Pinned tweets, etc. 固定ツイート等


SNSは複雑単純あるにしてもどれでも使い続けないと正直よく分からないものであると認識していますが、当方が唯一使い続けているツイッターの良さは
1.設定が全体に自由かつ簡単であり、また、それゆえもあり拡散力に優れてもいる
2.そのため、難しい話を内容とするディスカッション、コンテンツマーケティング、キュレーションに適している。
こういう良さを備えるSNSは、今後も出て来ないように感じます。
そもそも、情報が有り過ぎて困る今の時代には、ある意味キュレーション無くして物事の正確な理解はできません。
この意味では、キュレーション等のためのツイッターも、その存在無くして今の時代を語れないとも言い得ます。
フォロワー数やリツイート数・ライク数よりも、コンテンツの質が重要とも言えます。


Honestly, we have understood that it is difficult to understand how to use social network services, if we don’t keep using some specific ones, regardless of being complicated or simple. The strengths of Twitter, which we have kept using as our single tool, would be:
1. in general, we can set it freely and easily, and so forth as well, it is good at spreading stories on the Internet;
2. therefore it is suitable to discussions, content marketing, curation, etc. on difficult topics or contents.
It seems that there will not be such strong services other than Twitter.
Today, when there is too much information, in a sense, it is impossible to accurately understand news without curation.
In this sense, it would be impossible to talk about current era without presense of Twitter, which is suitable to curation, etc.
We can say that the quality of contents is far more important than the number of followers, retweets, likes, etc.

ご参考:
1.フロントページの(結局ずっと使っていませんが)アマゾンアソシエイトの下の2件の和文英文もご覧ください。
Please read the two notices below the Amazon associate on the front page of this website. And, of course, we have never even clicked books written in Japanese related to political assertions, energy, personal know-how, Ireland, etc.
2.まあ例えばですが(笑)、ほとんどデジタルサイネージ化してしまっている弊社フェイスブック電子書籍宣伝ページに関連組織やら何やら出て来ますが、歯科や医療関係は仕事面でも生活面でもフェイスブックを見る必要はこれまでありません。決して丈夫な肉体でもないですが、50歳の今まで心身共に深刻な状況に陥ったことは一度もありません。様々な人等に感謝すると同時に、当然ですが今後も自分で自分を維持し続けるしかありません。自分のことは他の誰にも分からないですから。まあある意味、非常に安定的ではあります。
ということで、弊社は、歯科・医療関係、道具類、他のコンサルティング、個人的ノウハウ、政治的主義主張、一切関係ありません。勿論、クリックしたことすらありません。 関係無い団体でも、たまたま abbreviation 略称が同じというような例は、面白いと思います。
弊社は、中立的実質的に、国際ビジネス、(主に経済)政策をひたすら深めて行けば良いと常々考えています。
3.デジタルサイネージと言うと、(無料で使用しているので思うような表示にはなっておりませんが)一応こちらもあります。アイルランド関連・電子書籍関連に可能な限り絞って貼って行こうと考えています。(概ね日本語 Mostly in Japanese) https://9223.teacup.com/ireland_corps/bbs
4.https://www.goodreads.com/world_solutions (in English)
これは、若干趣味的に試行錯誤の最中です。フィクション愛好者が圧倒的に多い、更新後の内容が表れるのが半日くらい後である、などの特徴のあるシステムのようです。

#FoodexJapan2019 non-Japanese companies #フーデックスジャパン2019 外国企業(於:幕張メッセ Makuhari Messe)

先週行われた標記に幸運にもご招待頂き、4日間のうち最初の2日間行って来ました。
取り急ぎ下記(順不同)のとおり、名刺交換し(濃淡はありますがお話し)た外国企業の約半数を貼っておきます。企業名部分がハイパーリンクになっていますので、押して頂くと各企業ウェブサイトに飛びます。
私は通常、名刺交換・会話したのみでは固有名詞を挙げませんが、
日本でのビジネスを後押し申しあげたい(そして日本企業の在外ビジネスもどんどん活発化する必要がある)という想い(及び客観情勢)
により今回はこのようにします。
なお、ここに挙げた企業全て宛てに、こういう宣伝を行う旨、事前にメールを送ってあります。
I was lucky enough to be invited to Foodex Japan 2019, and visited many booths at Makuhari Messe on its first and second days.
As below (no particular order), I pasted names and hyperlinks of about half of the companies with which I exchanged my name cards (and talked with more rich content or less). If you push the names, you can go to the companies’ websites.
Although I usually don’t publicize specific names when I just exchanged my name cards and had conversations, this time I am doing it because I would like to boost foreign companies’ business in Japan (and Japanese companies also need to expand business in foreign countries more).
Please note that I let all the below companies know in advance.
March 13, 2019
Taku NAKAMINATO

Finland フィンランド / Cheese チーズ各種  Finnish Cheese Company Ltd
The Netherlands オランダ / Gouda cheese ゴーダチーズ類  Vergeer Holland
Bulgaria ブルガリア / Cheese, Butter チーズ各種及びバター  Germa Food Stuff Trading LLC
Greece ギリシャ / Feta cheese, Yoghurt, etc. フェタチーズ、ヨーグルト等  ROUSSAS
Greece ギリシャ / Yogurt, Feta cheese, etc. ヨーグルト、フェタチーズ等  Mevgal S.A.
Denmark デンマーク / Eggs 鶏卵  Danaeg Products A/S
Australia オーストラリア / Kangaroo and wild game meat カンガルー及び獣肉  Macro Group Australia Pty Ltd.
Finland フィンランド / Pork 豚肉類  Snellmanin Lihanjalostus Oy (フィンランド語)
Canada カナダ / Processed pork 豚肉加工品  Siwin Foods Ltd.
Australia オーストラリア / Dumplings, etc. 東欧風餃子等  From Granny
USA アメリカ / Pecan ペカン  Hudson Pecan Company, Inc.
Mexico メキシコ / Canned peppers, salsas, etc. 缶詰トウガラシ・大豆ソース等  La Morena
Indonesia インドネシア / Seasoning 調味料  PT RODAMAS INTI INTERNASIONAL
Belgium ベルギー / Salt 塩  Zoutman
Italy イタリア / Canned tuna, etc. ツナ缶詰等  Macaluso
Italy イタリア / Preserved tomatoes 保存トマト  Finagricola Soc.Coop.
Germany ドイツ / Health and functional confectionary ヘルスケア菓子(サプリメント等)  sanotact GmbH
Italy イタリア / Truffle トリュフ  Selektia Italia s.r.l
Italy イタリア / Pasta パスタ  Pasta Zara S.p.A.
Ukraine ウクライナ / Garlic ニンニク  Agro Patriot
Greece ギリシャ / Green pitted olives, etc. オリーブ加工品等  EL MAR OLIVES LTD
Australia オーストラリア / Olive oil オリーブオイル  Pendleton Olive Estate
Australia オーストラリア / Olive oil オリーブオイル  OLEAPAK PTY.LTD
Greece ギリシャ / Olive oil オリーブオイル  ELEON – Soya Hellas S.A.
UK イギリス / Nuts ナッツ類  Snack Factory Limited
India インド / Cashews カシューナッツ  Prasanthi Cashew Company
Thailand タイ / Snack スナック菓子  Kanom Thaipattana Co., Ltd.
Italy イタリア / Snack スナック菓子  Nutkao
Belgium ベルギー / Biscuits ビスケット  Noble Food Group
Canada カナダ / Banana chips, etc. バナナチップス等スナック菓子  Oh! Naturals
Belgium ベルギー / Ice creams アイスクリーム  COLAC
Spain スペイン / Honey 蜂蜜  Alemany
Ukraine ウクライナ / Berry paste ベリーペースト  LiQberry
Turkey トルコ / Direct juice squeezing, etc. 各種フルーツジュース等色々  Goknur
Costa Rica コスタリカ / Pineapple chunks, etc. 冷凍パイナップル片等  Costa De Oro Internacional S.A.
Costa Rica コスタリカ / Pineapple chunks, etc. ドライバナナ等  Purejoy
UAE アラブ首長国連邦 / Date paste, Premium dates, etc. ナツメヤシペースト、高級ナツメヤシ等  Royal Palm
Tunisia チュニジア / Dried tomatoes, Dried pitted dates, etc. ドライトマト、ドライナツメヤシ等色々   Mila Business Group
Canada カナダ / Blueberries ブルーベリー  Westberry Farms
Austria オーストリア / Pomegranate juice, etc. ザクロジュース等  Rubin Garden Vertriebs GmbH
Poland ポーランド / Berry juice, etc. ベリージュース等  BIO JUICE
Ecuador エクアドル / Coffee コーヒー  El Cafe C.A.
Australia オーストラリア / Coffee コーヒー  Coffee MIO
Czech チェコ / Wine ワイン  Wine Of Czech
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  Cantina Frentana
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  CASCINA PIAN D’OR Az. Agricola di Barbero Valter
Italy イタリア / Wine ワイン  Cantine Sgarzi Luigi srl
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  WINES FROM GALICIA
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  Monte La Reina
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  VIRGEN DE LAS VINAS
Spain スペイン / Wine ワイン  Bodegas Jimenez-Vila Hnos

EUJEPA Vol.4 / TPP Vol.7 (チーズ、牛肉、シーフード、ワイン Cheese, Beef, Seafood, Wine)

取り急ぎ標記につき以下貼っておきます。

English
Cheese
Beef
Seafood
Wine

日本語

cf. Cheese, etc., Top 10 Importers
EUJEPA-TPP cheese top-10-importers

U.K. Vol.17(Brexit Vol.14: 3 points concerning Brexit which have not been confronted in the media etc. – especially outside the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland)

Now we have only one month left to March 29, 2019, the day of Brexit. Whenever possible since the UK referendum in 2016, I have checked out news articles, professional reports. government’s remarks, etc. in English and Japanese. I am listing and explaining the three topics which have seemingly not been confronted in the media, etc., as below.

I. Leaving the European Union Customs Union and Avoiding the return of a Hard Border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are incompatible.
I have gotten an impression from the media, etc.: in the U.K., Leavers and Remainers have respectively been stick to their own convictions since political activities before the referendum; and agreements between the two factions and those between the EU and UK by the deadline seem a steep path.
In the first half of last year, I felt such steepness is due to the Northern-Southern border. And I have come to feel so stronger, last autumn when there arose much news about the Brexit backstop – a safety net in order that the NI and the ROI will maintain the current open border, under the 1998 Good Friday agreement which decided not to make physical facilities on the border, in case no formal deal between the EU and the UK can be reached on trade and security arrangements by the end of transition period, i.e. the end of the year 2020.
In English there is much news articles plainly explaining the border question, and not a few ones whose precondition is the above incompatibility. However, there seems no article which confronts the incompatibility itself. In Japanese, there seems no such news articles other than the one written by a senior researcher of a Japanese think tank who I do not know in person.
That article says the entire Brexit necessitates the hard border – such a tight border control that Japan has done as a distinct economic area; and you need to give up the entire Brexit if you maintain the current open border, which means you need to stay in the EU customs union as you belong to the same economic area as the EU. I agree to it. I have an overall impression that concerned people have actually continued to find some compromise plan because it would have been all for nothing if they had said this clearly in public. However, eventually, nothing comes from nothing.
The incompatibility eventually leads just to “some people choose one of the two”. There are options such as another referendum, a resolution of the House of Commons, a snap election, etc. In the first place, the referendum, one of the campaign promises in the 2015 general election, was conducted in 2016 and followed by a state of seemingly senseless chaos. So, the least unreasonable would be another referendum which confirms whether or not the result of the referendum in 2016 is UK citizens’ will in reality.
Fundamentally, not only referendum but also voting itself tends to be greatly affected by political winds, not decided by the content of the subject on which the judgement of the people was sought. And in 2016, Leave won by a very narrow margin, despite this result will turn over the status quo of the whole UK. If the result were Remain, i.e. maintaining the status quo, a very narrow margin would not matter. But the result was the turnover. What are convincing reasons to avoid another referendum under democracy, which ask people whether it is OK to really exit the EU on the basis of the narrow margin? I have not understood such reasons, while I saw “referendum should not be carried out twice because we had better preserve the credibility of the referendum”, etc. Most of UK citizens will be convinced, if another referendum confirms their judgement and a hard Brexit comes true.

II. The state of things in electoral districts of MPs who left the Labour or the Conservative parties.
As of 21 February, eight Members of Parliament have left the Labour, the largest opposition party, due to their dissatisfaction with its leader’s vague attitude toward Brexit, anti-Semitic attitude, etc. On the other hand, three MPs have left the Conservative, due to their dissatisfaction with the government’s catastrophic handling of Brexit. A total of these eleven members will not join the opposition Liberal Democrats, but form an independent group which aims to conduct another referendum (seemingly similar to my above thought). We can think in general that their actions are based on their concerns that they lament the UK as parliamentarians, or are related to circumstances of constituency to whom they owe many things.
The eight ex-Labours [district/county] are Coffey [Stockport/Greater Manchester], Smith [Penistone and Stocksbridge/South Yorkshire], Shuker [Luton South/Bedfordshire], Gapes [Ilford South/Greater London], Umunna [Streatham/Greater London], Leslie [Nottingham East/Nottinghamshire], Berger [Liverpool Wavertree/Merseyside], Ryan [Enfield North/Greater London]; the three ex-Conservatives Soubry [Broxtowe/Nottinghamshire], Allen [South Cambridgeshire/Cambridgeshire], Wollaston [Totnes/Devon].
According to a UK university’s research, for example, in Coffey’s Stockport, Leave-Remain difference were marginal, and Remainers increased in proportion to house prices. We can think that there are not a few people who have middle-price houses, voted Leave in 2016, but converted themselves to Remainers, while there are usually more middle-price house owners. Would this situational change urge the ex-Labour and ex-Conservative members to secede from the party and to try to conduct another referendum? When we see MPs’ voting behaviors at resolutions in the House of Commons, there must be cases in which it is useful to analyze not only house prices but the state of things in electoral districts.

III. The City of London does not prefer Jeremy Corbyn’s policies.
Although the ruling party achieved a great victory in the 2015 general election, it could not have been intrinsically strange if approval for the party had dropped significantly in the UK where regime changes by two largest parties have already taken roots, considering chaos which has continued so far and will continue. And the above attitude of the Labour leader seems to rather show his favor on soft Brexit.
However, in the media, etc., it has been said by and large that Corbyn’s Labour government with a strong left-wing flavor and its public policy such as re-nationalisation of public utilities and wealth tax are undesired, and are feared more than hard Brexit. The former would expand budget deficit and cause a sharp rise of inflation rate, which would lead to government bonds’ decrease in demand and long-term government bonds’ decrease in price. The latter would be an income tax hike towards people with over eighty thousand pounds, and would lead to the people’s escaping abroad and the UK’s revenue decline. The City is said to be on its guard against such policies. If I dare to say, its guard might not be off-base.
For example, concerning the re-nationalisation, we need to take the following into consideration: the UK government deficit-to-GDP ratio is not extremely bad (0.875 in 2017); and Tony Blair’s Labour government so positively expanded the PPP (public-private partnership) including the PFI (private finance initiative) that re-nationalisation, which means banks, equity investors and other private financiers being forced to take a haircut on their investments, is not wanted by the City. On the other hand, in many ages and countries, there have often been policy differences between two largest parties, which need to be tackled at any time taking considerable contents such as the above two into consideration.

It should be noted that immediate news coverage and possible analyses shortly after it are of course important. And I usually respect the importance to sort long processes, significant effects on international society, complicated and mysterious affairs of politics and economy, etc., at each turning point of major incidents. However, I picked up the above three points, on the assumption that I write about Brexit just this time – after countless news articles, researches, etc. were already published.

Taku Nakaminato, World Solutions LLC
24 February, 2019

The above is a provisional English translation of “Brexit Vol.13“.

P.S. I posted the above at around 5 pm (JST). Thank you for coming, many English readers.
Around 2 pm, 25 February Today I just added the following hyperlinks:
NOT JUST ANTISEMITISM: CORBYN’S BREXIT PROBLEM IS ALSO A DISASTER FOR JEWS
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THERESA MAY COMMENTS ON LABOUR PARTY ATTRITION
Ian Austin quits Labour blaming Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership
Ian Austin says he couldn’t look Jewish father ‘in the eye’ if he remained in Labour party
Corbyn told: change course before it’s too late for Labour

France フランス

Most of the below links (incl tweets) are in English.

取り急ぎ以下貼っておきます。

France Vol.3 (Finance)
France Vol.4 (Finance)
France Vol.5 (Brands)
France Vol.6 (Food)
France Vol.7 (Pharma/Health/Biotech/Food)
France Vol.8 (Energy/Utilities, Airplane/Train)
France Vol.9 (Digital/Telecommunications/Media)
France Vol.10 (Automobile)
France Vol.11 (United States)
France Vol.12 (U.S., Canada, U.K.)
France Vol.13 (Government, diplomacy, Ireland, technology, etc.)


France Vol.2 (2017 French Presidential Elections)
France Vol.1 (France regions, history, technology, et al.)

TPP Vol.6

All the below links and excerpts (incl 5 pictures) are in English.

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – National Interest Analysis @ NZ MFAT (PDF; 03/2018) You can check out the below pictures (Tables, etc.) as well.
p4 Table 1.1: Exports from New Zealand to new FTA partners
pp5-6 Table 1.2: Estimated impact of CPTPP
p8 KEY FACTS, etc.
p16 Japan is New Zealand’s fifth largest export market and it is a high value one for exporters. In the year to June 2017 two-way trade stood at NZ$7.9 billion. New Zealand exports to Japan were NZ$4.0 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of our total exports. The trading relationship is highly complementary with New Zealand supplying food and industrial materials, such as wood and aluminium, and Japan exporting finished industrial goods and machinery to New Zealand. The CPTPP will help New Zealand agriculture exporters in particular overcome high MFN tariff rates into Japan. Japan is also New Zealand’s fifth largest source of foreign direct investment, with significant investments in the forestry sector. Services exports are another big part of our trading relationship, with Japan a top-five source of students and tourists.
p19 … There are already competitors that enjoy lower barriers to trade relative to New Zealand businesses in key CPTPP markets (e.g. Australia in Japan) and more will follow as other free trade agreements are realised (e.g. the EU-Japan FTA). …
p22 Table 4.1: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Country
p23 Table 4.2: Estimated Tariff Savings per annum by Sector
pp23-24
• At entry into force (Year 1): tariffs eliminated on NZ$1.4 billion of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including many horticultural and forestry goods, a number of dairy products, some wine, many manufactured products, and much fish and seafood. Specific product examples include such items as: Japan (kiwifruit, squash); Canada (wine); Mexico (mussels, kiwifruit, milk albumin); and Peru (buttermilk powder). As a result, 79.8 percent of New Zealand exports to these new FTA markets would enter duty free on the day the CPTPP enters into force, with estimated tariff savings for New Zealand exporters of NZ$95.1 million.
• By the 5th year after entry into force (Year 6): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$111.2 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs, including: … Japan (hoki and other frozen fish, carrot juice, sausages and mandarins) … 2.4 percent of total current New Zealand exports to … 82.2 percent … Estimated total tariff savings in the fifth year after entry into force are NZ$148.1 million.
• By the 10th year after entry into force (Year 11): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$175.0 million … Japan (tongues, hides, bluefin tuna and apples) … 3.7 percent … 85.9 percent … NZ$186.9 million.
• By the 15th year after entry into force (Year 16): tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$220.8 million … Japan (cheese, sawn wood and offal) … 4.7 percent … 90.6 percent … NZ$220.6 million.
• When fully phased in: tariffs eliminated on an additional NZ$71.9 million of New Zealand exports currently subject to tariffs. The total tariff savings from the CPTPP are estimated to be NZ$222.4 million per year at full implementation, not taking account of dynamic impacts.
pp24-25
• Tariff reductions: Tariffs on an additional NZ$207.1 million of goods exports would be significantly reduced, but not eliminated, allowing for improved market access. This includes beef exporters that would benefit from a 77 percent reduction in Japan’s tariff for beef. This tariff would be reduced from the current 38.5 percent duty to 9 percent over sixteen years, with an initial sharp cut at entry into force, to 27.5 percent. There will be a transitional volume-based safeguard applying to all CPTPP beef imports into Japan, set above current trade levels, with a growth rate. The safeguard will be abolished by Year 20 at the earliest. The new CPTPP safeguard would remove the potential for Japan’s WTO beef safeguard to be applied to New Zealand’s exports. That safeguard was exceeded in 2017 meaning that a higher ‘snap-back’ tariff of 50 percent is being applied to New Zealand exports through to 31 March 2018 placing New Zealand beef exporters at a significant disadvantage to other countries (e.g. Australia) that have an FTA with Japan. This outcome is the best outcome that Japan has agreed in a FTA to date, and would help re-establish a level playing field with Japan’s largest beef supplier, Australia, after the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force in early 2015.
Japan will also reduce the tariff for ice-cream by two-thirds, from 21 percent today to 7 percent over six years, opening up new export opportunities given the significantly reduced tariff.
p26 Table 4.3: Estimated Total Volume of CPTPP Quota Access available to New Zealand Exporters
By Year 10 of the CPTPP Agreement entering into force:
• Japan will provide 40,200 MT of predominately CPTPP-wide access, with 14,000 MT on priority products for New Zealand including butter and powders. Japan is also eliminating tariffs for most cheese over sixteen years.
p27 … For country-specific access into Japan, tariffs on WTO trade are eliminated over 21 years after entry into force, with an 80 percent reduction in the first 11 years. …
… Given the scale of some of the tariff benefits from CPTPP that would, in this scenario, accrue to New Zealand’s competitors inside CPTPP, but not New Zealand – e.g. Japan’s reduced beef tariffs, or tariff elimination on Japanese cheese tariffs – New Zealand exporters would likely lose significant market share to other CPTPP exporters if New Zealand were not part of CPTPP.
p53 … The CPTPP also builds on the opportunities New Zealand businesses secured under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), with some modest improvements to access in Canada, Japan and Singapore (e.g. additional entities and coverage of private-public-partnerships). …
pp86-87 Export restrictions – food security
In Article 2.26, Parties acknowledge that countries may temporarily apply an export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs where there is risk of a critical shortage as set out in Article XI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Further to this, the Parties agree that if a CPTPP country is a net exporter of a foodstuff and imposes an export prohibition or restriction on the foodstuff from another CPTPP country in these circumstances, it must notify all of the other Parties before the measure comes into force. Notification must include the reason that the measure was imposed or maintained, how the measure is consistent with the GATT and any alternative measures the Party considered imposing. Any Party that has a substantial interest as an importer of that foodstuff may request consultations with, or data relating to the critical food shortage from, the Party imposing or maintaining the measure.
Any measure that is notified under this procedure should ordinarily be removed within four to six months. If a Party is considering extending the measure for longer than this, further notification must be provided to the other CPTPP countries. Measures may only be continued for longer than twelve months if all other Parties that are net importers of the relevant foodstuff have been consulted. A measure must be discontinued immediately if the critical shortage, or threat of critical shortage, no longer exists.
These measures may not be applied to food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian measures.
p95 Global safeguards
pp105-107 Wine and Distilled Spirits Annex
pp204-205 Table 7.1: Summary of impacts
p207 New Zealand exporters have direct experience of this kind of competitive displacement caused by being on the outside of preferential access enjoyed by competitors. For example:
• Since the entry into force of the Australia-Japan FTA, New Zealand beef exports to Japan have dropped by over 25 percent, with New Zealand exporters losing market share to their Australian competitors who are only beginning to enjoy tariff preferences under the FTA.
• Following the entry into force of the Korea-US FTA, US beef exports increased 25 percent. New Zealand exports declined by almost NZ$50 million. The US’ share of the Korean cheese import market has also grown from 41 percent to 74 percent.
• Until the entry in force of the New Zealand-Korea FTA, kiwifruit exporters paid a 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit. Their Chilean competitors enjoy duty-free access.
• Prior to the NAFTA agreement being signed by Canada, Mexico and the US in the 1990s, New Zealand was a significant supplier of dairy products to Mexico. Since Mexico eliminated tariffs for US dairy products, New Zealand’s share of Mexico’s cheese imports declined from 20 percent to 4 percent, and our share of milk powder imports from 25 percent to less than 10 percent.
ImpactEcon et al modelled the economic impact of the CPTPP by first estimating how New Zealand’s economy would be expected to develop as part of the global economy in the absence of CPTPP, and comparing this to the case where CPTPP liberalised trade in goods and services in four areas. The result of the CGE model takes account of the complicated adjustments that might take place in an economy following new trade flows and resource allocation. The four ways in which CPTPP was assumed to liberalise trade were:
• Reductions in tariffs and quota barriers on goods trade.
• Reductions in non-tariff measures on goods trade.
• Improved trade facilitation measures.
• Reductions in barriers on services trade.
pp207-211
pp221-225 8 The costs to New Zealand of compliance with the treaty
pp239-243 Overview of the suspensions

Latin American Perspectives on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/02/2016) | NEW ZEALAND CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, School of Cultures, Languages and Linguistics, University of Auckland
“Is the TPP a mega-NAFTA that will devastate Mexico?” Daniel Villafuerte Solis, The Centre for Advanced Studies in Mexico and Central America (CESMECA)
The agro-food sector, the most hard-hit by NAFTA, could suffer a new beating under the TPP. To put this into context, let us remember some figures from the Bank of Mexico: in 2014, the Mexico had a trade deficit for agro-food and agro-industrial products of US $2.593 billion, an amount equivalent to 40% percent of the budget assigned that year to the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).
The figures for imports by sector are frightening: between 2010 and 2014, imports of milk, diary, eggs and honey grew by 57.% totalling more than 2 billion dollars in 2014; meat and edible meat offal imports grew by 42.5% to $4.596 billion; cereals grew by 31.6% reaching $4.259 billion; and imports of legumes grew by 15.3%. Together, imports in these four sectors grew from $10.751 billion to $14.342 billion, an increase of 33.4%.
“What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership all about?” Alejandro Villamar, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
To give just some examples of recent analyses of the potential impacts on food sovereignty, agriculture and health, the TPP would result in illegal contamination of foodstuffs by genetically modified organisms, and a new report questions the rules of food security and animal health in the TPP (http://goo.gl/SKKbqe).
“The TPP: Bad news for farmers and agriculture” Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
The bad news is that the TPP expands many of the worst features of NAFTA. Mexican farmers were devastated by the dramatic increase in corn exports from the U.S. under NAFTA. This didn’t help most U.S. farmers, who were pushed to expand exports to compensate for low prices and declining public support. It led to increasing corporate concentration in agricultural production, leaving farmers with fewer options of where to buy and sell their goods, and a decline in the number of family farmers in all three NAFTA countries. This unfair market will be deepened under TPP. …

No More Business-as-Usual: Where to Now for International Trade? (PDF; 07/2017) | David Hall @ Auckland University of Technology
Departmental Disclosure Statement – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill (PDF; 21/06/2018)
Economic Gains and Costs from the TPP – Review of Modelled Economic Impacts of the Trans Pacific Partnership (PDF; 2014) | Sustainablity Council of New Zealand
Submission of the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (Parliament of New Zealand) regarding International treaty examination of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 04/2018)
Personal values and support (or not) for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 03/2018) | Jono Bannan, Simon Kemp and Zhe Chen @ University of Canterbury
The Benefits of Trade (PDF) | NZIER
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 09/2011) | NEW ZEALAND COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE

New Geopolitical Developments in the South Pacific: The Cases of Australia and New Zealand (PDF; 02/2018) | Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich @ ISPSW
TPP-11: Achieving Growth in a Time of Trade Uncertainty (27/08/2018) | Dr Luke Hurst @ Australian Institute of International Affairs
The TPP Investment Chapter & Investor State Arbitration in Asia & Oceania (PDF) | Dr Luke Nottage @ Sydney Law School
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateralise the ‘noodle bowl’of Asia-Pacific trade agreements? (PDF; 03/2016) | Jeffrey D. Wilson @ Perth USAsia Centre
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: COPYRIGHT LAW, THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, AND INTERNET FREEDOM (PDF; 10/2016) | DR MATTHEW RIMMER (@ QUT) @ THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE
The TPP: Truths about Power Politics (PDF; 08/2017) | Malcolm Cook @ ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF; 01/2016) | Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta with Jomo Kwame Sundaram @ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE, Tufts University
Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries (PDF; 08/2013) | Alan V. Deardorff @ The University of Michigan
TPP Countries Sign New CPTPP Agreement without U.S. Participation (PDF; 03/09/2018) | Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams @ CRS Insight
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (PDF; 08/21/2013) | Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas, Brock R. Williams @ Congressional Research Service (@ Cornell ILR)
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (PDF) | William Krist (Edited with an Introduction by Kent Hughes) @ Wilson Center
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? (PDF; 01/01/2011) | Meredith Kolsky Lewis @ Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

TPP-11 Agree on List of Suspended Provisions (PDF; 11/13/2017) | Charles Akande @ Geneva Watch
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders? (PDF; 12/2015) | Rahel Aichele and Gabriel Felbermayr @ CESifo Forum

NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table1.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Key etc.NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.1NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Table4.2NZmfat CPTPP NatlIntAnalysis Tabe7.1

cf.
New Zealand Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.1

TPP Vol.5

All the below links and excerpts (incl pictures) are in English.

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES FOR CANADIANS (PDF; 04/2017) | Standing Committee on International Trade, Canada
pp8-11 GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS
Consultations Prior to the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
Consultations Since the Conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
pp11-16 EXPECTED IMPACTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CANADA
Expected Overall Benefits for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Many witnesses representing Canadian businesses said that, among the TPP countries, the most significant market access opportunities for their sectors would be in Japan. In addition, the Cross-Border Institute mentioned that, “[w]hile Japan is now a slow-growing economy, it’s very large, and its potential for trade expansion with Canada is great.” According to it, the reductions in Japan’s import tariffs that would result from implementation of the TPP could reduce Canada’s trade deficit with that country.
… Similarly, the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership claimed that a failure by Canada to ratify the TPP could result in a lost opportunity to obtain preferential market access to countries that might accede to the TPP in the future, such as China, India and Indonesia.
… The Greater Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce said: “Should Canada choose to extricate itself from this agreement, we find ourselves in a position where it will be, over a period of time, more difficult for us to even access … traditional markets, let alone expand the opportunities and the productive capacity of this amazing region.” The Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal told the Committee that, “[i]f the U.S. has a competitive advantage … and we have no such advantage, we are affected, as in the case of South Korea when the U.S. signed an agreement with that country. …
Expected Overall Costs for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives considered that, because tariffs on Canada’s imports from TPP countries with which it does not yet have an FTA are higher than those on its exports, the TPP would likely increase Canada’s trade deficit with those countries.
… the United Steelworkers stated that the TPP would reduce the wages of Canadian workers “by putting them into competition with poorly paid foreign workers … [working in Canada] and abroad.” Global Affairs Canada provided the Committee with a different perspective, claiming that foreign professionals who would come to Canada as a result of TPP commitments “would have to be paid the prevailing wage in Canada, in that region, for a professional at that level of expertise and experience.”
… a brief submitted to the Committee by the Niagara Regional Labour Council mentioned that “provisions contained within the TPP will lead to thousands of lost jobs, higher levels of unemployment, and stagnating wages, meaning that inequality will continue unabated.”…
In addition, many witnesses believed that the TPP would increase corporate influence on Canadian public policy. … However, Global Affairs Canada provided a different perspective in remarking that provisions in the TPP would reinforce the right of member countries to “regulate in the public interest.”
Modelling the Economic Impacts for Canada of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
… Global Affairs Canada … If Canada were not to participate in the agreement, and the 11 other countries were to implement it, the study projects GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.”
… the Business Council of Canada referred to a study released by the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics that suggested that the TPP would increase Canada’s national income by $37 billion by 2030. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce commented that economic impact assessments have estimated the economic benefits for Canada of joining the TPP to be between $5 billion and $10 billion annually.
… C.D. Howe Institute, Dan Ciuriak… estimated that the TPP would lead to a “modest”GDP gain for Canada of about 0.07% by 2035, which would generate household income gains of approximately $3 billion.
Tufts University’s Jeronim Capaldo, who is one of Mr. Izurieta’s co-authors … claimed that Global Affairs Canada’s economic impact assessment made an assumption about the level of employment that would occur following the TPP’s entry into force, instead of directly modelling the TPP’s effects on Canadian employment. According to him, Global Affairs Canada’s assumption about full employment is unrealistic …
pp17-19 RATIFICATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The Alberta Beef Producers said that the Government should ratify the TPP quickly in order to “continue momentum towards implementation of the agreement more broadly.”In addition, the National Cattle Feeders’ Association indicated that “the argument can be made that Canada should ratify the TPP before the U.S. in order to make it easier to resist American efforts to extract more concessions from Canada.”
… The Canadian Chamber of Commerce contended that it would be catastrophic for Canada not to ratify the TPP if its NAFTA partners do so.
… the National Cattle Feeders’ Association claimed that, if the United States does not ratify the TPP, Canada should conclude a bilateral agreement with Japan that would “salvage” what it hopedwould be accomplished in the TPP, and that “would put Canadian producers back on an even playing field in the Japanese market with producers from countries which already have FTAs with Japan.”…
pp19-20 FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR CANADIAN BUSINESSES
… The Mining Association of Canada suggested that the Government include a northern-specific fund within Canada’s proposed infrastructure bank. In its view, this fund should be based on the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority model, which it characterized as highly successful.
… the Canadian Federation of Independent Business indicated that “many smaller companies don’t really know much about [the] TPP.” Similarly, Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters stated that “[t]he vast majority of smaller companies in Canada would have no clue about what the [TPP] is.”
pp21-22 TRADE IN GOODS
… some witnesses from the automobile manufacturing sector, as well as those representing Canada’s supply-managed agricultural sectors, said that these sectors would experience new import competition or would lose domestic market share as a result of the TPP’s tariff and quota provisions. Unifor commented that, “[w]ith elimination of the tariffs and lowering of the [rules of origin] thresholds, our supply jobs and assembly jobs are not only going to be threatened by the TPP players, but they’re also going to be penalized by non-TPP imports from China, from Malaysia, and from other countries around the world that aren’t even a part of the TPP agreement.” Similarly, Dairy Farmers of Canada …
pp22-32 Agriculture and Agri-Food
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association estimated that the TPP would allow beef producers to double or nearly triple the value of Canada’s beef exports to Japan. According to the Saskatchewan Cattlemen’s Association, such an increase in beef exports could create between 5,200 and 5,400 jobs in Canada.
The Canadian Pork Council noted that, according to a study that it commissioned, the TPP’s new market access opportunities would increase the value of Canadian pork producers’ exports by an estimated $300 million, and would create 4,000 new jobs …
Regarding Canada’s beef sector, the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association indicated that, “[w]ithout the TPP or a bilateral agreement with Japan, Canada will likely lose around 80% of the value of our [beef] exports to Japan.” The Canadian Pork Council commented that the Japanese market for Canadian pork would be lost, and that damage to Canada’s pork sector would be “extreme,” if the TPP enters into force without the participation of Canada. Cereals Canada said that “being left out of a ratified TPP agreement could result in a 50% reduction in Canadian wheat exports to the [Asia-Pacific] region,” while the B.C. Seafood Alliance stated that it would be “disastrous” for its members …
According to Chicken Farmers of Canada, the TPP would open the Canadian market to an additional 26.7 million kilograms of annual chicken imports, leading to an estimated loss of 2,200 jobs and a reduction of about $150 million in Canada’s GDP. Similarly, Les Eleveurs de volailles du Quebec said that the TPP would increase import access to the Canadian chicken market from 7.5% of domestic production to 9.6%. …
Dairy Farmers of Canada noted that the TPP would increase import access to Canada’s dairy market by between 3.37% and 3.97% of the country’s annual dairy production …
… the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association explained that, because of the 2015 Japan?Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef is currently higher than its tariffs on Australian beef. It stated that, if the Government does not ratify the TPP, the discrepancy between Japan’s tariff on Canadian beef and its tariffs on Australian beef would widen due to future successive reductions in the latter tariffs under the 2015 agreement.
pp32-38 Manufacturing
… According to a brief submitted by Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, “the TPP does not deliver any incremental or meaningful new opportunities to increase Canadian produced vehicle exports by reducing tariffs in the markets that represent the overwhelming majority of new vehicle sales because the duty rate for these markets is already 0%.” Similarly, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association …
… Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada provided a different point of view, and denied the existence of barriers that limit Japan’s imports of foreign automobiles. According to it, North American automobile manufacturers do not produce many models of small cars, which are popular in Japan. It claimed that approximately 90% of Japanese passenger car sales are “very small cars,” with engines under 2,000 cubic centimeters; in 2014, Detroit-based companies had only 10 models in that market segment.
… for vehicles, the percentage would be 45%. In contrast, the assessment notes that NAFTA requires at least 62.5% of an automobile’s content to originate from the NAFTA region …
… the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada observed that eight out of every ten vehicles sold in Canada by its members are manufactured in North America, while the remaining two are imported from Japan. It remarked that “the elimination of tariffs into the Canadian marketplace will have little or no impact on the manufacturing base here in Canada.”
pp38-42 TRADE IN SERVICES
… The value of total services trade between Canada and the other TPP countries was $134.0 billion in 2014 … $58.8 billion in Canadian exports to, and $75.2 billion in imports from, those countries … 89.6% of the value of Canadian services exports to the other TPP countries was destined for the United States, while 89.3% of the value of Canadian services imports from those countries originated from the United States.
… some witnesses – including the Business Council of Canada and Scotiabank – said that financial service providers would benefit the most from the TPP. …
… the Canadian Union of Postal Workers pointed out that Chapter 10 of the TPP includes a “detailed annex on ‘Express Delivery Services’ which would impose far more explicit constraints on government authority concerning postal services and the activities of Canada Post than do those in NAFTA or the [WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services].” In its view, “[t]hese new rules would not only limit the ability of Canada Post to expand current services such as those of Xpresspost and its subsidiary Purolator, but would threaten its ability to maintain its current business model of integrated express delivery and letter mail services.”
pp45-51 INVESTMENT PROTECTION
pp57-61 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pp99-105 SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION BY THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION – CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA
pp107-113 DISSENTING OPINION – NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADA

Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Entering a New Era of Strategic Trade Policy (PDF; 09/2013) | Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci @ Frazer Institute
ppiii-iv Executive summary
Canada’s trade rules and procedures are already strongly aligned with those of the United States and, as such, implementation of the TPP should not be costly. There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP would require us to dismantle our supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. However, with Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines may improve: Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. If its rice protections remain, this will open the door for other members to shield their sensitive industries.
Canada gains from the TPP not only by expanding its economic partnerships but also by playing a significant role in shaping the rules that will govern trade relationships in the twenty-first century. …
pp6-7
Figure 6: Canada’s exports to top five trading partners, 2012 (billions of $CA)
Figure 7: Canada’s exports to top TPP countries, 2012 (billions of $CA)
p10 Figure 8: Overlapping rules of origin: the “noodle bowl” of trade agreements
p11 … Figure 9 shows that countries such as Vietnam, China, Mexico, and Peru still have significant barriers to foreign trade, though Mexico, which has had a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and Canada since 1994, has shown consistent improvements in its trade and investment rankings. …
p14 There has been much speculation as to whether Canada’s participation in the TPP will require the dismantling of Canada’s supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs. As Canada was negotiating entry into the talks in 2010, messaging from the United States and New Zealand indicated that Canada’s dairy exceptions were keeping it out of the negotiations (see, for example, Inside US Trade, 2010). However, the entry of Japan into the TPP negotiations probably improves the odds for countries wishing to exempt sensitive sectors from TPP disciplines. Japan’s protective policies for its domestic rice sector in the name of food security are well known and unlikely to be dismantled. As a wealthy and attractive market (currently the third largest in the world), Japan may have enough leverage in the negotiations to maintain its agricultural protections in spite of the lofty liberalization goals of the TPP. Thus, if Japanese rice protections remain, others will likely be able to shield sensitive sectors such as US sugar and Canadian dairy.

The New Trans-Pacific Partnership: Smaller, but Just as Ambitious (PDF; 16/03/2018) | Desjardins You can check out the below two pictures: GRAPH 3, 4, and TABLE 2.
GRAPH 3 Share of CPTPP members in Canadian goods export and import categories
TABLE 1 Variation in Canadian exports by 2040 in relation to the base scenario according to various CPTPP scenarios
GRAPH 4 Highest tariffs in the 25 biggest categories of exports to the CPTPP
TABLE 2 Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam would be Canada’s biggest opportunity for saving on tariffs

GRAPH 5 Some products could be especially impacted by the CPTPP

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP): AN OVERVIEW (PDF; 12/2015) | John M. Curtis @ School of Public Policy, University of Calgary
Economic Impact of Canada’s Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; 02/16/2018) | Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada
Canadian industries split on new TPP trade deal (PDF; 01/23/2018) | Steven Chase and Greg Keenan @ The Globe and Mail
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP – WHAT’S IN IT FOR CANADA? (PDF; 2016) | Business Council of Canada
Give and Take – Risks and Opportunities of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Canada’s Building Trades Unions (PDF; 08/2016) | Dawson Strategic
Gains from Trade but to Whom? – Canola and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (PDF; Fall 2016) | Hawley Campbell and Henry An @ Western Economics Forum
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (PDF; 07/2015) | CAFTA-ACCA
ACTRA SUBMISSION TO GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA ON THE CANADA-PACIFIC TRADE CONSULTATIONS (FORMERLY TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP) (PDF; 10/30/2017)
POLICY BRIEF: The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Health: Potential Risks and Benefits (PDF) | Ronald Labonte & Arne Ruckert @ Globalization and Health Equity, University of Ottawa

Desjardins CanadianGoodsExportImportDesjardins HighestTariffs, BiggestOpportunity

cf.
Canada Vol.38 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.4

TPP Vol.4

All the below links and excerpts (incl Figures 6-8 & 10-12) are in English.

The Art of the TRADE DEAL – Quantifying the Benefits of a TPP without the United States (PDF; 06/2017) | Canada West Foundation
p2 Executive Summary … Our modelling and analysis shows how Canada and other TPP signatories would fare under a TPP11; what the U.S. stands to lose; and, how the agreement would affect different sectors of the economy, including how changes in one sector will impact other sectors. …
… Is the endgame of a TPP11 solely its economic benefits, primarily in trade in goods and services? How should the eleven TPP countries deal with issues on which U.S. policy is shifting? Should potential losses for the U.S. from opting out be used to try and bring the Americans back to the TPP table to regain the additional benefits for all (and avoid aggressive bilateral talks)? If so, what changes, if any, should be made to the pact to either facilitate the Americans’ return to the table or, on the other hand, to try and extract concessions from them as a price for re-entry?
pp4-5 Major Findings from TPP11 modelling
FOR CANADA
⭢ Canada stands to benefit in TPP11 compared to TPP12 more than any other country in the group, save Mexico. Canada’s welfare gains would improve to C$3.4 billion under the TPP11, compared to C$2.8 billion in TPP12. Real GDP gain improves to 0.082%. from 0.068%.
⭢ A TPP11 would actually be better than the original agreement for Canadian agriculture and agri-food, because this sector would no longer compete with the U.S. in TPP11 markets. Beef, in particular, would benefit from access to the Japanese market without having to share with the Americans. Fruit and vegetable exports, processed food products, and pork and poultry would likewise do well. Canola would continue to see a significant change in the composition of exports from unprocessed oilseeds to crude and refined canola oil, due to the elimination of Japan’s tariff escalation policy in the oilseed sector.
⭢ The only Canadian sector with a significant negative impact relative to the pre-TPP baseline would be dairy, which would face increased imports under Canada’s concession – in both TPP12 or 11. Because the main global dairy producer, New Zealand, is geographically distant from Canada, the U.S. would have been more important competition to Canada in terms of fluid milk. Without the U.S., TPP11 may mean less pressure on fluid milk. But …
⭢ Canadian textiles and apparel – another sensitive sector – would see only a moderate reduction in total shipments, despite a strong surge of imports from TPP11 partners (again, this is unchanged from TPP12).
⭢ The impact on the automotive sector is neutral in the new modelling results, but much would depend on how a TPP11 would proceed on the rules of origin (ROOs), given the central role of U.S.-based producers in TPP automotive supply chains.
FOR OTHER TPP11 COUNTRIES
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for signatories in the Americas (Mexico, Canada, Peru and Chile), as these countries would avoid erosion of existing preferences in the U.S. market (assuming existing bilateral agreements remain unchanged). These countries would also benefit from not having to compete with U.S. suppliers, as they would have had to under TPP12.
⭢ A TPP11 would improve upon TPP12 for Singapore, which similarly would avoid loss to U.S. competition of its existing preferential position in Asian markets.
⭢ Vietnam and Japan, while they would still benefit from TPP11, would also see the biggest reduction of gains, because they stood to gain the most in the U.S. market under TPP12.
FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS
⭢ Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the U.S., the automotive sector would make the largest intra-TPP export gains of all the goods sectors under TPP11.
⭢ Other sectors that would benefit from increased exports under TPP11 include machinery and equipment (C$2.3 billion), leather products (C$2.1 billion), beef (C$1.2 billion), processed foods (C$946 million) and fruit and vegetables (C$343 million).
⭢ The TPP11 would wash out the large export gains that Vietnam stood to make in textiles and apparel in the U.S. market under TPP12. Nonetheless, textiles and apparel (C$4.2 billion) see the largest gains in intra-TPP exports after automotive products.
⭢ Finally, service exports get little wind in the sails from TPP11. Business services exports make the most notable gain, expanding by C$345 million, but this falls far short of what TPP12 would likely generate.
pp6-7
TWO REASONS TO PROCEED
01 Economic Gains
02 Negotiating Leverage
An Important Caveat for Policy-Makers
TPP & NAFTA
p9 INTRODUCTION
01 Does TPP11 make sense for the eleven as a standalone agreement?
02 Does the existence of TPP11 give signatories leverage in potential bilateral (or in the case of nafta, trilateral) negotiations or renegotiations with the U.S.?
03 Could the losses to the U.S. due to its exclusion from the tpp bring the Americans back to the table? Essentially, could TPP11 be a path to realizing or re-achieving the larger political and economic benefits of a TPP12?
… If a company in Japan that produces goods with inputs from Malaysia and Vietnam wanted to sell to Canada, it could enter Canada under the favourable conditions of TPP11 since all the countries were members of the agreement.
A bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan would apply only to goods made only or mostly in Japan and the U.S. For the Japanese company that has supply and production chains in Vietnam and Malaysia, this would pose a major problem. …
pp12-13 BACKGROUND
Figure 1: Income and Population, estimated 2016, TPP11 and the U.S.
Figure 2: Global imports, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (us$ millions)
Figure 3: Inward and outward investment, TPP11 parties and the U.S., 2015 (current us$ millions)
p15 Framework for QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The GTAP-FDI model … On the production side, the model evaluates efficiency gains from the reallocation of factors of production across sectors. …
On the demand side, an aggregate Cobb-Douglas utility function allocates expenditures to private consumption, government spending, and savings to maximize per capita aggregate utility. …
pp24-32 Trade Impacts
Figure 6: Exports to TPP partners and to the world, 2035
Figure 7: Imports from TPP partners and from the world, 2035
Figure 8: Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impacts of the TPP
Figure 9: Decomposition of TPP11 impacts by policy, cumulated change in 2035
Figure 10: TPP regional sectoral impacts 2035
Figure 11: Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12 (c$ millions) (%)
Figure 12: Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada (c$ millions) (%)
pp34-35 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
… The biggest prize for Canada in a TPP11 is gaining access to Japan ahead of the U.S. and on terms that Canada could not achieve in a bilateral negotiation. This is the opposite of what happened to Canada in Korea where both the Americans and Australians were able to sign trade agreements ahead of Canada and take market share from our agricultural and livestock exporters. …
… The TPP12 featured a significant lowering of the overall amount of RVC required for an automotive product to qualify for TPP preferences compared to the NAFTA standard of 62.5% for automobiles and light trucks. …

COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP-11) – ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ON AUSTRALIA (PDF; 21/03/2018) | Parliament of Australia
PART 2: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
p3 Tariff barriers still faced by Australian exporters
15. With Japan, Australia has secured increased access for many products under the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), but will continue to face high tariffs and quota-limited access on Japan’s sensitive products. In dairy, products face ad valorem tariffs ranging up to 40 per cent and specific tariffs up to \1,199/kg ($12.62/kg). Beef tariffs, while significantly reduced under JAEPA, would still be as high as 23.5 per cent after 15 years. Wheat and barley face tariffs of up to \50/kg ($0.58/kg) and \39/kg ($0.45/kg) respectively, rice is subject to a \341/ kg tariff ($3.93/kg) and sugar is subject to a levy on high polarity sugar of 103.10 yen/kg ($1.19-kg). A range of tariffs also remain on other Australian interests in horticulture and seafood.
19. Access into the Canadian dairy market is currently significantly limited by existing quota and high tariff arrangements. Canada’s quota access for dairy products is incredibly small – for example, 332 tonnes for yoghurt, 394 tonnes for cream and 3,274 tonne for butter (2,000 tonnes of which are allocated to New Zealand). While out-of-quota tariffs range up to 369 per cent. Outside of dairy, Canada also imposes tariffs of up to 94 per cent for barley products, and imposes tariffs of 1.87 c/litre for wine, and up to around 20 per cent on industrial products, which it has eliminated for its other FTA partners.
20. Mexico has tariffs of up to 67 per cent on wheat, 115.2 per cent on barley, 125 per cent on dairy, 25 per cent on beef, and 20 per cent on wine. On industrial products, Mexico’s tariffs can range from 15 to 30 per cent for automotive parts or mining equipment.
PART 5: IMPACT ANALYSIS
pp15-19 Table 3: Key agricultural market access outcomes for Australia
pp19-20 Resources, Energy and Manufactured Good
pp28-34 Suspension of TPP provisions in TPP-11
pp35-38 PART 6: TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
p41 PART 9: IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW
113. A TPP-11 Commission established under the Agreement will be responsible for the operation of the TPP-11. The Commission will review the operation of the TPP-11 three years after entry into force of the Agreement and at least every five years thereafter. If the entry into force of the original TPP is imminent or if the original TPP is unlikely to enter into force, the Parties have agreed to, on the request of a Party, review the operation of the TPP-11 so as to consider any amendment to the Agreement and any related matters.
114. After the entry into force of the TPP-11, any state or separate customs territory may accede to the TPP-11 if it is prepared to comply with the provisions of the Agreement, other terms and conditions specified, and if all TPP-11 Parties agree to the accession.
115. Any Party may withdraw from the TPP-11 by providing written notice to the Depositary and other Parties. A withdrawal shall take effect six months after a Party provides written notification, unless the Parties agree on a different period.

JSCOT (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties) inquiry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) (PDF; 04/20/2018) | Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
pp4-6 2 Increased red tape and costs:
… It is important to understand that each agreement includes compliance terms which need to be satisfied in order to take advantage of the agreement. In the case of goods trade, this is the tariff regime where rules of origin must be satisfied. Zero preferential tariffs are different to the abolition of tariffs. Any tariff, even 0, requires the importers to satisfy the compliance rules and so red tape is retained. …
5 Further comments:
pp8-16 Annex 1: Previous Parliamentary Inquiry recommendations and resultant actions.
pp17-19 Annex 2: Previous Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee TPP Inquiry, October 2016
p22 6 Contribution to economic prosperity from liberalised trade
… Australia held similar positions in the 1950s but its ranking slipped over the following two and a half decades. It dropped to 15th in 1983 and again in 1991 and 1992.
Since then Australia’s international ranking has risen. This improvement has been linked to sustained economic reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, including: the opening up of trade and capital markets to competition; partial deregulation, commercialisation and privatisation of state owned enterprises; labour market reforms that reformed the centralized wage fixing system; and National Competition Policy reforms (PC 1999). These resulted in better utilisation of labour and capital by business and enabled the Australian economy to innovate, taking advantage of newly developed information and communication technologies.
pp38-39 9.2 Economic studies

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal (TPP): What are the economic consequences for in- and outsiders? (PDF; 10/08/2015) | Rahel Aichele, Gabriel Felbermayr @ ifo Institut (@ Global Economic Dynamics, Bertelsmann Foundation)
Table 1 Effects of TPP and FTAAP on real per capita income in insider countries, %
Table 2 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals on World Regions
Table 3 Real Income Effects of Pacific Mega Regionals in Europe and the US (%)
Table 4 Welfare Effects from TPP with Flexible Comparative Advantage
Table 5 The EU’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 6 Germany’s Importance in Global Sectoral Value Added with TPP and FTAAP
Table 7 Estimated trade policy effects, goods trade
Table 8 Estimated trade policy effects, services

A good dealfrom TPP for NZ Horticulture (PDF; 11/2015) | Simon Hegarty (@ Horticulture New Zealand)
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – members & value of NZ hort exports to each
The following table highlights the outcome for nine key product lines

New Zealand wine sector welcomes agreement on CPTPP (PDF; 26/01/2018) | New Zealand Wine
Trans-Pacific Partnership overview (PDF) | New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade
IS THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP’S INVESTMENT CHAPTER THE NEW “GOLD STANDARD”? (PDF; 2016) | Jose E Alvarez
PROCESS, POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF PROCESS: THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IN NEW ZEALAND (PDF) | Amokura Kawharu

Chile and the TPP Negotiations: Analysis of the economic and political impact (PDF; 05/2013) | ONG Derechos Digitales

17-10 Going It Alone in the Asia-Pacific: Regional Trade Agreements Without the United States (PDF; 10/2017) | Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, Shujiro Urata, and Fan Zhai (@ PIIE)

Figure 6 Exports to TPP partnersFigure 7 Imports from TPP partnersFigure 8 Gdp (%) and economic welfare (c$ millions) impactsFigure 10 TPP regional sectoral impactsFigure 11 Macroeconomic impacts on Canada, TPP11 vs. TPP12Figure 12 Sectoral impacts of TPP11 on Canada

cf.
Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.3 (Miscellaneous)
Australia Vol.15 / Trans-Pacific Partnership #TPP Vol.2

TPP(#CPTPP #TPP11 環太平洋パートナーシップに関する包括的及び先進的な協定 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership)Vol.3

All the below links and excerpts are in Japanese. Next post about this topic will be in English.
取り急ぎ標記につき以下のとおりリンク及び抜粋等を貼っておきます。次回、英文情報を貼ります。
平成31年2月13日、数件追加しました。

TPP協定の経済効果分析について(PDF;平成27年12月24日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
(別紙)農林水産物への影響試算の計算方法について(PDF;平成25年3月15日)| 内閣官房TPP政府対策本部 平成31年2月13日追加
内閣官房TPP等政府対策本部
環太平洋パートナーシップ(TPP)協定交渉(平成30年11月19日)| 外務省
日EU‣EPAとTPP11の概要と海外支援について(PDF;平成30年3月)| 経済産業省
下表“TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率”等をご覧ください。
経済連携協定の活用(PDF;平成29年12月1日)| 経済産業省 経済連携課
TPP11協定(CPTPP)の概要(税率差等)(PDF;平成30年11月)| 財務省関税局
セーフガードに係る説明や、下の“【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%…”等をご覧ください。
TPP11(CPTPP)原産地規則について(PDF;平成30年11月・12月)| 財務省関税局・税関

TPP11における品目ごとの農林水産物への影響について(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
農林水産物の生産額への影響について(TPP11)(PDF;平成29年12月)| 農林水産省
TPP11協定に基づく国家貿易による米麦等の輸入について(w PDFs)| 農林水産省
TPP11、12月30日発効 | 独立行政法人 農畜産業振興機構

TPP大筋合意 食卓への影響は? 価格帯も豊富、選択肢広がる(平成27年10月15日)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加
例えば、同店で現在、最も安く販売している米国産牛肉は100グラム当たり150円。38・5%の関税がかかってこの値段だが、関税が27・5%になると同138円、9%だと同118円となる。一方、同店で販売する国産豚肉の平均価格は100グラム当たり128円。現在は米国産牛肉の方が22円高いが、TPPで関税が27・5%になれば、価格差は10円に縮まる。さらに9%になると牛肉と豚肉の価格が逆転し、牛肉の方が豚肉より10円安くなる。
ただ、輸入の豚肉にかかる関税は、安い価格帯の豚肉が現行の1キロ当たり482円を10年目に50円に、高い豚肉の関税(価格の4・3%)を10年目に撤廃する方向で、輸入の牛肉よりもさらに安くなる可能性がある。
一方、輸入肉の価格が安くなることで、輸入や国産に関係なく、魚介類の価格も下がるとみられる。全国漁業協同組合連合会(全漁連)によると、総務省の消費者物価指数の動きから、牛肉の価格が20%下がると、魚介類の価格が15%下がるという関係が認められるという。
スーパーなどで品薄が続いているバターについては、新たに低関税の輸入枠が設けられる。ニュージーランドなどからの輸入が増え、品不足の解消が期待される。
【図解・行政】TPP新協定発効後の食品関税(平成29年11月)| 産経新聞 平成31年2月13日追加

包括的及び先進的な環太平洋パートナーシップ協定(TPP11協定)交渉の大筋合意に伴う熊本県産農林水産物への定性的な影響予測(PDF;平成29年12月11日)| 熊本県農林水産部
米、小麦、牛肉、豚肉、乳製品、オレンジ(温州みかん・中晩柑類)、野菜(施設野菜)、野菜(露地野菜)、鶏肉、鶏卵、林産物(合板・製材)、水産物について説明されています。
なお、同県以外の各都道府県等も同様の資料を公表されています。下の日本都道府県地図もご覧ください。
TPP協定の影響に関するQ&A(PDF;平成25年5月)| 北海道 平成31年2月13日追加
TPP11の発効について | 帯広市
<迫るTPP11 現場からの報告>(1)牛肉 黒毛輸出や銘柄化模索(2018年4月13日)| 北海道新聞
TPPの国民生活への影響|JAグループ宮城 平成31年2月13日追加

TPP 12月30日発効 米国離脱も見直さず(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
バター・脱脂粉乳で設けた生乳換算で最大7万トンの低関税輸入枠や牛肉のセーフガードの発動基準数量は、参加国全体からの輸入が対象。TPP11では元の12カ国の水準を維持した。例えば牛肉の発動基準数量は米国からの輸入を含むことを前提に設定しており、米国が抜けたため実際は発動されない可能性が高い。
牛肉の関税は、1年目に現行の38・5%から27・5%に削減。その後、段階的に削減し、16年目に9%になる。豚肉は差額関税制度を維持した上で、低価格帯の従量税、高価格帯の従価税を段階的に下げ、最終的に従量税1キロ当たり50円だけになる。米はオーストラリア向けに特別輸入枠を設ける。
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ(2018年11月2日)| 鶏鳴新聞
鶏肉の「丸どり=生鮮・冷蔵」と「丸どり、骨付きもも以外=冷凍」「アヒルの肉(丸どり以外)」は段階的に下げて6年目に撤廃。鶏肉の「丸どり=冷凍」「骨付きもも=生鮮・冷蔵」「丸どり・骨付きもも以外=生鮮・冷蔵」「骨付きもも=冷凍」は段階的に下げて11年目に撤廃。
けいざい早わかり(2017 年度第 5 号)署名されたTPP11の概要(PDF;2018年3月9日)| 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
図表2.TPP1 1における日本の農林水産物の関税の削減・撤廃の例

CPTPPが年末に発効(PDF;2018年11月1日)| みずほ総合研究所
カナダの乗用車関税は、現在の6.1%から発効日に5.5%、2019年1月1日には5.0%に引き下げられる。カナダの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、日本の対加輸出額の3割強を占める乗用車が即時撤廃ではないため、貿易額基準でみると68.4%にとどまるが、関税品目数基準では96.9%に達している。ニュージーランドの工業製品関税の対日即時撤廃率は、貿易額基準では98.0%、関税品目数基準でも93.9%と高い水準になっている(図表1)。
日本の牛肉輸入のうち、CPTPP参加国からの輸入は56.7%(2017年実績、金額ベース)を占め、その大半(49.8%)がオーストラリアからの輸入である(4頁図表3参照)。オーストラリア向けの牛肉関税は、日豪EPAによって生鮮・冷蔵が29.3%、冷凍が26.9%まですでに引き下げられている。そのため、オーストラリア産牛肉の輸入に関しては、CPTPP発効によって関税率が大きく引き下げられるわけではない。特に、冷凍牛肉については、日豪EPAに基づく現行関税率の方が低くなるため、CPTPP発効後も日豪EPAの関税率が適用される5。2019年4月1日(2年目)以降は、CPTPPにおける関税率(26.6%)が日豪EPAにおける関税率(26.7%)を下回る…
日本の輸入牛肉の56.7%がCPTPP参加国からの輸入であることはすでに述べたが、残る43.3%のうち43.0%を米国が占めている(図表3左図)。つまり、CPTPP発効後は、事実上米国のみがCPTPPの特恵関税率を適用されない国となる。また、豚肉については、日本の輸入豚肉市場はCPTPP参加国(35.3%)、EU(35.9%)、米国(28.7%)で3分されており(図表3右図)…
TAG交渉が長引けば、それだけ米国の輸出者が日本市場で不利な状況に置かれる期間が長くなることを意味する。したがって、CPTPPの発効は、TAG交渉の早期妥結を求める米国内の圧力を高め、交渉における米国の姿勢をより宥和的にする方向に働くことが考えられる。
米国のTPP復帰は米国が譲歩しないと実現しない(2018年4月18日)| 野村総合研究所
米国のTPP復帰に対する11か国の姿勢には、実は大きな開きがある。日本が米国の復帰を望んでいるのは、米国市場へのアクセスが強まり、輸出が拡大するとの期待があるためである。日本以外にも、マレーシアやベトナムには同様な期待がある。しかし一方で、米国が参加しないことでメリットを受けている国もある点に留意すべきだ。それが最も顕著なのは北米・南米の4ヵ国、つまりカナダ、チリ、メキシコ、ペルーである。これらの4か国は既に米国との間に北米自由貿易協定(NAFTA)などの協定を結んでいることから…
米国抜きTPPの行方(PDF;2017年11月15日)| 三井物産戦略研究所 アジア・中国・大洋州室
TPP参加国のうち、 米国がFTAを結んでいない国は、日本に加えベトナム、マレーシア、ブルネイ、ニュージーランドの4カ国である。…
TPP参加国のうち、 日本がFTAを結んでいないのは、米国とニュージーランドおよび交渉中のカナダだけ…
ベトナム、マレーシア… 米国抜き TPP に慎重。両国ともTPP交渉で、米国への輸出拡大を期待し、国内規制の緩和を受け入れた。そのため、米国抜きTPPでは、期待した利益の多くが得られない一方で、規制緩和の痛みばかり負うことになると懸念している。 また、すでに日本とはEPAを結んでいるので、特段日本への輸出拡大は期待できない…
TPPにおける日本の牛肉関税の削減幅は、日豪EPAより大きく、TPP11では一層、豪州が有利となる。同試算では、豪州のTPP11参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は8,800万ドルとなる。…
ニュージーランドがTPPに参加したのは、日本とのFTA実現の意味合いが大きかったので、米国抜きのTPPでもあまり期待外れにはならない。…ニュージーランドのTPP12参加国向け輸出の押し上げ効果は17億4,200万ドルだったが、TPP11では 15億5,600万ドルとなり、大きく目減りすることはない。…

日本農業を壊すのは自由貿易ではない | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
1.TPPを悪用した農業界
4.ウソと矛盾の農業保護論
TPP11の次の一手は-アメリカにTPP復帰を求める必要はない- | キャノングローバル戦略研究所
農産物の日本市場をTPP11で奪われるアメリカが日米FTAを要求してくるなら、日本は多国間自由貿易協定(メガFTA)主義に転換したのでTPP11に参加しなさいと主張すればよい。理論的にも… TPP11に地理的な制約はない。トルコ、ブラジル、ケニアが入ってもよい。… 当初EUは日EU自由貿易協定に関心を示さなかった。…転換… 中国・インドも参加するRCEPでは、TPPのような高いレベルの協定内容は期待できない。…
動きだした米抜きTPP――日本がアジアの通商交渉リードへ(2017年7月18日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
… 米国が検事兼裁判官となって気に入らない国に制裁を一方的に加える通商法301条に、80年代の日本はおびえた。しかし、WTOはその紛争処理手続きを経なければ対抗措置は打てないとして、通商法301条を否定した。
日米FTA交渉を求められても、日本は拒否すればよい。日米FTAは望ましくないと、米国を諭すのである。第1に、TPPはアジア太平洋経済協力会議(APEC)地域全体の自由貿易圏(FTAAP)実現に向けた取り組みの1つとして位置付けられてきた。APEC首脳が約束してきた道から外れて、2国間のFTAを目指すことは適当ではない。第2に、2国間のFTAが重なると、多数のルールや規則が錯綜し混乱する。これをバグワティという著名な国際経済学者は「スパゲティボール」と呼んで批判している。…

7 日本はどの国と業種からTPP11のメリットを得られるか ―EPAとTPPの利用における効果を業種別に比較(PDF;2018年6月) |(一財)国際貿易投資研究所
表1 TPPにおける輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表2 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表3 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別平均関税率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表4 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの業種別効果(加重平均)
表5 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別効果(加重平均)
表6 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表7 日本のTPP10か国からの輸入の業種別関税削減額及び関税削減率(発効から1年目、加重平均)
表8 日本のマレーシア・ベトナムからの輸入でのEPAとTPPの品目別関税削減額および関税削減率(加重平均)
表9 日本のTPPを利用した輸出の効果(2017年、関税削減額および削減率、加重平均)
99頁 したがって、日本が TPP を活用してより多くのメリットを得ようとすると、米国以外の TPP 11 か国への輸出では、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、皮革・毛皮・ハンドバッグ(主にベトナム向け)、繊維製品・履物、輸送用機械・部品、などの分野が有望である。米国向け輸出では、繊維製品・履物、化学工業品、プラスチック・ゴム製品、などの分野でメリットが大きい。
一方、日本の輸入では、TPP 利用でメリットが大きい業種は、農水産品と食料品・アルコールであり、これに繊維製品・履物とプラスチック・ゴム製品が挙げられる。つまり、農水産品と食料品・アルコール、及び繊維製品・履物は、日本の TPP を利用した輸出と輸入の両面において効果がある業種ということになる。

TPPの関税低減に先駆けタスマニアビーフ2品値下げ(平成30年12月6日)| イオンリテールnews 平成31年2月13日追加
機関誌「あきた経済」:「TPP12」から「TPP11」に ~貿易摩擦とメガFTAの行方~ | 一般財団法人 秋田経済研究所
カナダ向け輸出増期待 TPP11署名で北陸企業(2018年3月9日)| 北國新聞
TPP11やEVFTA、ベトナムの農林水産業発展のチャンスに(2018年11月29日)| VIETJO
自由貿易体制に備えて ~TPP11、12月30日発効へ~(2018年11月28日)| ニコニコニュース(食品産業新聞社ニュースWEB)
TPP11はTPP12より悪い(2018年5月31日)| JAcom【鈴木宣弘・東京大学教授】
TPP11 の農業分野への影響について(PDF;2018年4月11日)| 農民運動全国連合会
日米新協議いよいよ始動 TPP11 テコに自由化加速 | 一般社団法人 中央酪農会議
TPP11発効まで1カ月 輸入枠見直さず セーフガード発動しない可能性(2018年12月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPP11 合意から1年で発効 迫る大幅市場開放(2018年11月1日)| 日本農業新聞
TPPの現在 ~米国の離脱と署名が行われたTPP11 | 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング
再起動した日本の通商戦略(PDF;2017年10・11月)| みずほ総合研究所 政策調査部
アセアン・レポート 2018年3月号(PDF)| 千葉銀行 シンガポール駐在員事務所・バンコク駐在員事務所

「TPP11大筋合意~日本の果たす役割」(時論公論)(2017年11月14日)| NHK解説委員室
また自由化の内容もやや後退しています。アメリカが求めていた知的財産権の保護など20項目が、アメリカがTPPにもどるまで実施されない「凍結」扱いとなりました。また「国有企業に対する優遇措置を禁じる新たなルール」など4項目についても新興国などが、「そもそもアメリカへの輸出が増やせることを前提に譲歩したものだ」として、凍結を主張していました。結局調整がつかずに継続協議となり、今後に課題を残しています。
大筋合意に至ったTPP11(PDF;2017年11月13日)| みずほ総合研究所
図表2:凍結項目リスト
TPP11を読む(2018年4月19日)| 独立行政法人 経済産業研究所
表1:TPP11に組み込まれないか、適用停止されるTPP12の条文
表2:TPP11における我が国のサイドレター
TPP11、12月30日に発効へ 著作権保護期間は70年に(2018年11月2日)| 財経新聞
TPP11と不動産(PDF;2018年4月3日)| 一般財団法人 土地総合研究所

TPP11:相手国及び我が国の工業製品の即時撤廃率及び関税撤廃率TPP:【例1】~【例3】税率差が3%Japan TPP,EUJEPA

オーストラリア連邦(Commonwealth of Australia) 基礎データ | 外務省
ニュージーランド(New Zealand) 基礎データ | 外務省
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EUJEPA Vol.3


All the below links, excerpts, and pictures (charts/tables) are in English.

Japan-EU EPA 【Benefits and Backgrounds】(PDF; 07/2018) | MOFA Japan You can also check out the first one of the below pictures.
Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) (07/17/2018) | MOFA Japan
2018 Japan-EU Summit: Signing Ceremony Of EPA And SPA (YouTube)

The EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (w PDF; 09/2018) | Policy Department for External Relations @ European Parliament (@Bruegel) You can also check out all the below pictures but the first one.
PDF p11 Within the EU-28, in 2017 the top goods exporters to Japan were Germany, Italy, the UK and France, respectively accounting for 32.87 %, 10.82 %, 10.67 % and 10.53 % of the EU’s EUR 60.66 billion of commodity exports to Japan in 2017. Germany, Italy, the UK and France were also the top four importers of Japanese goods, with respective shares of 23.28 %, 16.48 %, 14.37 % and 12.76 % of the EUR 68.89 billion worth of EU commodity imports from Japan in 2017.
Japan is among the low-tariff countries for industrial goods with a trade-weighted tariff average of 1.4 % (Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s agricultural markets are relatively protected. Simple average applied most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs stand at 13.3 % for agricultural goods, with high tariffs on animal products (10.6 %), dairy items (63.4 %), beverages and tobacco (15.1 %).
Figure 4 depicts the EU’s and Japan’s tariffs by harmonised system (HS) product categories. In terms of the average applied MFN tariffs, we note that Japanese tariffs are low across numerous sectors such as electrical machinery (0.1 %), transport equipment (0) and manufactures not elsewhere specified (n.e.s) (1.2 %). Prominent exceptions are clothing (9 %), leather and footwear (7.7 %).
p12 The dominant sectors in the EU’s total service exports to Japan in 2016 were financial services (23.53 %), telecommunications (14.5 %) and transport (13.97 %).
p13 Japan accounted for only 1.1 % of the total extra-EU FDI in 2016 (Figure 7). By comparison, EU investments in the US and Canada are much higher, representing 38 % and 3.7 % of total extra-EU FDI. Japanese investment in the EU stood at USD 56.8 billion, 33.7 % of its total FDI stock abroad in 2017. However, it should be noted that a substantial share, approximately 38 %, of Japan’s FDI stock in the EU is in the UK …
p15 A low score (0.05) in OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (2017), which measures statutory limitations on FDI, is indicative of the relative openness of the Japanese economy to foreign investors, as the OECD average is 0.07. On the other hand, the US (0.09), Canada (0.162) and China (0.316) are all relatively more restrictive as destinations for FDI. Except for a few countries in Europe (Austria, Poland and Sweden), all EU Member States are more open to FDI than Japan, with Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia being the least restrictive.
p17 Tariffs Agricultural goods. … significant reductions in customs duties for the EU’s major food exports to Japan such as pork (e.g. 4.3 % to 0 over 10 years for high value cuts), wine (15 % to 0 % on entry into force), beef (38.5 % to 9 % over 15 years), pasta and chocolates (complete tariff liberalisation in 10 years). For cheeses, the EUJEPA will deliver complete liberalisation for hard cheeses and provide tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with duty free access for fresh, processed and soft cheeses.
Industrial goods. In the agri-goods industry, South Korea was traditionally protectionist with a trade-weighted tariff of 49 % in the pre-FTA period. By 2014 however, these had been reduced on a preferential basis for EU goods to 28 %. The EU also liberalised its agricultural markets for South Korea by reducing trade-weighted tariffs from 11 % to 3 %.
Non-Tariff Barriers … Commission’s Impact Assessment Report (CIAR) in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Japan is aligning itself with international standards on medical devices (Quality Management Systems), textile labelling (ISO international care labelling), motor vehicles (UNECE international vehicle regulations) and pharmaceuticals (ICH).
p18 Services The EUJEPA seeks to promote bilateral trade in a broad range of services but does not require governments to deregulate or privatise the provision of public services such as healthcare, water supply and education. … In telecommunications, the agreement covers issues such as mobile roaming, number portability and confidentiality of users’ traffic data. In financial services, the agreement calls for deeper regulatory cooperation and establishes a Joint Financial Regulatory Forum for this purpose. In e-commerce, the parties commit to keep electronic transmissions duty-free, recognise the legal validity of electronic contracts and signatures and may not require source codes to be transferred or accessed. In postal and courier services, the EUJEPA will attempt to build a level-playing field for EU suppliers and their main competitors such as Japan Post.
p21 Japan is one of the least restrictive economies in the world according to ECIPE’s Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index Report …
pp30-33 Bilateral trade There is substantial variation in the anticipated trade response. DG Trade (2018) found that the EUJEPA would lead to an increase of +13.2 % (EUR 13 billion) increase in EU exports to Japan. EU exports to Japan would rise by 22.6-32.7 % in the CIAR (2012) simulations. A much stronger export response for the EU is found in Ifo 2017 (61 %) and Ifo 2018 (73 %).
On the import side, DG Trade (2018) reports a 23.5 % (EUR 22 billion) increase in EU imports from Japan. This result is similar to that of CIAR (2012) which predicted increases in EU import purchases from Japan in the range of 17.1-23.5 %. In contrast, Ifo (2017) and Ifo (2018) simulations lead to increases in EU imports from Japan of 55 % and 63 %, respectively.
Sectoral value added All EUJEPA studies report a positive impact on value added in agri-food industries e.g.+0.82 % according to Ifo 2018, +0.2 % increase in output for processed foods in DG Trade (2018), 0.5-0.6 % for processed foods in the CIAR (2012) and +13 % for meats in Ecorys (2009). For automobiles, projections of value added are model-dependent.
By 2035, Japan’s car exports to EU increase by nearly 51 % in this study. Because of significant NTB reductions by Japan in motors, the EU also increases its exports to Japan following the EUJEPA (+11.5 %).
Textiles, apparel and leather products benefit from the agreement as well. The industry is expected to increase its output by 2 % (EUR 7 billion) in the EU, with exports to Japan rising by 220 % (EUR 5 billion) in DG Trade (2018).
Impact of Brexit Brexit has a greater impact on Japan, as it reduces the economic benefits from EUJEPA by 14 % (EUR 1 billion) and 20 % in Ifo 2017 and Ifo 2018, respectively. This is the result of a smaller market size for Japanese companies following Brexit.
Impact of CPTPP-11 Ratification of the CPTPP-11 agreement between Japan and 10 Pacific countries may also affect gains from EUJEPA. This scenario is evaluated in Ifo 2018. Simulation results reveal that the conclusion of the agreement leads to slightly smaller positive gains for the EU and slightly higher real-income gains for Japan (from 0.308 % to 0.314 %) compared to the simple baseline scenario. CPTPP-11 is expected to reduce Japan’s costs of sourcing inputs from the Asia-Pacific, improving its competitiveness and trade with the EU.
pp44-45 1/Investment liberalisation and promotion ISDS is the mechanism preferred by Japan, one that it has also supported under the CPTPP-11. In the investment negotiations held during July 2018, chief negotiators from the EU and Japan acknowledged the convergence of positions on investment protection standards but not on investor-state dispute settlement.
2/US investigation into auto imports … In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce initiated a National Security Investigation into the import of automobiles and auto parts into the US. This investigation is motivated by Section 232 of US’s Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and will examine whether declining American domestic production in the automobile sector poses a threat to its national security by weakening the internal economy and reducing domestic research on advanced technologies. Given the deep value chains in the auto industry, EU and Japanese car producers would be significantly harmed if the investigation leads to an increase in duties on foreign vehicles entering the US market.
On 25 July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and US President Donald Trump announced plans to hold off on any new unilateral tariffs against each other as bilateral negotiations proceed on liberalising non-auto industrial goods, increasing EU imports of US soybeans and liquified natural gas (LNG), addressing WTO issues, reassessing US steel and aluminium tariffs and EU’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on US goods. The EU will therefore be shielded from the conclusions of the US auto investigations, unless ongoing negotiations are halted by either party.
4/Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) … In the EUJEPA, Japan provides TRQs for agri-foods such as whey products, malt, potato starch, fresh and processed cheeses. …
5/Japan’s future trade ties with the UK … during the transition period (March 2019 to end of 2020). The exact terms of EUJEPA would hence be applicable to the UK over this period. Their implementation will be crucial for Japan’s car manufacturers that collectively produce 800 000 vehicles in the UK, accounting for 50 % of the UK’s total annual production …

In Focus EU-Japan ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT | European Commission
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: texts of the agreement | European Commission
EU-Japan: A Partnership of Renewed Importance (w PDF) | Cristina de Esperanza Picardo @eucentresg
New EU-Japan economic, strategic partnership may work better than past efforts (07/19/2018) | Bastian Harth @ Asia Times
… The SPA lays out the first-ever framework between the EU and Japan for cooperation and dialogue across various bilateral, regional, and multilateral issues such as cybercrime, disaster management, energy security, climate change, and aging populations. It also calls on both sides to synergize on promoting peace, stability, and international prosperity, and to recede from a sectoral and segmented approach to a comprehensive and legally binding cooperation framework. …
Especially, cybersecurity is of enormous importance for Japan, given the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Millions of cyberattacks are predicted, and despite the country’s remarkable public safety… The topic is of such importance that Japan is even going to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. …

Brexit, a Catalyst for Closer EU-Japan Relations? (PDF) | Irina Angelescu
… Consequently, there is an implicit understanding from the Japanese side that the UK government “owes” special attention to Japanese interests, and should keep those interests in mind when negotiating Brexit. The former UK Ambassador to Japan, David Warren, indicated that some of his Japanese counterparts share a sense of “betrayal,” …
…three Japanese car manufacturers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) now make almost half of the 1.67 million cars produced in the UK. …
… GlaxoSmithKline Plc estimates that, in the next two-three years, it could incur costs as high as 70 million pounds ($98 million) of Brexit-related costs. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson estimated that it could face as many as 50,000 additional tests in the amount of 1 million pounds if there will be no post-Brexit mutual recognition of testing between the EU and the UK. AstroZeneca and MerkKGaA raised similar concerns. …
… Mitsubishi Bank UFJ picked Amsterdam as its base for EU securities operations, while Nomura Holdings, Daiwa Securities and Sumitomo Matsui Financial Group said they would move to Frankfurt. …
… Decisions such as that of Unilever – the UK’s third largest company to consolidate its HQ in the Netherlands and abandon the separate London HQ is just one recent example that has caused more unease among third parties about the outcome of Brexit. …
The Japanese position has remained consistent about its preferences for Brexit from the very beginning: no Brexit or the “softest” form of Brexit, with unhindered access to the European Single Market – preferably preceded by a very long transition period that would allow Japanese businesses to adapt to changes. …
… In particular, joint training and cooperation to address newer threats like cybersecurity or disinformation campaigns conducted by countries like Russia and China could prove to be mutually beneficial. In principle, the U.S. should also welcome the closer economic ties between the EU and Japan as a means to promote free trade worldwide. At the same time, the EU-Japan data protection agreement and certain provisions in the EU-Japan EPA such as Geographic Indicators (GIs) for agricultural products could negatively affect U.S. interests. …
EU-Japan partnership agreements herald new era of closer cooperation (29/01/2018) | Irina Angelescu @ European Council on Foreign Relations

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA): Good but Good Enough? (16/10/2018) | Axel Berkofsky @ ISPI
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – Responding to the Crisis of the Liberal World Order (PDF; 12/2017) | Axel Berkofsky @ University of Pavia, Italy & Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) (@ Bertelsmann Stiftung) You can check out Table 1 and Figure 2 (in this PDF).
The EU-Japan EPA/SPA and the ‘Abe Doctrine’: Reinforcing Norms Globally, Changing them Domestically (PDF; 07/2018) | Edward Danks @ European Institute for Asian Studies
JAPAN-EU COOPERATION IN THE ERA OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER TRANSFORMATION: IN SEARCH OF A STABLE WORLD SYSTEM (w PDFs; 28/11/2017) | INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (w PDFs) | Lords Select Committee, UK Parliament
EU-Japan Security Cooperation: trends and prospects (PDF; 07/03/2018) | The Royal Institute of International Affairs of Belgium & the University of Essex
EU-JAPAN – READY FOR A NEW STAGE IN RELATIONS? (PDF; Spring 2014) | Friends of Europe
The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A Framework To Promote Shared Values [International Agreements In Progress] (12/10/2018) | Enrico D’Ambrogio @ European Parliamentary Research
Largest Bilateral Free Trade Agreement: Japan, EU Conclude Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (18/07/2018) | Ankit Panda @ The Diplomat

〔Charts, Tables, etc.〕
EUJEPA MOFAjapan BenefitsTopProducts EU-JapanAve MFNdutiesEU servicesTrade wJapanEU FDIJapan outwardFDITradeFacilitationIndicator JapanEU ExImReduction EUtariffsComparison simulations Tab11Comparison simulations Tab11-2Comparison results Tab13