate activity and explains why exchange rate movements have had a significant impact on NFC debt in some quarters. …debt held by Irish residents has been on a downward trend in recent years. …partly reflected NFC deleveraging with Irish MFIs.

Chart 4.4 関連
…largely reflected MNC activities. Net financial assets (financial assets minus liabilities) became even more negative since Q1 2015. This is because some MNCs had large non-financial assets or relocated substantial non-financial assets to Ireland.

“The Creation and Destruction of Value” 価値の創造と破壊 Vol.9

(All the below links are in English.)

Vol.9 金融革命の度合と限界(第4章-2)

 J.P.モルガンが1995年に始めたもう一つの技術革新であるCDS(Credit Default Swap)は、2008年には58兆ドルに達し、世界GDP合計の50兆ドルを抜いていた。非常に小さいリスクと頼りになる手数料のために、AIGインターナショナルやSwiss Reのような大手かつ多角経営の保険会社がこのような保証契約に魅力を感じ取り組んでいた。リスクに対応するために金融当局が定めた自己資本規制比率も結局無駄になった。2003年からの5年間で米欧の10大銀行は資産を倍増し15兆ユーロに達したが、リスク調整資産は5兆ユーロに達したにすぎなかった。

Credit Derivatives Handbook (PDF) | J.P. Morgan
The Value of Risk: Swiss Re and the History of Reinsurance | Peter Borscheid, Harold James, David Gugerli, Tobias Straumann
Global Financial Stability Report, April 2008 | International Monetary Fund

“The Creation and Destruction of Value” 価値の創造と破壊 Vol.8

(All the below links are in English.)

Vol.8 金融革命の度合と限界(第4章-1)

 証券化に係る最も最近の根本的な技術革新は、1990年代半ばに始まり、J.P.モルガンが関係している。決定的だったのは、1997年に着手された Broad Index Securitized Trust Offering (BISTRO) であった。この制度では、元々の債権関係が細分化され、簿外単位で証券化され、Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) として取引された。21世紀に入ると、証券化は不動産ビジネスの形を変え始めた。サブプライム・モーゲージは、認証後に債権に何が起こっても認証者が責任を負わないものであった。

Robert Lucas, rational expectations, and the understanding of business cycles | @LarsPSyll
LIFE AFTER “RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS”?: Imperfect Knowledge, Behavioral Insights and the Social Context [PDF] | Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg
The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means [PDF] | George Soros

“The Creation and Destruction of Value” 価値の創造と破壊 Vol.7

(All the below links are in English.)

Vol.7 2008年世界金融危機(第3章-3)


(あくまで参考:The Rise and Fall of Pyramid Schemes in Albania | Christopher JervisThe Free Movement of Workers in an Enlarged European Union: Institutional Underpinnings of Economic Adjustment | IZAFact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament

“The Creation and Destruction of Value” 価値の創造と破壊 Vol.6

(All the below links are in English.)

Vol.6 2008年世界金融危機(第3章―2)

 そして、貿易が減ると人は貿易依存を減らそうとするという脱グローバリゼーションの悪循環に陥った。これは、理想的な防衛手法ではないにせよ、デフレーションの増殖を国境で食い止める非常に満足の行く次善の策であった。開放経済では、需要が自国の枠から漏れ外国に職を創出し税も外国政府に行ってしまう “leaky Keynesianism”(漏れるケインズ主義。あくまで参考:Fixing the Economy? Like Filling a Leaky Bucket | @TheRagBlog。)になることがあるためである。
 加えて、欧州では、通貨統合のためのマーストリヒト条約の中核である、公債発行額をGDPの3%以内、公債発行残高を60%以内とする財政ルールは、ケインズ的反循環政策(景気刺激策)を採らねばならない危機においては、放棄されねばならなかったが、それが可能な仏独と不可能な希伊葡に分かれるなど、意思決定力が麻痺してしまった(あくまで参考:Guest Post by Timothy King: Keynesian Policies Under the Fiscal Treaty | Phillip Lane @irisheconomyieGoverning hand: Philip Lane takes charge of Central Bank in recovering economy | @BeesleyIT)。

イギリス Vol.7(”Brexit”? – UK’s Referendum on EU Membership イギリスEU残留国民投票 Vol.6)

Here is just a part of universities’/scholars’ (academic) articles/papers/videos/podcasts concerning the Brexit on Twitter through early morning, 22 June (BST).

[United Kingdom]














Manchester @MBSnews







Leicester @UoLNewsCentre









London Business School @LBS


















(Aberystwyth @AberUni)




UCDDublin @UCDLawSchool



Melbourne @Government_UoM



Toronto @UofT_PolSci

(Toronto @munkschool)



Harvard @Kennedy_School





(Princeton @WilsonSchool)


Stanford @SIEPR




イギリス Vol.5(”Brexit”? – UK’s Referendum on EU Membership イギリスEU残留国民投票 Vol.4)

Here is just a part of (academic/analytical) articles concerning the Brexit.

This is how Brexit would affect British trade | Roderick Abbott @wefThey need each otherFree Trade WorldEEA two-pillar structureEEA & EFTA bodies

Will Brexit Destroy Britain and Europe?: @plegrain weighs the views of Joschka Fischer, Richard Haass, Joseph Nye, and others on what Britain’s withdrawal from the EU would mean for both sides. @ProSyn
– On June 23, British voters will decide in a referendum whether to remain in the EU or go it alone. Advocates of remaining, including Prime Minister David Cameron, may have the better arguments, but the future of the UK – and of Europe – is unlikely to be determined by reason alone. –

Britain’s Enemy Within | Harold James @ProSyn

Why Britain Should Remain European | Simon Johnson @ProSynCER-1CER-2

Europe’s Generational War | Harold James @ProSyn

Can the UK Survive Brexit? | Harold James @ProSyn

The Economic Consequences of Brexit | @plegrain @ProSyn @CEP_LSEPriceIncome

The UK Referendum – and the Future of the European Project [with PDF] | @guydej1 @ECIPE

The Brexit briefs June 2016: Our guide to Britain’s EU referendum [PDF] | @TheEconomistBrainsBetterLeverageShare

A background guide to “Brexit” from the European Union | @TheEconomistDebateTimesRegulation

EU referendum special [Podcast]
– @annemcelvoy hosts a special version of The Economist asks. @ZannyMB, editor of The Economist, reveals why the magazine has taken a strong line on Brexit, while Italian ex-Prime Minister and EU Commissioner Mario Monti criticises David Cameron’s handling of the issue. Plus, MPs from Leave and Remain go toe to toe, and Lane Greene gives his take on the language that has defined the campaigns. –

Brexit: the potential of a financial catastrophe and long-term consequences for the UK financial sector | ‏@CFMUK @voxeu @cepr_org

A British Exit from the EU Leaves the Financial Sector Vulnerable | @FTI_SC